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1 Introduction 
It seems to be general knowledge that people tend to favor social groups they belong to 
(ingroups) over groups they do not belong to (outgroups). There have been many attempts to 
explain this ubiquitous phenomenon. Interestingly, most of the time the general image (i.e., 
the mental representation) of the outgroup has been considered in order to explain the better 
evaluation of ingroups relative to outgroups (i.e., ingroup bias) (e.g., Richards & Hewstone, 
2001). Consequently, research in this field engaged in trying to find possibilities to change 
mental representations of outgroups. Much less attention was paid to the fact that mental 
representations of ingroups might be of importance, too. As the judgment about any stimulus 
is made in relation to another stimulus, outgroups are evaluated in relation to ingroups 
(Mussweiler, 2003). Thus, it could be argued that mental ingroup representations are 
fundamental for ingroup bias to occur. This conclusion was the origin of the present thesis 
which aims at investigating in how far the nature of the ingroup representation influences 
intergroup evaluations.  
Intergroup evaluations are the outcome of a comparison process between groups. A basic 
theory dealing with intergroup comparisons is Self Categorization Theory (Turner, 1987). In 
accordance with Self Categorization Theory, the present line of research relies on the 
assumption that ingroup and outgroup members compare each other with respect to a higher 
order category which includes both ingroup and outgroup. Self Categorization Theory 
suggests that two groups compare each other with reference to the prototype of a higher order 
category because it provides a comparison standard. The better the fit of the ingroup to the 
superordinate category prototype relative to the fit of the outgroup to the superordinate 
category prototype, the better the evaluation of the ingroup relative to the outgroup.  
The phenomenon of ingroup bias implies that there is in general a better fit between 
ingroup and superordinate category standard than between outgroup and superordinate 
category standard. But why is the perceived fit most commonly better for ingroups than for 
outgroups? The Ingroup Projection Model suggests a convincing mechanism. In short, the 
Ingroup Projection Model (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999) assumes that ingroup members 
transfer the characteristic features of their group onto the superordinate category. As a 
consequence, the mental representation of the superordinate category is more similar to the 
mental representation of the ingroup than to the mental representation of the outgroup. That 
means that the ingroup is relatively more prototypical of the superordinate category. This 
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leads to a relatively better evaluation of the ingroup because the ingroup fits the standard 
provided by the prototype of the superordinate category better than the outgroup. The Ingroup 
Projection Model assumes that peoples’ motivation to enhance their positive self-image is 
causally related to ingroup projection (see, e.g., Wenzel, Mummendey, Weber, & Waldzus, 
2003). 
In contrast to this motivational understanding of ingroup projection, the Cognitive Model 
of Ingroup Projection by Meiser, Machunsky, and Mummendey (2005) proposes that 
primarily cognitive processes can be sufficient to elicit projection. The Cognitive Model 
assumes that group features are only generalized to the superordinate category to the extent 
that these features are represented in an abstract manner (i.e., prototype-based). Relying on 
Rosch’s research on basic categories (e.g., Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 
1976) the model suggests that people project group attributes onto higher order categories 
because higher order categories are less clearly defined and less available than lower order 
categories. That means that people rely on the representation of subordinate categories in 
order to generate the prototype of the superordinate category. From social cognition research 
it is well-known that the usage of abstract mental representations preserves cognitive 
resources (Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994; Sherman, 1996; for a review see Sherman, 
Macrae, & Bodenhausen, 2000). Thus, it can be concluded that the reason why people rely on 
abstract mental representations is primarily to characterize superordinate categories in a 
resource-saving manner.  
The described principle can be transferred into ingroup-outgroup contexts. In general, 
ingroup and outgroup representations are not fundamentally different. Both groups can be 
represented either in a prototype-based (i.e., abstract) or in an exemplar-based (i.e., more 
specific) manner (Park & Hastie, 1987; Smith & Zárate, 1990). However, which of both 
representation modes is predominant seems to depend on the content. In particular, it has been 
shown that ingroup representations are primarily abstract when positive attributes are 
concerned whereas outgroup representations are primarily abstract when negative attributes 
are concerned (e.g., Sherman, Klein, Laskey, & Wyer, 1998). Linking these assumptions, the 
Cognitive Model of Ingroup Projection suggests that concerning positively valued contents 
ingroup attributes instead of outgroup attributes are projected.  
In sum, the Cognitive Model of Ingroup Projection proposes that projection is a process 
which saves cognitive resources and can be understood as a by-product of more general 
cognitive processes. This approach suggests a new possibility to modify ingroup projection 
Introduction  9
 
processes. The possibilities for modification of projection will be the key question of the 
present thesis. Therefore, properties of prototype-based mental representations need to be 
identified in order to know what to manipulate to modify cognitive projection.  
It has been suggested that prototype-based representations are clearly related to 
homogeneity of group perceptions (Brewer & Harasty, 1997; Mullen, 1991). Quite obviously, 
a prototype is only a good summary of a category if there is not too much deviance around the 
mean (Park & Hastie, 1987; 1992; Park, Judd, & Ryan, 1991). Thus, if the perception of the 
ingroup is diversified this should diminish the extent to which the prototype of the ingroup is 
available or usable as a means to characterize the superordinate category. In other words, 
ingroup projection should be a function of perceived ingroup variability.  
Similarly, the concept of complexity of mental representations is related to prototype-
based representations. In the present thesis, complexity is understood as a combination of 
differentiation and integration (Locke, 2003; Rafaeli-Mor & Steinberg, 2002; Tetlock, 1983). 
Differentiation refers to the extend to which stimuli are distributed on multiple dimensions 
whereas integration refers to the formation of clusters of stimuli according to multi-
dimensional similarities. This definition also clarifies the difference between variability and 
complexity: Variability can be conceived as mere differentiation and complexity as 
differentiation and integration. Although it has to be acknowledged that complexity is a much 
wider concept than variability empirical evidence indicates that complex group 
representations are related to more perceived variability (Park & Judd, 1990; Park, Ryan, & 
Judd, 1992). 
Prototypes can be used in a heuristic manner (Sherman et al., 2000). That is, they are 
employed as rules of thumb (as opposed to precise conclusions) when making judgments 
about a category or its members. This implies that they are simple as opposed to complex. In 
other words, understanding prototypes as a heuristic tool to navigate through social reality 
means that prototypes need to be of little complexity.  
Apparently, prototypes, low levels of variability, and low levels of complexity go hand in 
hand. To conclude, relying on the Cognitive Model of Ingroup Projection, I hypothesize that 
ingroup projection is a function of both variability and complexity of the mental ingroup 
representation.  
The argument delineated so far holds that variability and complexity of mental ingroup 
representations determine projection tendencies such that more heterogeneous and complex 
ingroup representations are less easily projected compared to more homogeneous and simple 
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ingroup representations. However, complexity and variability might as well shape the 
projection process in a different manner. It is conceivable that even complex and variable 
ingroup representations are projected. That would imply that complexity and variability as a 
structural feature are projected onto the superordinate category, too. Hence, the superordinate 
category would also be characterized by the ingroup’s variability and complexity. But how 
could a variable and complex mental representation serve as a prescriptive standard for 
subordinate categories? It is the nature of standards that they are clear and unambiguous. 
Once they loose this quality they are not usable as standards anymore. Therefore, it is likely 
that ingroup prototypicality only predicts ingroup bias in the case of simple and homogeneous 
ingroup representations whereas this relation decreases the more the ingroup representation 
becomes complex and heterogeneous. 
The idea to alter cognitive representations of outgroups or superordinate categories in 
order to change intergroup evaluations has been investigated within several models. The 
Personalization Model (Brewer & Miller, 1988), for example, suggests that personalized 
contacts with outgroups reduces the salience and meaning of social categories in such a way 
that ingroup and outgroup members are not represented as two distinct entities anymore but as 
singular individuals. This decategorization process suggests that group lines are less used for 
evaluation. Similarly, the Common Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) 
stresses the role of mental representations inasmuch as a transformation of ingroup and 
outgroup into one inclusive category reduces ingroup bias. Through this recategorization 
process the former outgroup becomes part of an ingroup at a higher level of categorization 
and, therefore, the positive evaluation of the ingroup extends to the former outgroup.  
Furthermore, Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, and Weber (2003) successfully decreased 
ingroup projection tendencies by manipulating the mental representation of the superordinate 
category as either indefinable (Study 1) or complex (Study 2). Indefinable or complex 
representations of the superordinate category imply that many alternative subordinate 
category representations are fitting the standard of the superordinate category equally good 
and the ingroup cannot claim prototypicality for itself. Therefore, both manipulations led to a 
decrease in perceived ingroup prototypicality which was, as expected, correlated with less 
ingroup bias. The results of Waldzus et al. (2003) suggest that the alteration of mental 
category representations is a fruitful approach to change intergroup evaluations. 
To my knowledge, the possibility that modifications of mental ingroup representations 
might be effective means to change intergroup evaluation has never been considered. The 
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Cognitive Model of Ingroup Projection provides the theoretical background for the 
assumption developed here that projection tendencies or the relation between projection and 
intergroup evaluation might be a function of the complexity and variability of the mental 
ingroup representation.  
The following chapters investigate this proposition. This dissertation encompasses seven 
chapters. Because the Ingroup Projection Model represents the theoretical basis of the present 
line of research, it is introduced in more detail in the second chapter. Besides, the Cognitive 
Model of Ingroup Projection is discussed and some first empirical evidence for cognitive 
projection is presented.  
In the third chapter the literature on mental representations in terms of complexity and 
variability is reviewed. I argue that prototype representations, variability and complexity are 
clearly related. As the mode of mental representations in terms of prototypes and exemplars is 
a function of target group and trait valence, so should variability and complexity. In reviewing 
the relevant literature on category variability, I delineate the so-called outgroup homogeneity 
effect that reflects the usual finding that the ingroup is, relative to the outgroup, perceived as 
inherently more diverse and variable. However, some research suggests a convergence with 
the findings on abstract representations such that both the abstractness of mental 
representations and variability of mental representations are a function of target group and 
trait valence. Similarly, research on complexity seems to unambiguously show that ingroup 
representations are more complex than outgroup representations. However, I demonstrate that 
the conclusions from the complexity research are not that clear-cut as it seems at first glance. 
In a forth chapter I draw conclusions from the literature review and deduce the hypotheses of 
the present thesis. The theoretical part closes with an overview. 
The empirical section of this thesis is divided into two parts. In the first part (chapter 5), I 
report Experiment 1 and 2 in which complexity manipulations were used in order to 
manipulate mental ingroup representations. Furthermore, Experiment 2 focuses on the role of 
interindividual differences and their role in intergroup evaluations. In particular, Personal 
Need for Structure (PNS), which is a motivated cognition and refers to interindividual 
differences in the need to mentally structure (social) information (Neuberg & Newsome, 
1993), and diversity beliefs, which refer to the appreciation of diverse categories, were 
employed. Experiment 3 and 4, in which variability manipulations were employed, are 
presented in Part II (chapter 6). With distinctiveness threat, another motivated process is 
introduced in the second part. Distinctiveness threat signifies the phenomenon that groups 
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whose boundaries are not clearly defined react with ingroup bias (Jetten & Spears, 2003). 
Distinctiveness threat might be triggered if high levels of variability and complexity are 
induced. In chapter 7, the results are summarized and discussed. Limitations of the presented 
experiments and implications for further research are considered. 
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2 Models of ingroup projection  
2.1 The original Ingroup Projection Model  
The ubiquitous phenomenon that people favor ingroups over outgroups was and still is 
predominantly explained in terms of motivational factors. For example, Social Identity 
Theory (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979) assumes that biased intergroup evaluation serves the 
creation or maintenance of a positive (social) identity. Similarly, the more recent Ingroup 
Projection Model (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Wenzel et al., 2003), which has its roots in 
Social Identity Theory and Self Categorization Theory (Turner, 1987), supposes that ingroup 
members project typical ingroup features onto a superordinate category encompassing 
ingroup and outgroup in order to make the ingroup more prototypical of this superordinate 
category. According to Self Categorization Theory, the superordinate category provides the 
standards and norms for intergroup comparison, therefore, higher ingroup prototypicality 
leads to a better evaluation of the ingroup relative to the outgroup. In other words, people 
project features of their own ingroup onto the superordinate category so that the ingroup is 
more prototypical of the superordinate category in order to evaluate ingroups better than 
outgroups. In line with Social Identity Theory, the Ingroup Projection Model assumes that 
people are motivated to obtain a positive ingroup evaluation and that they instrumentally 
engage in ingroup projection to attain this goal. Wenzel et al. (2003) emphasized the 
motivational character of the Ingroup Projection Model as follows:  
This is the first assumption of SCT [Self Categorization Theory] on which 
Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) based their analysis: Ingroup and outgroup 
are evaluated in terms of their relative prototypicality for a salient inclusive 
self-category. A second relevant SCT assumption is “that self-categories 
tend to be evaluated positively” (Turner, 1987a, p. 57), which has its roots 
in SIT [Social Identity Theory] (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and its proposition 
that group members strive towards a positive social identity. Mummendey 
and Wenzel (1999) took these assumptions to the logical conclusion that 
group members would tend to perceive their own group as more 
prototypical for the inclusive category than the outgroup. (…) Because both 
groups want to be considered as the more (or not much less) prototypical 
subgroup, group members tend to perceive their own group’s attributes as 
relatively prototypical and thus project their ingroup’s attributes onto the 
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inclusive category. Through projection, each group tries to increase its 
relative social status. (p. 462) 
The Ingroup Projection Model was supported by research showing that the ingroup is 
perceived as more prototypical of a superordinate category relative to an outgroup (Waldzus, 
Mummendey, Wenzel, & Boettcher, 2004; Wenzel et al., 2003). A perspective divergence is 
the inevitable result if members of two groups belonging to the same superordinate category 
perceive their respective ingroup as relatively more prototypical than it is perceived by the 
outgroup. And indeed, Wenzel et al. (2003) demonstrated that two subgroups belonging to the 
same superordinate category disagree about each others prototypicality. Wenzel et al. (2003) 
assessed the perceived prototypicality of both psychology and business students. The results 
showed that psychology students perceive psychology students as more prototypical of 
students in general than did business students. In contrast, business students perceived 
business students as more prototypical of students in general than did psychology students.  
Two conditions have been specified which have to be met simultaneously for ingroup 
projection to occur: High ingroup identification and high superordinate category 
identification. Only if members are highly identified with their ingroup and, thus, have 
internalized group membership as an aspect of their identity, they are motivated to enhance 
their social identity. Consequently, only high ingroup identifiers should engage in ingroup 
projection. In addition, high superordinate category identification is a precondition for 
projection because without superordinate category identification the standard is of no 
normative relevance. In fact, research has shown that only dual identifiers (i.e., members who 
are highly identified with both the ingroup and the superordinate category) perceive the 
ingroup as relatively more prototypical of the superordinate category (Waldzus et al., 2003; 
Wenzel et al., 2003).  
From Self Categorization Theory, the Ingroup Projection Model adopted the assumption 
that the superordinate category provides standards for comparison. Hence, more perceived 
ingroup prototypicality should be related to more negative outgroup evaluations. Evidence for 
this reasoning has been provided by Waldzus and Mummendey (2004), Waldzus et al. (2003), 
and Wenzel et al. (2003). Similarly, perceived ingroup prototypicality predicts the 
legitimization of low outgroup status (Weber, Mummendey, & Waldzus, 2003). However, the 
positive relation between relative ingroup prototypicality and negative outgroup evaluations is 
limited to cases in which the superordinate category is valued positively and, thus, is a 
positive reference standard. If the reference standard (i.e., the superordinate category) has 
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negative valence, relative ingroup prototypicality should be related to more positive attitudes 
towards the outgroup. In such a case, where the ingroup fits a negative standard better than 
the outgroup the outgroup must be evaluated better. This hypothesis was confirmed by 
Wenzel et al. (2003, Study 3). The authors found that valence of the superordinate category 
significantly moderated the relation between relative ingroup prototypicality and outgroup 
evaluations.  
Convincing evidence that it is the mental representation of the ingroup that is projected 
onto the superordinate category was provided by Waldzus, Mummendey, and Wenzel (2005). 
Waldzus et al. (2005) demonstrated that the characterization of the superordinate category 
varied with the ingroup stereotype. In this study, the ingroup stereotype was manipulated by 
varying only the reference outgroup across experimental conditions while the ingroup was 
kept constant. Through this manipulation the distinctiveness of ingroup attributes varies with 
the respective reference outgroup. In particular, in one condition Germans (the ingroup) 
compared themselves with Italians; in the other condition Germans compared themselves with 
the British. The characterization of the superordinate category depended on the reference 
outgroup: Europeans were perceived as more orderly and disciplined when the reference 
outgroup were Italians whereas Europeans were perceived as more easygoing and sociable if 
the reference outgroup were the British. By adapting the mental representation of the 
superordinate category, ingroup members ensured their own relative prototypicality. 
As already outlined, for both the Ingroup Projection Model and the Common Ingroup 
Identity Model the representation of the superordinate category plays a crucial role. Yet, while 
the Common Ingroup Identity Model postulates that the inclusion of ingroup and outgroup in 
one higher order category dissolves ingroup favoritism, the Ingroup Projection Model argues 
that the inclusion of ingroup and outgroup in one superordinate category is precisely the 
condition in which ingroup favoritism should emerge. Meiser, Mummendey, and Waldzus 
(2004) suggested that these effects are moderated by the relevance of the superordinate 
category. A superordinate category is relevant if it completely encompasses ingroup and 
outgroup. Studies investigating the Ingroup Projection Model always used relevant 
superordinate categories. So, for example, all Germans (ingroup) and all Poles (outgroup) 
exhaustively belong to the superordinate category of Europeans. In contrast, the Common 
Ingroup Identity Model employed cross-cutting categories like, for example, Democrats and 
Republicans belonging to the same superordinate category of “participants” in an 
experimental study. Obviously, not all Democrats and Republicans belong to the 
superordinate category of participants in an experimental study. In addition to the structure of 
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the intergroup setting, relevance is determined by the content of intergroup comparison. A 
superordinate category is relevant to the extent that social categorization and the content of 
the intergroup scenario correspond. The authors found evidence that highly relevant inclusive 
categories produce ingroup bias (Ingroup Projection Model) whereas categories of low 
relevance lead to an improvement in intergroup evaluations (Common Ingroup Identity 
Model). 
As the superordinate category is fundamental for intergroup evaluations, the authors of 
the Ingroup Projection Model modified the mental representation of the superordinate 
category in order to increase tolerance. Waldzus and colleagues (2003) suggested that if the 
superordinate category is indefinable (Study 1) or complex (Study 2) neither subgroup could 
claim to be more prototypical. The results confirmed the hypothesis: Manipulations of 
undefineability and complexity led to a decrease in perceived ingroup prototypicality which 
was, as expected, correlated with better outgroup evaluations. However, considering the path 
model in the 2003 study in more detail, there was no total effect of complexity on outgroup 
evaluations. That is, regressing outgroup evaluations on experimental manipulation 
(complexity versus simplicity condition and definable versus indefinable condition, 
respectively) did not show the expected increase in outgroup evaluations. Recently, Waldzus 
et al. (2005) could provide evidence for a main effect of complexity manipulations on 
outgroup evaluations such that more complex superordinate category representations are 
related to more positive outgroup evaluations. This main effect was clearly mediated by the 
perception of ingroup prototypicality. Still, further research seems necessary to clarify when 
and when not direct effects from complexity to outgroup evaluation can be expected.  
The review of the relevant research on the Ingroup Projection Model should have 
contributed to the understanding of mental group representations as fundamental for 
intergroup evaluations. Especially the research by Meiser et al. (2004) and Waldzus et al. 
(2003, 2005) corroborates that the mental representation of the intergroup setting is essential 
for projection and evaluation. 
2.2 Mental representation as cognitive basis of ingroup projection 
The Cognitive Model of Ingroup Projection emphasizes the role of mental group 
representations for intergroup evaluations and suggests a more cognitive mechanism of 
ingroup projection. More precisely, it assumes that mental representations of ingroup and 
outgroup (as opposed to the superordinate category representation) play a major role for 
projection and intergroup evaluations. Derived from this assumption, the present thesis 
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investigates the hypothesis that the mental representation of the ingroup leads to changes in 
the projection and evaluation process. Before the Cognitive Model of Ingroup Projection and 
the theoretical ideas of the present thesis are introduced in more detail, I review some relevant 
research on mental representations of social categories. 
Cognitive and social psychological theories of category acquisition and representation 
distinguish abstraction or prototype-based processes from a representation on the basis of 
exemplars (see, e.g., Medin, Altom, & Murphy, 1984; Smith & Zárate, 1990). Prototype 
models assume that information about a group is stored as a sort of vector that captures the 
relevant information about a group. Exemplar models, in contrast, assume that exemplars of a 
category are stored and that a sample of exemplars is retrieved from memory once a judgment 
is required. It has been suggested that exemplar-based representations and abstract 
representations coexist (see also Judd & Park, 1988; Park & Hastie, 1987; Smith & Zárate, 
1990). That is, some groups might be represented in one mode, other groups in the other 
mode. Furthermore, the same group might be represented exemplar-based with regard to one 
content and prototype-based with regard to another content.  
Several fields of research indicate that ingroup and outgroup information are represented 
differently in long-term memory. Research on attributions within an intergroup context 
revealed that positive behaviors of ingroup members and negative behaviors of outgroup 
members are explained in terms of internal causality (i.e., the person’s personality), stability 
over time and controllability by the acting person whereas negative behaviors of ingroup 
members and positive behaviors of outgroup members are explained in terms of external 
causality (i.e., the situation), variability over time and a cause which is not under the control 
of the acting person (ultimate attribution error; Islam & Hewstone, 1993; Pettigrew, 1979). 
Likewise, research on the linguistic intergroup bias (e.g., Maass, Salvi, Arcuri, & Semin, 
1989) has shown that in order to describe positive behaviors of the ingroup and negative 
behaviors of the outgroup, people use more abstract terms compared to descriptions of 
negative behaviors of the ingroup and positive behaviors of the outgroup. This indicates that 
the former behaviors are encoded in a more generalized, trait-like form compared to the latter. 
Finally, Otten and Moskowitz (2000) demonstrated that participants spontaneously infer traits 
from behaviors only in the case of positive ingroup information but not negative ingroup or 
positive outgroup information. Thus, again positive ingroup information is encoded in a more 
abstract manner as compared to positive outgroup or negative ingroup information.  
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Most direct evidence for the assumption of different storage modes depending on the 
ingroup-outgroup distinction and valence stems from research by Sherman et al. (1998) who 
used a task facilitation paradigm to assess abstract, prototype-based representations as 
opposed to singular, exemplar-based representations of social information. The participants of 
Sherman and collaborators (1998) were assigned to two novel, arbitrary, minimally important 
groups following the procedure of the minimal group paradigm by Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, and 
Flament (1971). Thereafter, participants read either positive or negative trait-relevant 
behaviors of ingroup and outgroup members and afterwards had to perform two tasks in 
succession. The first task that required participants to make a judgment whether a trait was 
describing the group (e.g., “Does the word intelligent describes group A?”), facilitated the 
second task which required participants to recall a specific trait-relevant behavior (e.g., 
“Remember a specific incident in which a member of group A behaved in an intelligent 
manner.”). However, the facilitation in terms of reaction times only occurred when the mental 
representation of the respective group was exemplar-based because only then the judgment 
task already activated knowledge about specific exemplars relevant for the recall task. In 
contrast, when the group was represented prototype-based the first task activated abstract trait 
knowledge which did not activate specific exemplars and, thus, no relevant knowledge for the 
recall task. Sherman et al.’s (1998) results confirmed the expectation that positive ingroup and 
negative outgroup behaviors are stored in an abstract prototype-based representation, whereas 
negative ingroup and positive outgroup behaviors are stored in an exemplar-based 
representation.  
To summarize, research provided convergent evidence that positive ingroup and negative 
outgroup information is represented in an abstract manner, whereas negative ingroup 
information and positive outgroup information is stored on the basis of exemplars. 
2.3 The Cognitive Model of Ingroup Projection 
According to the Ingroup Projection Model, two groups compare each other with respect 
to the prototype of a higher order category. As Rosch et al. (1976) have demonstrated, higher 
order categories are less clearly defined than so-called basic categories and are less readily 
available. Thus, if members of two groups compare each other on the basis of a superordinate 
category they first have to generate a representation of this more inclusive category. The 
Cognitive Model of Ingroup Projection assumes that group members generate a prototype of a 
superordinate category by means of heuristic, resource-saving processes. Research has 
suggested that prototype-based representations are very efficient and resource preserving 
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(Macrae et al., 1994; Sherman, 1996). It is proposed that people use prototype-based 
representations of more basic categories and project these onto the superordinate category to 
form a mental image of that category. Concerning positive contents, it is the abstract mental 
representation of the ingroup that is available and, thus, used to characterize the superordinate 
category. Thereby, the phenomenon of ingroup projection may result from largely cognitive 
processes. Concerning negative contents on the other hand, an abstract mental representation 
of the outgroup is accessible and can be used in order to characterize the superordinate 
category. In these cases, the relations reverse such that less ingroup prototypicality leads to 
more ingroup bias. 
Two experiments provided evidence for the Cognitive Model of Ingroup Projection. A 
first experiment demonstrated that people heuristically use prototype information to 
characterize the superordinate category. A category learning paradigm was employed. 
Participants were asked to build an impression of two artificial groups which supposedly had 
been identified by recent psychological research. Participants were told that one group’s 
performance improved in cognitive tasks if there was high pitch background noise, the other 
group’s performance improved if there was a low pitch background noise. However, both 
groups were introduced to belong to an inclusive superordinate category whose performance 
improves under background noise (as opposed to a group whose performance degrades under 
background noise). Importantly, the participants themselves were not categorized to preclude 
any motivational concerns in this paradigm. In principle, both groups were characterized by 
three traits which were reflected in behavioral descriptions. To learn about the groups, 
participants read trait-relevant behaviors of members of both groups in the same way (i.e., 
“Peter, member of the group ‘improved performance under high pitch background noise’, 
helped an old lady to cross the street”).  
In order to manipulate mental representations in terms of exemplars and prototypes, trait 
information was provided for one group before participants learned about the specific 
behaviors. Trait information summarizes relevant information and is related to prototype-
based representation of social categories (for a similar procedure see, e.g., Park & Hastie, 
1987). After the impression formation task participants indicated how prototypical each group 
was of the superordinate category of performance improvers under background noise. As 
predicted, the group for which a prototype-based representation was induced was perceived to 
be significantly more prototypical of the superordinate category (t(39) = 2.45, p < .05). The 
results are illustrated in Figure 1a.  
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Figure 1a, b. Perceived prototypicality of the superordinate category as a function of mode of 
mental representation (Experiment 1, 2).  
A second experiment replicated these results with a slightly different procedure. Instead 
of providing trait information prior to the presentation of behavioral information, the 
prototype was induced by presenting three times more trait-relevant behaviors in the 
prototype-group as compared to the exemplar-group because higher numbers of trait-relevant 
behaviors facilitate the formation of abstract information (for a similar procedure see Klein, 
Loftus, Trafton, & Fuhrmann, 1992). Again, the group that was represented prototype-based 
was perceived to be more prototypical of the superordinate category as compared to the group 
that was represented exemplar-based (t(35) = 3.11, p < .01, see Figure 1b). Apparently, 
participants used information from the prototype-based representation of one subgroup in a 
heuristic fashion to define the superordinate category. These two studies provided convergent 
evidence for the notion that subgroup features are projected onto superordinate categories to 
the extent that the features are represented prototype-based. However, it still needs to be 
demonstrated how prototype-projection relates to evaluation. A critical test would include 
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both positive and negative behavioral information to demonstrate that group prototypicality is 
related to better evaluation concerning positive information whereas group prototypicality is 
related to worse evaluation concerning negative information.  
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3 Complexity and variability of mental representation 
The present thesis relies on the Cognitive Model of Ingroup Projection with the focus on 
alterations of projection and evaluation processes concerning positive group characteristics. 
Concerning positive characteristics, the Cognitive Model of Ingroup Projection predicts that it 
is the easily available, abstract mental representation of the ingroup (i.e., the ingroup 
prototype) that is projected onto the superordinate category. Furthermore, at the level of the 
superordinate category, the projected ingroup prototype serves as a comparison standard 
which necessarily leads to a better match between ingroup and superordinate category than 
between outgroup and superordinate category, and, finally, to a better evaluation of the 
ingroup relative to the outgroup. Therefore, it seems very likely that alterations of the ingroup 
representation are highly effective for modifications of projection and evaluation processes. In 
particular, I hypothesize that conditions that interfere with or facilitate the availability of an 
ingroup prototype should decrease or increase projection, respectively. Thus, the properties of 
prototype-based representations need to be identified.  
It has been argued that prototype representations go together with restricted variability 
perceptions (Brewer & Harasty, 1997; Mullen, 1991; Ford & Stangor, 1992). Similarly, Park 
and Hastie (1987) demonstrated that stereotypes (i.e., prototypes) are only useful and 
diagnostic to the extent that the deviance around the mean is small. Therefore, projection 
should not only depend on prototype-based representations but should be a function of 
perceived variability, too.  
Next to variability I suggest that complexity is negatively related to the abstractness of 
mental representations. As will be outlined later, complexity consists of two components, 
namely differentiation and integration (Locke, 2003; Rafaeli-Mor & Steinberg, 2002; Tetlock, 
1983). Differentiation signifies the discrimination of stimuli within a category whereas 
integration denotes the formation of clusters of these stimuli according to multi-dimensional 
similarities. Similar to the previous argument concerning the relation between variability and 
prototypes, I suggest that a prototype can only be used in a heuristic manner if the prototype is 
of little complexity.  
In conclusion, prototypes, variability, and complexity are clearly related although they 
are different constructs. Changes in variability and complexity should therefore affect 
projection given that projection is a function of prototype accessibility (as suggested by the 
Cognitive Model of Ingroup Projection). Since the change of mental ingroup representations 
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in terms of variability and complexity is a major concern of the present thesis, I briefly review 
the literature concerning mental representations with the focus on variability and complexity. 
Because I argue that variability, complexity, and abstractness of mental representation are 
clearly related, it is of major interest whether variability and complexity are functions of trait 
valence and target group as is the case for the abstractness of mental representations. 
However, an alternative process is conceivable. This second hypothesis involves the 
mental representation of the superordinate category. I discuss the possibility that complexity 
and variability of the ingroup are projected onto the superordinate category as structural 
features. From previous literature I derive the hypothesis that this has consequences for the 
usability of the superordinate category representation as a prescriptive standard.  
3.1 Variability of ingroup and outgroup representations 
Variability refers to the dispersion of category elements on multiple dimensions. 
Perceived variability of groups was measured with a number of different methods. Park and 
Judd (1990) analyzed the different measurement methods and extracted two intercorrelated 
factors, stereotypicality and dispersion. Stereotypicality was assessed with a rating of how 
many members out of a hundred show stereotypical and counterstereotypical attributes. 
Dispersion was assessed with a distribution of members on stereotypic and counterstereotypic 
attributes from which a standard deviation was calculated. A range measure in which 
participants marked the two most extreme members of a target group on several dimensions 
also belonged to the dispersion measures. A global similarity measure asking for the overall 
similarity of group members loaded on both factors.  
Regarding perceived group variability, the outgroup homogeneity effect is probably one 
of the best investigated phenomena in social psychology (Voci, 2000) and seems to be in 
contradiction with the reasoning of the present thesis at first glance. The outgroup 
homogeneity effect describes the tendency to perceive a group one does not belong to as more 
homogeneous than a group one is member of (Judd & Park, 1988; Linville, Fischer, & Salvoy, 
1989; Park & Rothbart, 1982; Quattrone & Jones, 1980). The social cognition literature 
provided convergent evidence for the outgroup homogeneity effect although there is much 
less agreement concerning the underlying causes. Linville et al. (1989) proposed that this 
effect is based on higher familiarity with the ingroup. Their model relies on an exemplar-
based model of mental group representation. In contrast, Park and Judd (Judd & Park, 1988; 
Park & Judd, 1990; Park et al., 1991) proposed a dual-storage model. This model suggests 
that information about a group is primarily stored in the form of abstract summaries. 
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Regarding the outgroup, judgments of variability are only based on the abstract 
representation. In contrast, for judgments about the ingroup additional exemplar information 
is used. The additional information regarding the ingroup leads to relatively more perceived 
variability. Both models share the assumption that the outgroup homogeneity effect depends 
on retrieval processes. 
This social cognition line of research can be contrasted with research that showed that the 
outgroup homogeneity effect is not a global effect. Indeed, other researchers demonstrated 
that the effect depends very much on contextual features (Castano & Yzerbyt, 1998; Haslam, 
Oakes, Turner, & McGarty, 1995; Rothgerber, 1997; Simon, 1992a; Simon & Mummendey, 
1990; Simon & Pettigrew, 1990). One of the most influencing variables is the minority-
majority context: If the ingroup forms a minority in relation to an outgroup the effect reverses 
and the ingroup is perceived as more homogeneous than the outgroup (e.g., Mullen & Hu, 
1989; Simon & Brown, 1987). Other variables influencing the outgroup homogeneity effect 
are status (Brauer, 2001; Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1998), absence or presence of comparative context 
(Castano & Yzerbyt, 1998; Haslam et al., 1995), reference to the individual self (Park & Judd, 
1990) and the attribute dimensions in terms of relevance and valence (Haslam et al., 1995). 
Given the heterogeneity of results Voci (2000) concluded that the occurrence of the outgroup 
homogeneity effect is frequent but not general (see also Mullen & Hu, 1989; Ostrom & 
Sedikides, 1992). 
In order to dissolve the inconsistent effects concerning the outgroup homogeneity effect, 
researchers have looked for moderators. An interesting moderator of homogeneity which 
matches very well the research on the linguistic intergroup bias, spontaneous trait inferences, 
intergroup attributions, and Sherman et al.’s (1998) work with the task-facilitation paradigm 
was suggested by Haslam and collaborators (1995). They found an ingroup homogeneity 
effect when the judgment was made on positive traits whereas a traditional outgroup 
homogeneity effect emerged when the judgment was made on negative traits. Similarly, 
Ostrom and Sedikides (1992) reasoned that the outgroup homogeneity effect might even 
reverse to an ingroup homogeneity effect if only positive traits are used to assess the 
perceived variability of the ingroup and the outgroup (see Simon, 1992b, for a similar 
reasoning).  
Apparently, as the mode of representation in terms of prototypes and exemplars 
perceived homogeneity is a function of both target group and trait valence. In particular, the 
Cognitive Model of Ingroup Projection proposes that positive ingroup and negative outgroup 
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attributes are represented abstraction-based whereas negative ingroup and positive outgroup 
attributes are represented on the basis of exemplars. Similarly, research by Haslam et al. 
(1995) on variability has shown that the pattern of variability in the 2 × 2 matrix of ingroup 
versus outgroup and positive versus negative attributes matches the prototype versus exemplar 
distribution such that in the positive ingroup and negative outgroup cells the perceived 
variability is more limited than in the negative ingroup and positive outgroup cells (see Table 
1). This substantiates the reasoning that the abstractness of mental representation goes hand in 
hand with restricted variability perceptions. 
Table 1. Variability and abstractness of mental representation as a function of trait valence 
and target group. 
  Trait valence 
  Positive Negative 
Ingroup Prototype 
Low variability 
Exemplar 
High variability 
Target group 
Outgroup Exemplar 
High variability 
Prototype 
Low variability 
 
3.2 Complexity of ingroup and outgroup representations 
Complexity has been a topic in social psychology since decades. As diverse as the 
definition of complexity in different sciences is the definition within different sub-disciplines 
of social psychology. In the 1950s, a complexity-simplicity scale (Berkowitz, 1957) measured 
a construct of interindividual differences which closely resembles what we call Personal Need 
for Structure (Thompson, Naccarato, Parker, & Moskowitz, 2001) or Need for Closure 
(Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) nowadays. In contrast to this trait conception of complexity, 
Linville (1982) presented complexity as a domain specific issue. In this view, people can have 
complex knowledge structures regarding one category or set of stimuli but rather simple 
knowledge structures regarding another category or set of stimuli. Linville (1982) defined 
complexity as the number of different aspects or features which are used to characterize a 
stimulus set and the semantic differences among them (see also Judd & Lusk, 1984; Linville 
& Jones, 1980).  
Like Linville, most studies in social psychology used card sorting tasks and Scott’s H to 
measure the complexity of the cognitive representation of a category (Brewer & Lui, 1984; 
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Linville, 1985, 1987; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993; Niedenthal, Setterlund, & Wherry, 1992). 
For example, Neuberg and Newsom (1993) asked participants to sort 33 index cards that 
contained trait words on the basis of how they were related to elderly people. Furthermore, 
participants were to sort the cards into groups based on similarities. Participants could use as 
many cards as they wanted and could also use traits more than once. From this sorting H was 
calculated which increases with the number of traits used, the number of subgroups formed 
and the number of times the same trait was used for different subgroups. 1
Originally, Scott’s H was a measure of unpredictability which was derived from 
information theory (Locke, 2003). A response conveys more information the more 
unpredictable it is. This is the most critical point about H: Randomness in assignment of 
features to subgroups leads to an artificial increase in H expressing chaos and complete 
unpredictability (Scott, 1962), but randomness should be the opposite of complexity. 
In order to understand the measurement problem of Scott’s H, the definition of 
complexity needs to be considered once again. Although there was only little consensus about 
how to define complexity (Locke, 2003; Rafaeli-Mor & Steinberg, 2002), most authors refer 
to a combination of differentiation and integration (see e.g., Tetlock, 1983). Differentiation 
and integration was defined by Suedfeld, Tetlock, and Steufert (1992) as followed: 
Differentiation refers to the perception of different dimensions within a 
stimulus domain, and to the taking of different perspectives when 
considering the domain. It is a necessary but not sufficient prerequisite for 
integration, which is the development of conceptual connections among 
differentiated dimensions or perspectives. (p. 393) 
                                                 
1 H =   whereby n is the total number of attributes and nnnnn i
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i
i /)log(log 2
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− i is the number of 
attributes that appear in a given response category, ∑= .inn  C is the number of possible response 
categories. C is determined by R which is the number of subgroups formed, C = 2R. So for example, if 
participants are asked to sort traits into two groups, Group A and Group B, four response categories 
are possible. Participants can sort a trait into either Group A (C1), Group B (C2), Group A and Group 
B (C3) or neither group (C4). Thus, n1 is the number of traits sorted into response category C1, n2 is the 
number of traits sorted into response category C2 etc.  
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Locke (2003) also defined complexity by the two components of differentiation and 
integration. According to him, differentiation is to distinguish elements within a stimulus 
domain and integration is to link or organize the differentiated elements. These definitions 
clarify the problem of Scott’s H: H increases with differentiation but tends to decrease with 
integration (Locke, 2003). Therefore, H is a suitable measure for differentiation as long as no 
integration is encouraged.  
If Linville’s (1982) definition of complexity is reconsidered, it becomes clear that the 
focus on the number of features which are used to describe a category emphasized 
differentiation whereas integration is neglected. Therefore, Scott’s H might be a suitable 
measure for her work. However, in the present thesis both components should be considered. 
Moreover, I suggest that the two component-definition of complexity makes it possible to 
distinguish the concepts of variability and complexity. I suggest that a set of stimuli is 
variable if its components are highly differentiated. If these stimuli are also integrated, the set 
of stimuli is variable as well as complex. In other words, complexity refers to the formation of 
meaningful clusters among stimuli which have been recognized as highly differentiated on 
multiple dimensions. As variability includes only one step, it is the more parsimonious 
concept. 
This definition of complexity has obviously a structural similarity to the formation of 
subgroups within a social category (Brewer & Lui, 1984; Brewer & Miller, 1988; Park et al., 
1991; Richards & Hewstone, 2001). Subgrouping is a process which has been identified by 
the stereotyping literature and refers to the mental organization of information about a group 
into several clusters of individuals who are similar to one another in some way and different 
from members of other subgroups (Maurer, Park, & Rothbart, 1995). A subgroup can contain 
stereotype-consistent and -inconsistent members at the same time. Importantly, all subgroups 
still belong to the category as a whole. So, for example, the group of psychologists can be 
divided into subgroups of scientists, therapists, work psychologists, consultants etc. Less 
typical examples like consultants are still perceived as psychologists which leads to an 
increase in complexity. Because complexity and variability are related constructs, 
subgrouping also leads to an increase in perceived variability. As a result, the stereotypic 
perception of group members decreases (Park & Judd, 1990; Park et al., 1992). Therefore, 
subgrouping is conceived of as a process that weakens existing stereotypes and has the 
potential for stereotype change (Richards & Hewstone, 2001).  
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In contrast to subgrouping, subtyping is a process that serves stereotype conservation 
(Hewstone, Hassebrauck, Wirth, & Waenke, 2000; Johnston & Hewstone, 1992; Rothbart & 
John, 1985; Weber & Crocker, 1983). Subtyping is defined as the process by which 
stereotype-inconsistent group members are mentally excluded from the rest of the group 
(Maurer et al., 1995). The “refencing” process described by Allport (1954) refers to the same 
idea. Think for example about mathematically talented women. As they do not fit the overall 
stereotype about women they are conceived as more man-like and their female features are 
denied. As a consequence they are mentally excluded from the group of women, which 
simplifies the mental representation of women.  
Weber and Crocker (1983) were the first who experimentally investigated subtyping. 
They showed that stereotype-inconsistent information that is concentrated within a few group 
members leads to the mental exclusion of these disconfirming members, leaves the stereotype 
of the remaining group relatively unchanged and still lets the group appear homogeneous (for 
similar results, see Johnston & Hewstone, 1992). In terms of the definition of complexity, 
differentiation of stimuli only takes place on the basis of the consistency-inconsistency 
dichotomy. Thus, in the process of integration, only two clusters are formed: One cluster 
contains the inconsistent stimuli, the other cluster contains the consistent stimuli. 
Furthermore, after the exclusion of inconsistent stimuli, only the consistent stimuli remain to 
represent the category. The remaining stimuli are necessarily neither very differentiated (all 
stimuli are consistent) nor are they integrated in more than one sub-cluster. Although this is a 
very ideal description of subtyping, it should have exemplified the process. To conclude, the 
process of subtyping leads to a reduction of complexity. 
Several studies compared subgrouping and subtyping directly and confirmed that 
subgrouping and subtyping have the predicted opposite effects on perceived homo- and 
heterogeneity of groups (Maurer et al., 1995; Park, Wolsko, & Judd, 2001; for a review, see 
Richards & Hewstone, 2001). Sophisticated models have been developed in order to specify 
the relation between subgroups and perceived variability. Kraus, Ryan, Judd, Hastie, and Park 
(1993) proposed that perceivers create mental distributions when observing behaviors of 
group members. From these mental distributions they deduce the central tendency and 
variability of a group when judgment is required. The authors reasoned that the higher the 
resolution of the distribution in terms of subgroups, the more variability is perceived within a 
group. Similarly, Park and Judd (1990) showed that a higher number of generated self-
subgroups goes hand in hand with an increase in variability perceptions. Moreover, more 
subgroups were generated for the ingroup than for the outgroup (Park & Judd, 1990, 
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Experiment 2). Park et al. (1992) showed that outgroup homogeneity (i.e., low perceived 
outgroup variability relative to high perceived ingroup variability) is mediated by the larger 
number of subgroups generated for the ingroup relative to the outgroup. These results 
demonstrated two things: Firstly, complexity and variability of social categories are strongly 
interwoven constructs although complexity is a wider concept. Secondly, the mental 
representation of ingroups seems to be more complex than the mental representation of 
outgroups. 
Although the reported research converges such that ingroup representations are 
represented by more subgroups and are therefore more complex than outgroup 
representations, it can be questioned whether this effect is as general as it appears to be. To 
my knowledge subgrouping for ingroups and outgroups has never been controlled for trait 
valence. Furthermore, Kraus et al. (1993) found that participants construed significantly more 
subgroups on counterstereotypic dimensions. Assuming that stereotypicality in an ingroup-
outgroup context is related to the valence of the considered dimensions, the results of Kraus et 
al. (1993) might suggest that participants have more complex ingroup representations if 
negative traits are concerned and more complex outgroup representations if positive traits are 
concerned. But certainly more research is needed in this field to come to a conclusion. 
3.3 The effects of ingroup variability and complexity on superordinate category 
representation 
So far, I have focused on mental ingroup and outgroup representations. Relying on the 
Cognitive Model of Ingroup Projection that suggests that features of subordinate groups are 
projected to the extent that they are represented prototype-based, I looked for properties of 
prototype-based representations because modifications of these properties should change the 
abstractness of the mental representation and, thus, the projection process. I identified low 
levels of complexity and variability as two properties of abstract, prototype-based mental 
representations. Therefore, changes in complexity or variability of mental ingroup 
representations should affect the magnitude of the projection of ingroup features.  
However, in addition to the outlined process concerning the magnitude of projection, a 
second process is conceivable when complexity or variability of the mental ingroup 
representation is changed. Judd and Park (1988) argued that variability information, as 
information about the central tendency, might be represented in an abstract form. Abstract 
variability information about a social category might be imagined as a tag that is fixed to the 
category and contains the relevant information concerning variability. Thus, variability or 
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complexity is not deduced from the distribution of category members any time a judgment is 
needed. Instead, complexity and variability information are stored in an abstract manner and 
are readily available when judgment is needed. So what if this abstract tag is also projected 
onto the superordinate category as any other feature? If complexity or variability information 
is projected onto the superordinate category as a structural feature the question of 
consequences of more or less complex or variable superordinate category representations 
arises. The projection of variability and complexity information onto the superordinate 
category should influence the way the prototype of the superordinate category is used as a 
standard for judgment of subordinate groups. 
Some insights of how variability or complexity of judgmental standards might influence 
evaluation derive from research on intragroup processes. Hogg, Cooper-Shaw, and Holzworth 
(1993) showed that prototypicality serves as a basis for liking only among those ingroup 
members who perceived the group as cohesive and having a clear prototype. Thus, the 
ingroup prototype as a reference for evaluation of ingroup members was useless if the group 
was not homogeneous. Transferring this result to the domain of intergroup processes means 
that only a superordinate category with a prototype of little complexity and variability 
provides comparison standards which can be used for judgment. Interestingly, already 
Waldzus et al. (2003) mentioned the possibility that concerning variability “different 
representations can affect the extent to which a category prototype is used as a prescriptive 
standard for prototypicality and attractiveness judgments” (p. 32). Though Waldzus et al. 
(2003) mentioned this possibility, it was not tested.  
Because only a clearly defined ingroup prototype should serve as a prescriptive standard 
at the level of the superordinate category, I expect that relative ingroup prototypicality is a 
strong predictor of ingroup bias only if the mental representation of the ingroup is of little 
complexity and variability, respectively. In more technical terms, variability and complexity 
of the ingroup representation interacts with relative ingroup prototypicality and ingroup bias 
such that the predicted relation between relative ingroup prototypicality and ingroup bias only 
occurs if the ingroup and, thus, the superordinate category is of little complexity or variability.  
3.4 Conclusion 
It has been shown that on positive traits the ingroup is perceived as more homogeneous 
than the outgroup (Haslam et al., 1995). The dependence of perceived variability on trait 
valence and target group matches the cited literature on the linguistic intergroup bias, 
spontaneous trait inference, intergroup attributions and the results of Sherman et al. (1998) in 
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showing that perceived variability decreases on positive traits when rating the ingroup and on 
negative traits when rating the outgroup. Thus, considering the results of Haslam et al. (1995) 
as well as other research (e.g., Simon & Brown, 1987) it can be concluded that the well-
known outgroup-homogeneity effect is not as stable as it appears at first glance.  
Complexity is defined by differentiation and integration. Within the stereotyping 
literature two processes have been identified which I consider to be related to complexity: 
Subgrouping is related to higher levels of complexity whereas subtyping is related to lower 
levels of complexity. Although complexity is a broader concept, it is clearly related to 
variability perceptions. Research on complexity converges such that the ingroup is perceived 
as relatively complex compared to the outgroup. But to my knowledge research on 
complexity did never control for the contents of judgment (i.e., trait valence). It is conceivable 
that complexity of mental representations is a function of trait valence and target group, too. 
Finally, I have reasoned that complexity and variability of the ingroup representation 
might affect complexity and variability of the superordinate category representation. At the 
level of the superordinate category, complexity and variability influences the extent to which 
the superordinate category prototype is usable as a prescriptive standard for intergroup 
evaluations because standards should be clear and homogeneous to fulfill their functions for 
judgments.  
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4 The role of complexity and variability of the ingroup representation for 
projection and evaluation  
The Cognitive Model of Ingroup Projection assumes that ingroup features are projected 
to the extent that they are represented in a prototype-based manner. Accordingly, projection is 
a function of mental representation in terms of prototypes versus exemplars. I have argued so 
far that prototype representations, variability, and complexity are clearly related constructs. 
The reviewed literature and logical considerations amount to the conclusion that the 
projection of group features is a function of the complexity and variability, respectively, of 
the mental group representation, too. Thus, a first hypothesis concerns the magnitude of 
ingroup projection. 
The second hypothesis relies on the idea that complexity and variability information is 
projected as a structural feature onto the superordinate category. This idea stems from the 
suggestion that variability information might be stored in an abstract manner (Judd & Park, 
1988). From research on intragroup processes (Hogg et al., 1993) it was deduced that category 
representations can only serve as prescriptive standards to the extent that a clear prototype is 
available. Linking these assumptions, changing mental ingroup representations in terms of 
complexity and variability should change the superordinate category representation in terms 
of variability and complexity and accordingly the suitability of the superordinate category as a 
prescriptive standard. As superordinate category representations only serve as prescriptive 
standards if they are of little complexity and variability, relative ingroup prototypicality 
should be related to ingroup bias only if the mental representation of the ingroup is of little 
complexity and variability. Thus, a second hypothesis specifies the conditions under which a 
link between prototypicality and ingroup bias should occur. 
Previous approaches (Waldzus et al., 2003, 2005) directly manipulated the superordinate 
category representation in order to change the projection process and, thus, the comparison 
standard itself. The present research in contrast manipulated the representation of the ingroup 
and, therefore, the starting point of projection. I expect that high levels of complexity and 
variability decrease relative ingroup prototypicality and/or weaken the link between relative 
ingroup prototypicality and ingroup bias whereas low levels of complexity and variability 
increase relative ingroup prototypicality and/or strengthen the link between relative ingroup 
prototypicality and ingroup bias. In statistical terms, the first hypothesis relates to a main 
effect of variability and complexity on the magnitude of relative ingroup prototypicality 
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whereas the second hypothesis relates to an interaction effect in which the relation between 
relative ingroup prototypicality and ingroup bias is moderated by complexity and variability 
of the mental ingroup representation.  
Both hypotheses are not necessarily exclusive. Theoretically and statistically they can 
occur in parallel. Concerning low levels of complexity and variability of the mental ingroup 
representation, higher levels of relative ingroup prototypicality and/or a stronger ingroup 
prototypicality-ingroup bias link are expected. However, it is only possible to obtain a strong 
ingroup prototypicality-ingroup bias link if both variables have sufficient variance. This 
means that the induction of low complexity and variability should not lead to a ceiling effect 
for ingroup prototypicality because under this condition a strong prototypicality-evaluation 
link is impossible to occur. Similarly, it is expected that high levels of complexity and 
variability lead to low levels of relative ingroup prototypicality and/or a weaker ingroup 
prototypicality-ingroup bias link. Following the reasoning of this doctoral thesis, a weaker 
prototypicality-ingroup bias link is expected after the information of complexity or variability 
of the ingroup representation was projected onto the superordinate category as a structural 
feature. Therefore, to weaken the ingroup prototypicality-ingroup bias link a certain amount 
of information concerning complexity or variability needs to be projected onto the 
superordinate category. Furthermore, a floor effect of relative ingroup prototypicality in the 
high complexity and variability conditions would not confirm the hypothesis concerning the 
weakened ingroup prototypicality-ingroup bias link because a non-significant relation 
between ingroup prototypicality and ingroup bias due to a floor effect represents an artifact 
and does not allow the conclusion that a variable and complex ingroup representation cannot 
serve as a standard at the superordinate category level. In sum, it is possible that both 
hypotheses are confirmed simultaneously unless low complexity and variability lead to a 
ceiling effect and high complexity and variability do not allow any projection and, thus, lead 
to a floor effect.  
To change the mental representation of the ingroup in terms of complexity, subgrouping 
and subtyping manipulations were employed (Park et al., 1992). Subtyping of the ingroup 
simplifies the prototype because members who do not fit the ingroup as a whole are excluded 
from the mental representation. Subgrouping enhances complexity by clustering the ingroup 
into multiple subgroups that represent the category equally well. 
The manipulations of Waldzus et al. (2003, 2005) were adopted to manipulate variability. 
Waldzus and collaborators realized different levels of variability by asking participants to 
The role of complexity and variability of the ingroup representation for projection and evaluation  34
 
think either about the unity or the diversity of a group. Although Waldzus et al. claimed to 
induce complexity instead of variability, I would rather suggest that unity and diversity 
manipulations change variability perceptions rather than complexity. Relying on the 
complexity and variability distinction outlined in the present thesis, I propose that to think 
about diversity increases the differentiation of stimuli within a set (i.e., increase in variability) 
but does not necessarily trigger integration (i.e., increase in complexity). 
4.1 Main Hypotheses 
4.1.1 Hypothesis concerning the level of projection 
It is predicted that increased levels of complexity and variability of the mental ingroup 
representation decrease the perception of relative ingroup prototypicality whereas decreased 
levels of complexity and variability of the mental ingroup representation increase the 
perception of relative ingroup prototypicality.  
4.1.2 Hypothesis concerning the usability of the superordinate category as a comparison 
standard 
It is predicted that increased levels of complexity and variability of the mental ingroup 
representation decrease the relation between relative ingroup prototypicality and ingroup 
favoritism whereas the relation between relative ingroup prototypicality and ingroup 
favoritism increases with decreasing complexity or variability levels. 
4.2 Overview of the experiments 
In Experiment 1, subgrouping and subtyping instructions were used in order to 
manipulate the complexity of the mental ingroup representation of natural groups. Participants 
were asked to generate subgroups or subtypes, respectively, within their own ingroup. These 
open-ended instructions were adopted from Park et al. (1992). In Experiment 2 I adopted a 
sorting-task from self-complexity research (Halberstadt, Niedenthal, & Setterlund, 1996) 
which was intended to vary ingroup-complexity. After manipulating the mental representation 
of the ingroup, projection and intergroup evaluation were measured. Furthermore, the role of 
interindividual differences in the process of projection and evaluation was considered. For this 
reason, a German version of the Personal Need for Structure scale (Machunsky & Meiser, in 
press) and the diversity beliefs construct (van Knippenberg & Haslam, 2003) were employed. 
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In both Experiment 3 and Experiment 4 diversity and unity manipulations of Waldzus et 
al. (2003, 2005) were employed to manipulate homogeneity and heterogeneity of the mental 
ingroup representation of natural groups. In addition to the cognitive processes discussed 
earlier, the role of distinctiveness threat (Jetten & Spears, 2003) was investigated as a 
negative side effect of increased variability of mental ingroup representations in Experiment 
4. In particular, it was hypothesized that distinctiveness threat mediates the relation between 
variability of the ingroup representation and ingroup bias.  
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5 Part I: The role of complexity of mental ingroup representation in 
ingroup projection  
5.1 Experiment 1 
5.1.1 Introduction 
The main goal of the first experiment was to examine how complexity of the mental 
ingroup representation shapes ingroup projection and the ingroup prototypicality-ingroup bias 
link. In particular, I assumed that a complex ingroup representation decreases relative ingroup 
prototypicality whereas a simple ingroup representation increases relative ingroup 
prototypicality. Additionally, I have argued that the ingroup prototypicality-ingroup bias link 
will change such that complex ingroup representations will weaken the relation between 
relative ingroup prototypicality and ingroup bias whereas simple ingroup representations will 
strengthen the relation between relative ingroup prototypicality and ingroup bias. The 
experimental procedures were adopted from Park and colleagues (Judd, Park, Ryan, Brauer, 
& Kraus, 1995; Park et al., 1992). In particular, open-ended subgrouping and subtyping 
instructions were used in order to establish complex and simple mental ingroup 
representations. The effects of subgrouping and subtyping manipulations were compared to a 
control condition. The intergroup setting consisted of students of business administration as 
ingroup (in German: “Studierende der Betriebswirtschaftslehre”. Among students they are 
called “BWLer”) and students of economics as outgroup (in German: “Studierende der 
Volkswirtschaftslehre”. Among students they are called “VWLer”). In the German university 
system students of business administration and students of economics usually belong to a 
joint faculty and thereby to one superordinate category which is a salient group at German 
universities. In the German language there is a special term for this category 
(“Wirtschaftswissenschaften”) which has no equivalent in English. 
5.1.2 Method 
Pretest. In order to measure perceived prototypicality of the ingroup and the outgroup, 
participants did a number of trait ratings for the ingroup, the outgroup, and the superordinate 
category. From these trait ratings Euclidean Distances were calculated in order to assess 
prototypicality perceptions. The selected traits should meet two criteria. Firstly, the traits 
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should be balanced such that half of them are associated with the ingroup and half of them are 
associated with the outgroup so that ingroup and outgroup projection have at least the same 
initial conditions with regard to trait stereotypicality. Secondly, the typical ingroup and 
outgroup traits should be equally positive in valence. Because this dissertation project focused 
on positively valued superordinate category representations traits associated with the ingroup 
and the outgroup should be of positive valence. 
Pretests with N = 14 and N = 15 students of business administration were conducted to 
select appropriate traits for Experiment 1. 41 traits were selected which I perceived as being 
related to either the ingroup or the outgroup. 14 participants majoring in business 
administration were asked to rate all 41 traits on a rating scale ranging from -3 (very negative) 
to +3 (very positive). Another 15 students with a major in business administration rated the 
same 41 attributes for stereotypicality on a scale ranging from +3 (applies to students of 
business administration) via 0 (applies to both) to +3 (applies to students of economics)2. Six 
traits were chosen that were according to the ratings stereotypical of one of the two groups 
and slightly positive at the same time. After the rating scales were transformed into scales 
ranging from -3 (applies to students of business administration) to +3 (applies to students of 
economics), the three typical attributes chosen for students of business administration (e.g., 
“focus on occupational career“) received a mean typicality value of M = -1.80 (SD = 1.15) 
and the three typical attributes chosen for students of economics (e.g., “scientific mindset“) 
received a mean typicality value of M = 1.40 (SD = 0.91). The six selected items were 
moderately positive, M = 1.60 (SD = 0.82) for the outgroup traits and M = 1.79 (SD = 1.12) 
for the ingroup traits and all M ≥ 1.0. 
Participants. Participants in Experiment 1 were students from the University of Jena 
majoring in business administration. The study was advertised in lectures of business 
administration as a study on group perception. Participants received 5 Euros for their services. 
They were randomly assigned to one of three conditions, namely a subgrouping, a subtyping, 
and a control condition. Ten participants were dropped from the analyses for not being 
                                                 
2 The scale ranged from +3 (applies to students of business administration) via 0 (applies to both) to 
+3 (applies to students of economics) because I wanted to avoid that one end of the scale (and, 
therefore, the group associated with that end of the continuum) got a negative connotation by using 
negative values. 
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members of the group of business administration students. The final sample consisted of 75 
students of business administration, 25 in each condition. 
Procedure. The experiment was run in a laboratory with up to five participants in one 
session. Participants filled in a questionnaire on which they worked individually. The 
intergroup situation consisted of students of business administration as the ingroup, students 
of economics as the outgroup and the joint faculty of both majors as the superordinate 
category. The questionnaire started with a short introduction about the purpose of the study. 
To make the intergroup setting salient from the beginning, participants were told that large 
parts of the study are concerned with their perception of the group of students of business 
administration to which they belong themselves, and that the study is also concerned with the 
perception of the group of students of economics and the joint faculty which encompasses 
both. Following the general instructions participants described their own group of students of 
business administration with a few sentences. This procedure was the same for all three 
conditions and was meant to activate the representation of the ingroup. After the general 
introduction, the experimental manipulation of ingroup representation that differed between 
the three conditions was realized. 
In the subgrouping condition, an open-ended task from Park et al. (1992) and Judd et al. 
(1995) was adopted.3 Participants were provided with a definition of subgroups. Participants 
learned that members within one subgroup are more similar to each other compared to 
members who belong to other subgroups. At the same time, the common ground of all 
subgroups, that is, the common ingroup, was emphasized. Participants then generated 
subgroups within their ingroup, gave a name to every subgroup, and described each subgroup 
with a few sentences. Furthermore, they were asked to list three characteristic attributes for 
each subgroup. In the subtyping condition, subjects were instructed to name subtypes after 
they have received a definition of subtypes. It was pointed out that in almost any group there 
are individuals who do not fit the group because of their personality traits and behaviors. As 
in the subgrouping condition, participants were asked to name subtypes, to describe them and 
to list three characteristic attributes for each subtype. Participants in the control condition did 
not receive any instructions concerning subgroups or subtypes. To summarize, high levels of 
complexity were established in the first experimental condition through a decomposition into 
                                                 
3 I gratefully acknowledge that Bernadette Park provided me with the original instructions used in her 
previous research. 
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subgroups which still belong to the same group. In contrast, low levels of complexity were 
established through exclusion of non-fitting subtypes. 
Dependent Variables. Following the manipulation, the rest of the questionnaire was 
administered which was identical for all three experimental conditions. First, identification 
with the ingroup and with the superordinate category was measured with four items each (e.g., 
“I identify with the group of students of [business administration, of the joint faculty]”). 
These questions were answered on 5-point scales ranging from 1 (does not apply at all) to 5 
(applies completely). Identification was an important control variable as identification is 
strongly related to ingroup bias (for reviews see Brown, 2000; Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 
2002). Thus, it was important to control that identification does not increase or decrease with 
experimental condition so that the expected effects cannot be attributed to different levels of 
identification. Furthermore, identification with the ingroup and the superordinate category 
should be rather high to make sure that both are relevant categories for self-categorization.  
Next, participants were asked for group ratings on six pre-selected (see pretest) 
attributes. In particular, participants rated the ingroup, the outgroup, and the superordinate 
category on a scale ranging from 0 to 20. The scale ends were anchored with, for instance, 
“Minimal focus on occupational career” and “Maximal focus on occupational career”. From 
these ratings I calculated Euclidean Distances (Hand, 1981) which measure the proximity of 
two stimuli. In particular, Euclidean Distances reflect the dissimilarities between profiles of 
the superordinate category and the ingroup and outgroup, respectively. Euclidean Distances 
take on smaller values the closer two groups are. Importantly, Euclidean Distances should be 
affected by projection processes. The difference between ingroup-superordinate category 
distance and outgroup-superordinate category distance can be taken as an indirect measure of 
perceived prototypicality of the ingroup relative to that of the outgroup. Positive values 
indicate more ingroup projection than outgroup projection. 
Furthermore, direct measures of perceived prototypicality were assessed. Participants 
judged how typical they perceived the ingroup and the outgroup of the superordinate category 
on 7-point scales from -3 (not at all) to +3 (completely). Similarly to the indirect relative 
measure of prototypicality, the direct measure of prototypicality is the difference between 
ingroup and outgroup prototypicality. Direct relative prototypicality should also increase the 
more participants project attributes of the ingroup onto the superordinate category relative to 
the projection of outgroup attributes onto the superordinate category. 
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Finally, the evaluation of the ingroup and the outgroup was assessed with seven items 
each (e.g., “I like the group of students of [business administration, economics]”) on 7-point 
scales ranging from -3 (does not apply at all) to +3 (applies completely). The difference 
between ingroup evaluation and outgroup evaluation is referred to as ingroup bias. 
5.1.3 Results and discussion 
Identification. The items of identification with the ingroup formed a reliable scale 
(Cronbach’s α = .82). After exclusion of one item, the remaining items of identification with 
the superordinate category showed sufficient reliability, too (Cronbach’s α = .86). A 2 × 3 
mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA) with target group (i.e., identification with the 
ingroup versus superordinate category) as within-participants factor and experimental 
condition as between-participants factor revealed a marginal significant effect of target group, 
F(1,72) = 3.18, p = .08, η2 = .042. 4 Participants showed lower mean identification scores for 
the ingroup (M = 3.57, SD = .89) than for the superordinate category (M = 3.76; SD = .82). 
The effect of experimental condition and the interaction were not significant, F < 1 and 
F(2,72) = 1.14, p > .1. Mean identification with the ingroup and mean identification with the 
superordinate category differed significantly from the scale midpoint of 3, t(74) = 5.53, p < 
.001 and t(74) = 8.06, p < .001. Thus, identification with both the ingroup and the 
superordinate category was consistently high across experimental manipulations.  
Indirect and direct measures of prototypicality. The means and standard deviations of the 
Euclidean distance measures between ingroup and superordinate category and between 
outgroup and superordinate category are displayed in Table 2. An 2 × 3 ANOVA with target 
group (i.e., indirect prototypicality of ingroup versus outgroup) as within-participants factor 
and experimental condition as between-participants factor revealed a main effect of target 
group, F(1,68) = 14.615, p < .001, η2 = .117. Overall, the ingroup profile is less dissimilar to 
that of the superordinate category (M = 8.09, SD = 3.12) than the outgroup profile (M = 10.31, 
SD = 5.51). No further main effect or interaction occurred, Fs < 1. Similarly, the direct 
prototypicality measures were subjected to 2 × 3 ANOVA. Again, the effect of target group 
                                                 
4 η2 refers to the partial eta-square which is defined as partial η2 = SSfactor/(SSfactor + SSerror) 
(Pierce, Block, & Aguinis, 2004). 
5 Due to missing values this test was based on a sample of N = 71 so that the error term has only 68 
degrees of freedom. 
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was significant, F(1,72) = 19.23, p < .001, η2 = .211, indicating that the ingroup was 
perceived as more prototypical of the superordinate category (M = 1.69, SD = 0.96) than the 
outgroup (M = 0.96, SD = 1.24). The main effect of experimental condition and the 
interaction were not significant, F < 1 and F(2,72) = 2.77, p > .05.  
Thus, independent of whether the measurement of perceived prototypicality was direct or 
indirect, the results confirmed the general assumption of the Ingroup Projection Model that 
the ingroup is perceived as being more prototypical of the superordinate category than the 
outgroup but the experimental manipulation did not influence the magnitude of relative 
prototypicality.  
Table 2. Means and standard deviations of indirect prototypicality, direct prototypicality, and 
evaluation of the ingroup and outgroup as a function of experimental condition (Experiment 
1).  
 Subgrouping Control Subtyping 
Dependent variable M SD M SD M SD 
Euclidean distance       
d(IG-SC) 8.24 2.72 8.06 3.68 7.96 3.00 
d(OG-SC) 10.39 6.03 10.33 3.98 10.19 6.41 
Direct typicality       
Ingroup 1.92 .91 1.44 .92 1.72 1.02 
Outgroup .68 1.55 1.16 .90 1.04 1.17 
Intergroup evaluation       
Ingroup evaluation 1.02 1.08 1.18 1.11 1.37 .97 
Outgroup evaluation 1.33 .86 1.38 .84 .88 .87 
Note. d(IG,SC): Euclidean Distance between the ingroup and the superordinate category; 
d(OG,SC): Euclidean Distance between the outgroup and the superordinate category. 
Experiment 1 42
 
Intergroup evaluation. Ingroup and outgroup evaluation was assessed by seven items 
each that exhibited sufficient reliability (Cronbach’s α = .88 and Cronbach’s α = .83). Table 2 
shows mean evaluation scores and standard deviations. Evaluation of ingroup and outgroup 
was subjected to a 2 × 3 ANOVA with ingroup and outgroup evaluation as within-participants 
factor and experimental condition as between-participants factor. No main effect was 
significant, Fs < 1, but a significant interaction effect was found, F(2,72) = 3.70, p < .05, η2 = 
.093. To explore the interaction effect, ingroup bias (i.e., the difference between ingroup and 
outgroup evaluation) was used as dependent variable and an orthogonal contrast analysis was 
conducted. Testing my hypothesis concerning the subtyping condition, the first contrast (0 -1 
1) compared the subtyping condition against the control condition. The second contrast (-2 1 
1) juxtaposed the subtyping and control condition against the subgrouping condition. The first 
contrast was significant, t(72) = 2.16, p < .05, whereas the second contrast was not, t(72) = 
1.66, p > .1. Although the manipulation of the ingroup representation did not change 
perceived group prototypicality, the results concerning intergroup evaluation were thus 
significant: Establishing a clearly defined representation of the ingroup by excluding 
inconsistent members led to more ingroup bias compared to a control group. 
Relation between relative ingroup prototypicality and intergroup evaluation. To test the 
hypothesis concerning the interaction between experimental condition and perceived 
prototypicality on ingroup bias, a multiple regression analysis according to Aiken and West 
(1991) was conducted. As the Experiment had three experimental conditions, two effect-
coded variables ([1 -1 0] and [0 -1 1]) were formed and perceived relative prototypicality (i.e., 
the difference between perceived ingroup and outgroup prototypicality) was subjected to a z-
standardization. Ingroup bias was the dependent variable. The model with both effect-coded 
variables and the indirect measure of prototypicality as predictors explained a significant 
portion of variance, R2 = .214, F(3,67) = 6.066, p < .01. Adding the interaction terms to the 
model equation did not lead to a significant change in R2, R2-change = .004 and change in F < 
1. Note, however, that indirect prototypicality was a significant predictor of ingroup bias in 
the multiple regression when the experimental contrasts were partialled out, β = .347, p < .01. 
However, using the direct measure of prototypicality, the effect-coded variables and their 
interaction terms as predictors, a significant moderation of the effect of prototypicality on 
                                                 
6 Due to missing values this test was based on a sample of N = 71 so that the error term has only 67 
degrees of freedom. 
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ingroup bias was obtained. The base model including only the effect-coded variables and 
prototypicality explained 10.1% of the variance, F(3,71) = 2.66, p = .06. The interaction terms 
led to a significant R2-change = .091, F(2,69) = 3.91, p < .05. The beta coefficient for the 
interaction term of the first effect-coded variable and direct prototypicality was not 
significant, β = .091, p > .05, but the beta coefficient for the interaction term of the second 
effect-coded variable and direct prototypicality was significant, β = .255, p < .05. These 
results indicate that the correlations between direct prototypicality and ingroup bias did not 
differ between control and subgrouping condition, whereas they did differ between subtyping 
and control condition.  
To explore the moderation further, the simple slopes in the regression of ingroup bias on 
the direct prototypicality measure were analyzed within each experimental condition. Non-
significant slopes were found in the subgrouping and control condition, β = .194 and  
β = -.356, both ps > .05, whereas the slope was significant in the subtyping condition,  
β = .405, p < .05, indicating that perceived prototypicality formed a significant predictor of 
ingroup bias only in the subtyping condition. In order to illustrate the moderation effect, the 
simple slopes are depicted in Figure 2. Given a clear prototype of the ingroup, a significant 
relation between relative ingroup prototypicality and ingroup bias was obtained as predicted 
by the Ingroup Projection Model, whereas there was no such relation in the subgrouping and 
the control condition.  
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Figure 2. The relation between ingroup bias and relative ingroup prototypicality in the three 
experimental conditions (Experiment 1). 
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5.1.4 Summary 
It was hypothesized that complexity of mental ingroup representations changes the 
projection and evaluation process such that less complex ingroup representations either 
increase relative ingroup prototypicality or strengthen the ingroup prototypicality-ingroup bias 
link. Experiment 1 provided evidence that subtyping manipulations did not change the 
average perception of relative ingroup prototypicality but strengthened the relation between 
perceived prototypicality and ingroup bias. This finding confirmed the hypothesis that only a 
prototype characterized by little complexity can serve as a prescriptive comparison standard. 
A plausible explanation is that only in the subtyping condition the projected ingroup prototype 
served as a judgmental standard at the level of the superordinate category because it provided 
clear criteria for judgment. 
Concerning the subgrouping condition, less relative ingroup prototypicality and less 
ingroup bias as a consequence of complexity was expected but not found. One post-hoc 
explanation why the subgrouping condition did not differ from the control condition neither 
with regard to ingroup bias nor with regard to the strength of the relation between relative 
ingroup prototypicality and ingroup bias derives from research by Park et al. (1992). Park and 
colleagues showed that people generate subgroups for their ingroups more easily than for 
outgroups. This result suggests that subgrouping is the default for ingroups so that instructions 
concerning the ingroup can hardly show substantial effects.  
A second experiment aimed at a replication of the effect that perceived ingroup 
prototypicality only predicts ingroup bias if the ingroup prototype is of little complexity. 
Because I wanted to show that the effect was neither limited to the particular intergroup 
situation of Experiment 1 nor to the particular manipulation of complexity, a second 
experiment was conducted which relied on a different intergroup setting and a different 
manipulation. 
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5.2 Experiment 2 
5.2.1 Introduction 
The second experiment was particularly aiming at a replication of the subtyping effect of 
Experiment 1. Furthermore, I hypothesized that subtyping of the ingroup creates an instance 
of what Snyder and Ickes (1985) called psychologically strong situations which “tend to be 
those that provide salient cues to guide behavior and have a fairly high degree of structure and 
definition” (p. 904). Snyder and Ickes (1985) pointed out that most experimental treatments 
are intended to be strong situations in which the effects of personality variables are 
overpowered. Thus, in “psychologically weak” situations like the control condition, 
interindividual differences might have predictive power. In a subtyping condition, which 
should be a “psychologically strong” situation, in contrast, prototypicality should become the 
main predicting variable of ingroup favoritism and interindividual variables should lose 
influence. To investigate this issue, the interindividual difference measure Personal Need for 
Structure (PNS) was introduced. As a second interindividual difference measure, diversity 
beliefs were introduced. However, the employment of diversity beliefs has a clearly 
explorative character.  
Next to the replication of the subtyping effect, subgrouping is manipulated again to 
examine whether a different manipulation has the potential to increases the complexity of the 
ingroup representation. As a second factor, the order of ingroup and outgroup judgments were 
manipulated because of evidence that the order of evaluation may play a role for the level of 
ingroup bias (Meiser et al., 2004; Otten, 2002). Thus, Experiment 2 has a 2 (order: ingroup 
first versus outgroup first) × 3 (mental representation: Subgrouping versus control versus 
subtyping) between-participants design. Furthermore, a different intergroup setting was 
chosen in Experiment 2. Students of natural sciences constituted the ingroup, students of 
humanities constituted the outgroup, and scientists in general constituted the superordinate 
category. 
5.2.2 Interindividual differences 
Diversity beliefs. Van Knippenberg and Haslam (2003) suggested that diversity of a 
group may be an aspect of the social identity. Van Knippenberg, Haslam and Platow (2000) 
and Haslam and van Knippenberg (2000, both cited after van Knippenberg & Haslam, 2003) 
tested this idea experimentally as well as correlationally. Experimentally, they manipulated 
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the composition of the group by giving participants bogus feedback about the ingroup 
composition. In one condition the group was said to be homogeneous whereas it was said to 
be heterogeneous in the other condition. As a second between-participants factor group tasks 
were manipulated. In one condition participants had to generate as many unique ideas as 
possible (unique ideas condition); in the other condition the solutions to the problem had to be 
shared by the majority (shared ideas condition). Thus, as a second factor the authors 
manipulated believes in diversity itself such that in the unique ideas condition participants 
learned to favor diversity whereas they learned to favor unity in the shared ideas condition. As 
a result, participants in the unique ideas condition believed in the superiority of heterogeneous 
groups whereas participants in the shared ideas condition believed in the superiority of 
homogeneous groups. In a correlational study by Haslam and van Knippenberg (2000, cited 
after van Knippenberg & Haslam, 2003) some of the results converged with the experimental 
findings such that identification with heterogeneous groups is high when composition beliefs 
favor diversity.  
Although diversity beliefs were so far only considered to be an aspect of identity in 
intragroup processes, I wanted to explore the influence of diversity beliefs with regard to 
intergroup processes. Furthermore, in the cited literature diversity beliefs varied with the 
context. However, it is also conceivable to consider diversity beliefs as a personal value. For 
Experiment 2, a scale was constructed that measured the extent to which people appreciate 
heterogeneity of the superordinate category. On a societal level, the concept of diversity 
beliefs should be identical with the ideological approach of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism 
advocates or even emphasizes category membership and acknowledges and appreciates 
differences between groups (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004). It has been shown that the belief 
in multiculturalism leads to a better explicit and implicit evaluation of outgroups (Richeson & 
Nussbaum, 2004; Wolsko, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2000; see also Park & Judd, in press). 
In assuming that in an intergroup context the concepts of diversity beliefs and 
multiculturalism are almost identical, I argue that diversity beliefs are negatively related to 
ingroup bias. But diversity beliefs should be a strong predictor of ingroup bias only in the 
control condition because in the subtyping condition there should be strong cues, namely 
ingroup prototypicality, that guide intergroup judgment. However, this variable has a clearly 
explorative function.  
Personal Need for Structure. Aside from diversity beliefs, I wanted to investigate 
whether individual differences in the mental structuring of social information may play a role 
in the projection process. It has been demonstrated that the Personal Need for Structure (PNS) 
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scale by Thompson et al. (1993, cited after Neuberg & Newsom, 1993) is related to social 
perception, stereotype formation, and social judgment (Moskowitz, 1993; Neuberg & 
Newsom, 1993; Schaller, Boyd, Yohannes, & O'Brian, 1995). Furthermore, PNS is related to 
identification with the ingroup in a minimal group paradigm (Perreault & Bourhis, 1999). 
Similar results were obtained for the Need for Cognitive Closure (NFC) scale by Webster and 
Kruglanski (1994), which measures largely the same construct as PNS (Leone, Wallace, & 
Modglin, 1999; Neuberg, Judice, & West, 1997). NFC is related to the application of 
stereotypes, to the perception of homogeneity of groups, and to the memory for stereotype-
inconsistent behavior (Dijksterhuis, van Knippenberg, Kruglanski, & Schaper, 1996). In the 
field of intergroup studies, research has shown that NFC is significantly related to ingroup 
favoritism and outgroup derogation (Kruglanski, Shah, Pierro, & Mannetti, 2002; Shah, 
Kruglanski, & Thompson, 1998). On the basis of these previous findings, I expected 
correlations between PNS and ingroup bias in the control condition. For the subtyping 
condition, however, relative ingroup prototypicality was expected to be the strongest predictor 
because a clear standard for judgment is available which should overpower the role of 
interindividual differences (Snyder & Ickes, 1985).  
Construction of a German Personal Need for Structure Scale. Because a complete, 
reliable and valid PNS scale was not available in German language, the original PNS Scale as 
cited in Neuberg and Newsom (1993) was translated into German, subjected to a scale 
analysis, and validated with personality and social psychological variables (Machunsky & 
Meiser, in press). The psychometric analysis which was based on a sample of 710 participants 
revealed that the internal consistency of the German scale was with Cronbach’s α = .80 
comparable to the English version. Similarly, according to a factor analysis the factorial 
structure was equivalent to the results of Neuberg and Newsom (1993). In particular, the two 
factorial structure of the original version was replicated with factor loadings of the individual 
items being widely equivalent. Furthermore, a confirmatory factor analysis with two 
correlated latent variables yielded a better model fit than a one-factor model. Again, this 
parallels the results of the scale analysis of the English version.  
In a second study, the convergent and divergent validity of the PNS scale was tested with 
classical personality variables. Next to Need for Cognition (Keller, Bohner, & Erb, 2000) and 
Conservatism (Riemann, Grubich, Hempel, & Mergl, 1993), the Big Five personality factors 
(Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1993) were employed. As expected, PNS was positively correlated 
with Neuroticism, Conscientiousness, and Conservatism, and negatively correlated with 
Openness. The divergent validity was provided by non-significant relations between PNS and 
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Need for Cognition as well as between PNS and Agreeableness. The aim of the third study 
was to integrate PNS into a nomothetical network of variables from the field of intergroup 
research. In accordance with the hypothesis, PNS was related to diversity beliefs, perceptions 
of group homogeneity, and ingroup bias (i.e., the evaluation of the ingroup relative to the 
outgroup). From the successful psychometric analysis and validation it can be concluded that 
the German version of the PNS scale is a reliable and valid scale. Therefore, the German 
version of the PNS scale by Machunsky and Meiser (in press) was employed in order to test 
the hypothesis that PNS predicts ingroup bias in psychologically weak situations but loses 
predictive power in psychologically strong situations. 
5.2.3 Method 
Pretest. Similar to Experiment 1, in order to assess indirect prototypicality, traits needed 
to be identified which are associated with either the ingroup or the outgroup to an equally 
strong extent and which are moderately positive in valence. Thus, 33 traits were collected 
which I perceived as either associated with the ingroup or the outgroup. Twenty students of 
natural sciences indicated for 33 traits on bipolar scales how much they applied to the group 
of students of natural sciences or to the group of students of humanities. Trait ratings were 
made on 7-point scales ranging from 3 (applies to the group of students of humanities) via 0 
(applies to both) to 3 (applies to the group of students of natural sciences). Another 20 
students of natural sciences rated the same 33 traits for valence on rating scales ranging from  
-3 (very negative) to +3 (very positive). For Experiment 2, six traits were chosen of which half 
were associated with the ingroup (M = 1.58, SD = 1.25) and half were associated with the 
outgroup (M = 1.58, SD = 1.23). Thus, the association of ingroup and ingroup specific traits 
(e.g., “goal-oriented”) and outgroup and outgroup specific traits (e.g., “liking discussions”) 
was about equally strong. Furthermore, the three ingroup traits and the three outgroup traits 
were about equally positive in valence (M = 1.91, SD = 1.12, and M = 1.85, SD = 1.03). 
Participants. Participants were 88 students of the natural sciences from the University of 
Jena. They were recruited in lectures of natural sciences and were told the study investigates 
group perception. Participants were randomly assigned to a 3 (mental representation: 
subgrouping, subtyping, control) × 2 (order: ingroup evaluation first, outgroup evaluation 
first) factorial design. Three students were excluded because they did not aspire a degree in 
natural sciences. Thus, the final sample consisted of 85 students of natural sciences.  
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Procedure. As in Experiment 1, mental representation of the ingroup which was 
manipulated by means of subgrouping, subtyping, and control instructions served as a first 
between-participants factor. To control for the influence of order, half of the participants rated 
the prototypicality of the ingroup and evaluated the ingroup first and the outgroup second, 
whereas the other half responded to outgroup items first.  
As in the first experiment, participants read a general introduction about the purpose of 
the experiment which was again announced as investigating group perception. It was stated 
that wide parts of the experiment are concerned with the group of natural scientists to whom 
the participants themselves belonged. Furthermore, the experiment dealt with scientists of 
humanities as outgroup and with scientists in general as superordinate category. 
In order to manipulate the complexity of mental group representations, a procedure from 
Halberstadt et al. (1996) was adopted in which participants had to sort cards containing 
personality attributes into either three piles or into seven piles which represented “future 
selves” (see also Linville & Jones, 1980, for a similar procedure). This procedure was 
employed to induce different levels of self-complexity. For the purpose of the present 
dissertation, the procedure was transferred from the level of the self to the level of the 
ingroup. In a pilot study, students of the natural sciences were interviewed to name commonly 
perceived subgroups and subtypes within the group of natural scientists. From subgroups 
those were chosen that cut across various subjects within the natural sciences and that are 
characterized, for instance, by different scientific methods and objects of research. Namely, 
the subgroups of predominantly theoretical, applied, technical, analytical, and experimental 
natural sciences were chosen. Similarly, 22 attributes were chosen which were considered as 
useful for differentiating between the different approaches within natural sciences. In the 
subgrouping condition participants had to sort these 22 attributes into the five predetermined 
subgroups of natural scientists. According to the pilot study “technical natural scientists” were 
considered as being different from the group of natural scientists in general. Hence, in the 
subtyping condition participants were asked to sort the same 22 attributes into either “the 
proper group of natural scientists” or into a subtype of “technical natural scientists”. That is, 
the group of technical natural scientists was framed as one of several subgroups in the 
subgrouping condition, whereas it was framed as a subtype that differed from the rest of the 
group of natural scientists in the subtyping condition. Again, subgrouping should lead to the 
ingroup being perceived as complex, whereas subtyping should lead to a simple 
representation that includes only members who closely fit the prototype of the group of 
natural scientists in general. To equate conditions, participants in the control condition were 
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told that the same list of 22 attributes can be used to describe the group of natural scientists 
and were asked to rate the list for valence on a 7-point scale ranging from -3 (negative) to +3 
(positive) to activate the representation of the ingroup. 
Dependent Variables. Firstly, the identification with the ingroup and the superordinate 
category was assessed again as a control variable. As in the first experiment each scale 
contained four items with scale endpoints of 0 (does not apply at all) and 5 (applies 
completely). Diversity beliefs were assessed by eight items which can be found in the 
Appendix. Participants rated their agreement with the statements on 6-point scales ranging 
from 1 (does not apply at all) to 6 (applies completely). To assess PNS, the German version of 
the original PNS scale was used, the psychometric qualities and content validity of which 
were shown in previous research (Machunsky & Meiser, in press). Participants rated the 
applicability of twelve statements on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (does not apply at all) to 
6 (applies completely). 
Next, participants completed trait ratings for the ingroup, the outgroup and the 
superordinate category. The 7-point scales for the six pre-selected attributes (see pretest) 
ranged from -3 (not at all) to +3 (completely). As in Experiment 1, Euclidean Distances were 
computed between ingroup and superordinate category and between outgroup and 
superordinate category. The difference between the outgroup-superordinate category distance 
and the ingroup-superordinate category distance is referred to as indirect measure of 
prototypicality. Again, similar to Experiment 1, perceived prototypicality of the ingroup and 
the outgroup was also assessed directly on 7-point scales ranging from -3 (not at all) to +3 
(completely). Ingroup and outgroup evaluation was assessed with eight items each (e.g., “I 
like to talk to students [of natural sciences, of humanities]”) on 7-point scales ranging from -3 
(applies not at all) to +3 (applies completely). The difference between ingroup evaluation and 
outgroup evaluation is referred to as ingroup bias. 
5.2.4 Results and discussion 
Identification. The items of identification with the ingroup as well as identification with 
the superordinate category provided an internal consistency of Cronbach’s α = .71 and α = 
.68, respectively. Mean identification scores as a function of mental representation and order 
can be found in Table 3. According to a 3 (mental representation) × 2 (order) ANOVA, 
identification with the superordinate category did not vary as a function of mental 
representation, F(2,79) = 1.58, p > .1, or order, F < 1. The interaction was not significant 
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either, F(2,79) = 1.52, p > .1. Likewise, identification with the ingroup did not vary as a 
function of mental representation, F(2,79) = 1.91, p > .1, or order, F(1,79) = 1.02, p > .1. For 
identification with the ingroup there was, however, a marginally significant interaction 
between mental representation and order, F(2,79) = 3.16, p = .05, η2 = .074. Whereas there 
was no main effect of mental representation within the “ingroup first” condition, F(2,39) = 
1.20, p > .05, there was a significant effect of mental representation in the “outgroup first” 
condition, F(2,40) = 6.01, p < .01, η2 = .231. A Tukey-HSD post hoc test revealed that the 
control condition differed significantly from the subgrouping condition, p < .01. Table 3 
shows that participants were more identified with their ingroup in the subgrouping condition 
than in the control condition. However, testing within the subgrouping condition whether the 
“ingroup first condition” differ from the “outgroup first condition” revealed no significant 
result, t(26) = -1.56, p > .1. Similarly, within the control condition and the subtyping 
condition the order conditions did not differ significantly, t(27) = 1.47, p > .1, and t(26) = 
1.61, p > .1. Identification scores with the ingroup and the superordinate category averaged 
across conditions were significantly above the scale midpoint of 2.5, t(84) = 19.00, p < .001, 
and t(84) = 16.13, p < .001. Participants were more identified with the ingroup (M = 4.04, SD 
= 0.75) than with the superordinate category (M = 3.84, SD = 0.77), t(84) = 2.84 and p < .01. 
The interaction between mental representation and order for ingroup identification can 
hardly be interpreted as an effect of experimental manipulation because at this point of the 
questionnaire the order factor was not yet introduced. Therefore, the significant result could 
be regarded as an α-error in the randomized assignment of participants to the cells of the 
experimental design. However, identification with the ingroup and the superordinate category 
were generally rather high. 
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Table 3. Means and standard deviations of identification with the ingroup and the 
superordinate category, diversity beliefs, and Personal Need for Structure as a function of 
experimental condition (Experiment 2).  
 Ingroup first Outgroup first 
Dependent variable  M SD M SD 
Identification      
Ingroup Subgrouping 4.08 .69 4.42 .46 
 Control 4.12 .77 3.73 .63 
 Subtyping 3.66 1.09 4.18 .51 
Superordinate category Subgrouping 4.15 .57 3.95 .73 
 Control 3.77 .89 3.75 .67 
 Subtyping 3.48 .91 3.96 .71 
Diversity beliefs Subgrouping 4.45 .63 4.18 .63 
 Control 4.48 .68 4.70 .61 
 Subtyping 4.68 .59 4.78 .44 
Personal Need for Structure Subgrouping 3.19 .64 3.47 .56 
 Control 3.34 .85 3.36 .73 
 Subtyping 3.17 .89 3.39 .51 
 
Diversity beliefs and Personal Need for Structure. The eight items of the diversity beliefs 
scale showed less than an optimal level of reliability of Cronbach’s α = .67. A 3 × 2 ANOVA 
with mental representation and order as factors and diversity beliefs as dependent variable 
revealed a significant effect of mental representation, F(2,79) = 3.41, p < .05, η2 = .080, but 
no main effect of order and no interaction, Fs < 1.3, ps > .1. The means and standard 
deviations are displayed in Table 3. Contrasting the experimental conditions of mental 
representation, the linear trend (-1 0 1) was significant, t(82) = 2.64 and p < .05, whereas the 
quadratic contrast (-1 2 -1) was not, t < 1. Interestingly, the linear trend shows a significant 
difference between the subgrouping and subtyping condition with regard to diversity beliefs 
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such that subgrouping led to less diversity beliefs. This effect will be discussed in terms of 
distinctiveness threat in the discussion of Part I. 
The PNS items provided sufficient reliability, Cronbach’s α = .78. Neither mental 
representation, nor order or their interaction did influence PNS, Fs < 1.3, ps > .1. Means and 
standard deviations are displayed in Table 3. As expected, the PNS scores did not change as a 
function of experimental condition.  
Indirect and direct measures of prototypicality. Table 4 displays the means and standard 
deviations of the Euclidean Distance measures between ingroup and superordinate category 
and between outgroup and superordinate category, respectively, as a function of mental 
representation and order (indirect prototypicality). Note that these measures reflect profile 
dissimilarities and, therefore, reach high values when group prototypicality is low. A 2 × 2 × 
3 ANOVA with target group (i.e., indirect prototypicality of ingroup versus outgroup) as 
within-participants factor and order and mental representation as between-participants factors 
revealed a main effect of target group, F(1,79) = 67.22, p < .001, η2 = .460. The significant 
within-participants factor revealed that ingroup and superordinate category were perceived 
less dissimilar with respect to the selected attributes (mean distance of M = 2.35, SD = 1.10) 
than outgroup and superordinate category (mean distance of M = 3.90, SD = 1.72). All other 
effects were not significant, Fs < 1. 
The direct prototypicality measures were subjected to a 2 × 2 × 3 ANOVA, too. As for 
indirect prototypicality, a significant effect of target group for direct prototypicality was 
found, F(1,79) = 127.40, p < .001, η2 = .617. The effect indicates that the ingroup was 
perceived as more prototypical of the superordinate category than the outgroup (see Table 4). 
There was no further significant main or two-way interaction effect, Fs < 1.7, ps > .1. 
However, the effect of target group was qualified by a significant three-way interaction, 
F(2,79) = 3.35, p < .05, η2 = .078. A closer inspection of Table 4 shows that the difference 
between ingroup and outgroup prototypicality is especially pronounced in the subgrouping 
condition if the outgroup is rated first. On the other hand, the difference between ingroup and 
outgroup prototypicality is especially low in the control condition if the outgroup is rated first. 
Pairwise post hoc tests (Tukey-HSD) among the six means of relative prototypicality (i.e., 
direct ingroup prototypicality minus direct outgroup prototypicality) revealed one significant 
comparison: The subgrouping/outgroup first condition differed significantly from the 
control/outgroup first condition with regard to direct prototypicality, p < .05.  
Experiment 2 54
 
Table 4. Means and standard deviations of direct and indirect ingroup prototypicality and 
intergroup evaluations as a function of experimental condition (Experiment 2).  
 Ingroup first Outgroup first 
Dependent variable  M SD M SD 
Euclidean Distance      
d(IG-SC) Subgrouping 2.45 1.01 2.01 .82 
 Control 2.48 1.42 2.33 1.30 
 Subtyping 2.34 .81 2.51 1.23 
d(OG-SC) Subgrouping 3.85 1.67 4.09 1.89 
 Control 3.81 1.89 3.40 1.55 
 Subtyping 3.74 1.74 4.47 1.66 
Direct prototypicality      
Ingroup Subgrouping 1.54 1.05 1.93 .80 
 Control 1.33 1.11 1.43 1.28 
 Subtyping 1.50 .94 1.43 1.02 
Outgroup Subgrouping -.08 1.04 -.87 1.41 
 Control -.60 .91 .29 1.20 
 Subtyping -.29 .83 -.14 1.46 
Intergroup evaluation      
Ingroup evaluation Subgrouping 1.98 .49 1.98 .46 
 Control 1.87 .46 1.77 .75 
 Subtyping 1.83 .81 2.24 .32 
Outgroup evaluation Subgrouping .53 1.18 .40 .70 
 Control 1.08 .70 1.21 .76 
 Subtyping .62 .87 .60 .97 
Note. d(IG,SC): Euclidean Distance between the ingroup and the superordinate category; 
d(OG,SC): Euclidean Distance between the outgroup and the superordinate category. 
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Both measures of prototypicality revealed that the ingroup is perceived as significantly 
more prototypical than the outgroup. Again, the mental representation did not influence any of 
the prototypicality measures. However, a significant interaction between mental 
representation and order was obtained for direct prototypicality for which a theoretical 
explanation cannot be provided. Interestingly, the subgrouping/outgroup first condition and 
the control/outgroup first condition were exactly the two conditions which already differed 
significantly with regard to ingroup identification. So there might be a causal relation between 
these two effects. Note however that the significant interaction did not involve the subtyping 
condition which was the main focus here.7  
Intergroup evaluation. The eight items for ingroup and outgroup evaluation provided 
reliable measures, Cronbach’s α = .79 and α = .85, respectively. Table 4 displays mean scores 
and standard deviations of ingroup and outgroup evaluation with high scores indicating the 
possession of desirable traits. A 2 × 2 × 3 ANOVA with target group as within-participants 
factor and order and mental representation as between-participants factor revealed a 
significant effect of target group, F(1,78) = 126.47,8 p < .001, η2 = .619. The ingroup was 
evaluated significantly better than the outgroup. However, this main effect was qualified by a 
reliable target group by mental representation interaction, F(2,78) = 6.33, p < .01, η2 = .140, 
indicating that the difference between ingroup and outgroup evaluation is varying with the 
mental representation. There were no further main or interaction effects, Fs < .1. The analyses 
of the simple effects within the conditions of mental representation indicated that ingroup bias 
was reliable in all three conditions and that the effect sizes were of comparable magnitude in 
the subgrouping and subtyping condition, F(1,26) = 59.70 p < .001, η2 = .697, and F(1,26) = 
49.45, p < .001, η2 = .647, respectively, whereas it was smaller in the control condition,  
F(1, 28) = 19.95, p < .001, η2 = .416. Tukey-HSD post hoc tests of the difference measure of 
ingroup bias between the three conditions of mental representation showed that the 
subgrouping and subtyping conditions differed significantly from the control condition, both 
ps < .01, but not from each other, p > .1. 
                                                 
7 A 2 (mental representation) × 2 (order) between-participants ANOVA that only included the control 
and the subtyping condition revealed that there was no significant interaction for the direct 
prototypicality measure, F < 1. 
8 Due to missing values this test was based on a sample of N = 84 so that the error term has only 78 
degrees of freedom. 
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The means in Table 4 suggest that variations in ingroup bias are mainly driven by 
evaluation of the outgroup. Therefore two two-factorial ANOVAs with group representation 
and order as factors and evaluation of the ingroup and the outgroup, respectively, as 
dependent variables were conducted. Evaluation of the ingroup did not vary as a function of 
group representation, order or the interaction of both, Fs < 1.6, ps > .05. In contrast, group 
representation had a significant effect on outgroup evaluation, F(2,78) = 4.75, p < .05,  
η2 = .109. The main effect of order and the interaction were not significant, Fs < 1. A contrast 
that compared outgroup evaluation between the subgrouping and subtyping conditions with 
the control condition (-1 2 -1) revealed a significant result, t(81) = 3.08, p < .01.  
Although the experimental manipulation did not influence perceived prototypicality in 
the subtyping condition as compared to the control condition, participants in the subtyping 
condition showed more ingroup bias than participants in the control condition. Unexpectedly, 
participants in the subgrouping condition showed more ingroup bias compared to the control 
condition, too.  
Relation between relative ingroup prototypicality, PNS, diversity beliefs, and intergroup 
evaluation. In a multiple regression approach following Aiken and West (1991) it was tested 
whether the relation between relative prototypicality and ingroup bias was moderated by 
mental ingroup representation. For this purpose, the experimental conditions were effect-
coded ([1 -1 0] contrasting subgrouping and control condition and [0 -1 1] contrasting 
subtyping and control condition). Both effect codes and the z-standardized prototypicality 
measure were entered into the regression model first. Then, the interaction terms were entered 
as predictors, too. 
The model with both effect-coded variables and the indirect measure of prototypicality 
reached significance, R2 = .153, F(3,80), p < .05. Adding the interaction terms did not lead to 
a significant change in R2, R2-change = .002, F < 1. Indirect prototypicality was not a 
significant predictor of ingroup bias when controlling for mental representation, β = .129,  
p > .1. 
Using the direct measure of prototypicality and both effect-coded variables as predictors 
led to a significant regression model, R2 = .220, F(3,80) = 7.54, p < .001. Again, including the 
interaction terms did not lead to a significant increase in the portion of explained variance,  
R2-change = .031, F(2,78) = 1.61, p > .1. The analysis of simple slopes, however, showed the 
expected pattern. The simple slope for the control condition was not significant, β = .009, p > 
.1, whereas the simple slopes for the subgrouping and subtyping conditions were both 
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direct prototypicality and ingroup bias for the three conditions of mental representation can be 
seen in Figure 3. On account of the results of the simple slopes analysis, the regression 
analysis was computed anew, contrasting the subgrouping and subtyping conditions together 
against the control condition [-1 2 -1] and testing subgrouping and subtyping against each 
other in a second contrast-coded variable [1 0 -1]. The marginally significant interaction term 
between the [-1 2 -1] coded variable and direct prototypicality, β = -.171, p = .09, indicated 
that the ingroup prototypicality-ingroup bias link in the subgrouping and subtyping conditions 
were stronger than that in the control condition. The second interaction term was not 
significant, t < 1, indicating that the slopes in the subgrouping condition and the subtyping 
condition did not differ. 
With respect to the role of diversity beliefs, there was neither an interaction between 
diversity beliefs and experimental condition for ingroup evaluation nor for outgroup 
evaluation or ingroup bias, R2-changes < .002, Fs < 1. There was a tendency for a relation 
between ingroup bias and diversity beliefs in the expected direction, β = -.174, p = .11. 
Diversity beliefs did not predict evaluation of the ingroup, β = .128, p > .1, but evaluation of 
the outgroup was related to diversity beliefs in the expected direction, β = .283, p < .01.  
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Figure 3. The relation between relative ingroup prototypicality and ingroup bias in the three 
experimental conditions (Experiment 2). 
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The relation between PNS and ingroup bias was not moderated by experimental 
condition either, R2-change = .014, F < 1, but as PNS is a construct which consists of two 
factors (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993), a moderation was tested for both factors of PNS 
separately. The moderation of ingroup bias and the factor “desire for simple structure” by 
mental representation approached significance, R2-change = .048, F(2,78) = 2.30, p < .11, the 
moderation of ingroup bias and the factor “response to lack of structure” by mental 
representation did not, R2-change = .003, F < 1. Furthermore, for the factor “desire for simple 
structure” was tested whether the subgrouping and subtyping conditions converged in respect 
to the relation between PNS and ingroup bias, whereas the control condition was tested for 
divergence. A moderation analysis with the contrast codes of [-1 2 -1] and [1 0 -1] was 
calculated, which yielded a significant interaction term for the former contrast code, β = .219, 
p < .05, but no significant result for the latter, β = .013, p > .1. Simple slopes were calculated 
within each experimental condition for the relation between ingroup bias and the subfactor 
“desire for simple structure”. The simple slopes in the subgrouping and subtyping conditions 
were not significant, β = -.076, p > .1, and β = -.119, p > .1, whereas “desire for simple 
structure” and ingroup bias were significantly related in the control condition, β = .365, p < 
.05 (see Figure 4).  
It was also tested how PNS relates to relative prototypicality. Interestingly, PNS was 
neither related to indirect nor to direct prototypicality, β = -.077, p > .1, and β = -.079, p > .1. 
Neither relation was moderated by experimental condition, R2-change = .013, F < 1, and R2-
change = .027, F(2,79) = 1.15, p > .1. 
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Figure 4. The relation between “desire for simple structure” and ingroup bias in the three 
experimental conditions (Experiment 2). 
5.2.5 Summary 
The aim of Experiment 2 was to replicate the subtyping effect of Experiment 1. 
Furthermore, the role of interindividual differences was investigated. It was hypothesized that 
interindividual differences are predictors of ingroup bias in “psychologically weak situations” 
but that they loose predictive power in “psychologically strong situations”. Concerning 
subgrouping, it was investigated whether stronger manipulations of subgrouping than in 
Experiment 1 would have effects on projection and evaluation such that more complex 
ingroup representations either decrease the magnitude of relative ingroup prototypicality or 
weaken the relation between relative ingroup prototypicality and ingroup bias.  
To summarize the results, a significant interaction between experimental condition and 
order was obtained for identification with the ingroup. This effect was also found for direct 
prototypicality. However, none of the other dependent variables varied with the order of 
ingroup and outgroup judgments. As the effect for ingroup identification occurred before the 
order factor was introduced it was attributed to an α-error in the randomized assignment of 
participants to the cells of the experimental design. It is possible that the effect of ingroup 
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identification was transferred to the direct prototypicality measure. However, the interaction 
between order and mental representation did not include the subtyping and control condition.  
Similar to Experiment 1, prototypicality measures were not affected by experimental 
manipulations. However, the control condition showed significantly less ingroup bias 
compared to the subgrouping and the subtyping condition. In the two latter conditions, 
relative ingroup prototypicality was the basis for ingroup bias as indicated by significant 
relations between relative ingroup prototypicality measures and intergroup evaluation, 
whereas it was the desire to gain simple structure which predicted intergroup evaluation in the 
control condition. Thus, in those conditions in which high ingroup bias was obtained, ingroup 
bias was based on the perception of relative ingroup prototypicality. As expected, diversity 
beliefs were significantly correlated with more positive outgroup evaluations and marginally 
with reduced ingroup bias. Interestingly, diversity beliefs decreased significantly in the 
subgrouping condition.  
Hence, it was possible to provide evidence for the subtyping effect in two experiments. 
Open to question remains the effect of subgrouping. Processes that might be triggered by 
subgrouping and that have caused the results in Experiment 1 and 2 are discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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5.3 Discussion of Part I 
The two experiments reported in Part I investigated the influence of mental ingroup 
representations on projection and intergroup evaluation. In Experiment 1 experimental 
manipulations did not change the magnitude of relative ingroup prototypicality as measured 
by direct and indirect indices of prototypicality for the superordinate category. Nonetheless, 
more ingroup bias was found following a subtyping manipulation compared to a control and a 
subgrouping condition. Furthermore and in line with the hypothesis on the relation between 
ingroup prototypicality and ingroup bias, the subtyping condition showed a stronger link 
between relative ingroup prototypicality and ingroup bias. In Experiment 2, relative ingroup 
prototypicality was not affected by experimental manipulations either. Again, the subtyping 
manipulation led to more ingroup bias compared to the control condition. Unexpectedly, the 
subgrouping condition also led to more ingroup bias than the control condition. Interestingly, 
in the two conditions in which most ingroup bias was expressed, intergroup evaluation was 
based on relative ingroup prototypicality whereas intergroup evaluation in the control 
condition was strongly based on the individual desire for simple structure.  
To conclude, ingroup features seem to be projected onto the superordinate category 
irrespective of the complexity of the mental representation of the ingroup as indicated by the 
constant amount of relative ingroup prototypicality across experimental conditions in both 
experiments. However, relative ingroup prototypicality was not the basis for intergroup 
evaluation per se. It is rather the clarity of the prototype which determines if the prototype 
becomes prescriptive. I want to focus on the subtyping conditions in both studies first. 
Apparently, a projected ingroup prototype is a reliable ground for evaluation if the prototype 
possesses little complexity. This expected pattern was indicated by the simple slopes for 
relative ingroup prototypicality and ingroup bias in the subtyping conditions of both 
experiments. This finding parallels the results of Hogg et al. (1993) who showed that the 
prototypicality of an ingroup member only predicted liking if the group possessed a clear and 
simple prototype. In the control group, the central tendency of the ingroup was projected, too, 
as suggested by the constant amount of relative ingroup prototypicality across conditions. 
However, perceived prototypicality did not predict ingroup bias in the control condition, so 
that some characteristic of the prototype of the ingroup and superordinate category may have 
prevented that prototypicality was taken as a prescriptive standard for intergroup evaluations. 
The personality variable PNS led to a further completion of the interpretation. A subscale 
of PNS was a predictor of ingroup bias in the control condition, but its predictive power 
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diminished in the other experimental conditions. This result fits Snyder and Ickes’ idea (1985) 
that strong social situations overpower the influence of personality variables. Subtyping, that 
is, the creation of a simple ingroup representation, seemed to be such a strong situation, in 
which intergroup evaluations are guided by the availability of a unique prototype.  
I now turn to the results of the subgrouping manipulations. In Experiment 1 the 
subgrouping condition did not differ from the control condition. The instruction to form 
subgroups within the ingroup might not differ from the default mental representation of the 
ingroup. As already discussed, research by Park et al. (1992) suggested that participants more 
easily produced subgroups of the ingroup compared to the outgroup. Thus, asking participants 
to form subgroups of the ingroup may have led to a reproduction of the default mental 
representation of the ingroup and, therefore, did not affect the mental representation of the 
ingroup as compared to the control condition.  
In contrast, in Experiment 2, participants were forced to think about subgroups which 
they did not choose themselves. Thinking about subgroups predetermined by the experimenter 
might exceed the participant’s idiosyncratic mental representation of the ingroup. The fact 
that endorsement of diversity beliefs dropped under subgrouping might be useful in order to 
understand the increased ingroup bias. I can only speculate about this effect, but it seems 
plausible that forcing participants to think about subgroups that do not characterize their 
everyday thinking about their ingroup poses a certain threat to the distinctiveness of the 
ingroup. The “forced” complexity (and, therefore, variability) of the ingroup might threaten 
group boundaries and differentiation needs (e.g., Brewer, 1991). Especially Social Identity 
Theory emphasized the importance for the ingroup to be distinct from other groups 
(Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Jetten & Spears, 2003; see also Brewer, 
1991). Previous research has demonstrated that intergroup distance and within group 
variability trigger distinctiveness threat (Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1998). Thus, 
distinctiveness threat, resulting in an attempt to restore positive intergroup differentiation by 
ingroup bias, is also expected for high group variability. To the extent that subgrouping 
increases perceived ingroup variability, it may therefore lead to distinctiveness threat and, as a 
consequence, to a positive intergroup differentiation in terms of ingroup favoritism. In 
addition to social identity motives, it is also possible that positive ingroup differentiation is a 
means to re-establish a clear recategorization in order to conserve the resource-saving 
simplification of the social environment (Macrae et al., 1994). According to this notion, threat 
is a motivated cognition which is not aiming at positive ingroup distinctiveness but to a 
clearly categorized world in general. Irrespective of the underlying cause, it is conceivable 
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that participants rebuild the ingroup as a distinct unit through a devaluation of diversity in 
order to re-establish distinctiveness. This would suggest a paradoxical effect: Participants 
repair the threat posed by complexity through a denial of diversity within their ingroup. If it is 
correct that projection and evaluation only correlate if the prescriptive prototype is clearly 
defined and if subgrouping leads to a denial of ingroup diversity it is a logical outcome that a 
significant ingroup prototypicality-ingroup bias link under subgrouping was found. It goes 
without saying, however, that the assumed phenomenon of distinctiveness threat within the 
field of ingroup diversity needs further consideration and empirical evidence. The role of 
distinctiveness threat will be considered in further detail in the second part of the present 
thesis. 
In essence, from the experiments in Part I it might be concluded that intergroup 
evaluation only depends on projection if the projected prototype is clearly defined so that it 
can serve as a prescriptive standard. This conclusion is particularly based on the comparison 
between subtyping and control condition that showed that prototypicality only predicts 
ingroup bias under subtyping. More generally it can be concluded that mental ingroup 
representations in terms of complexity play a crucial role in projection and intergroup 
evaluation. 
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6 Part II: The role of variability of mental ingroup representation in 
ingroup projection  
Concerning the effects of complex and simple ingroup representations within the Model 
of Ingroup Projection, I assumed that two processes were possible. One possibility was a main 
effect of ingroup complexity on relative ingroup prototypicality such that higher levels of 
complexity reduce the perception of relative ingroup prototypicality. The second possibility 
was that ingroup complexity moderates the relation between relative ingroup prototypicality 
and ingroup bias such that complex ingroup representations weaken the ingroup 
prototypicality-ingroup bias link. Experiment 1 and 2 demonstrated that the prototypicality-
ingroup bias relation was a function of ingroup complexity. Thus, evidence for the hypothesis 
concerning a moderation effect was provided. 
In the second part of the present thesis the role of variability within the projection 
process is considered. Variability is of course closely related to complexity. But as already 
outlined in the theoretical part, complexity is a broader concept than variability. Complexity 
refers to the differentiation of stimuli in a first step and to the integration of stimuli according 
to their similarities on multiple dimensions in a second step (Scott, 1969). As already outlined 
before, I argue that variability refers to differentiation but not to integration. Thus, a category 
is variable to the extent that the corresponding stimuli are widely distributed on multiple 
dimensions but not clustered according to similarities. As variability comprises only one 
component, namely differentiation, it could be understood as the more parsimonious strategy 
because it might require less cognitive effort. It was the interest of the present thesis to 
investigate whether simple variability manipulations are already sufficient to establish effects 
on relative ingroup prototypicality and intergroup evaluation. In particular and in line with the 
hypotheses formulated in the theoretical part, it was tested whether variability of the ingroup 
representation affects the magnitude of relative ingroup prototypicality and whether 
variability of the ingroup representation affects the strength of the ingroup prototypicality-
ingroup bias relation. 
The second part of this dissertation encompasses Experiment 3 and Experiment 4. In both 
Experiment 3 and Experiment 4 diversity versus unity manipulations of Waldzus et al. (2003, 
2005) were employed to induce high versus low levels of ingroup variability. Furthermore, 
different levels of variability were also induced for the mental representation of the 
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superordinate category in Experiment 3. Effects of superordinate category variability on 
relative ingroup prototypicality would replicate the results of Waldzus et al. (2003; 2005). 
Experiment 4 opens another perspective on variability of mental ingroup representations. In 
particular, the role of distinctiveness threat (Jetten & Spears, 2003) was investigated as a 
negative side effect of increased variability of mental ingroup representations.  
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6.1 Experiment 3 
6.1.1 Introduction 
In Experiment 3, I wanted to test whether perceived ingroup variability (as opposed to 
ingroup complexity) has the potential to reduce projection tendencies or to weaken the 
ingroup prototypicality-ingroup bias link. For this purpose, the manipulation of Waldzus et al. 
(2003; 2005) was used which induces unity or diversity of a social category. Although 
Waldzus and colleagues intended to manipulate complexity by asking participants to either 
think about the unity or the diversity of a social category, in this thesis it was proposed that 
unity and diversity mainly refer to variability rather than to complexity. To think about the 
diversity of a social category instigates differentiation between the stimuli within that 
category. Relying on the proposed difference between variability and complexity, I suggested 
that unity and diversity manipulations miss the integration component and, therefore, should 
be conceived as a manipulation of variability. 
Waldzus et al.’s (2003, 2005) approach was to manipulate the mental representation of 
the inclusive category. They argued that people cannot project ingroup features onto diverse 
superordinate categories. With the same argument as in Experiments 1 and 2, I would argue 
that the manipulation of the variability of the ingroup representation is also an effective 
means to either prevent projection or to moderate the ingroup prototypicality-ingroup bias 
relation. Thus, both ingroup and superordinate category manipulations are hypothesized to 
change processes in ingroup projection. 
Ingroup diversity was predicted to lead to less relative ingroup prototypicality and, 
therefore, to less ingroup bias. On the other hand, superordinate category diversity was 
predicted to lead to less relative ingroup prototypicality and, therefore, to less ingroup bias. 
The hypothesis concerning the superordinate category relates to the work of Waldzus et al. 
(2003, 2005) and a confirmation of this hypothesis would represent a replication of previous 
research. An effect of ingroup diversity and superordinate category diversity such that both 
lead to less relative ingroup prototypicality translates into a main effect of variability on 
relative ingroup prototypicality.  
As we know from Experiment 1 and 2, projection can occur irrespective of the mental 
ingroup representation. At the same time, Experiment 1 and 2 provided some evidence for the 
reasoning that only a mental ingroup representation of little complexity can serve as a 
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prescriptive standard for evaluation. In line with Experiment 1 and 2, it is hypothesized that 
the relation between relative ingroup prototypicality and intergroup evaluation should only 
occur if variability is perceived to be low. This effect translates into a statistical interaction 
effect between relative ingroup prototypicality and variability of the mental representation on 
ingroup bias. 
The intergroup situation in Experiment 3 consisted of Germans as the ingroup, Poles as 
the outgroup and Europeans as the superordinate category. This setting was adopted from 
Waldzus et al. (2003). The design was a 2 (mental representation: unity versus diversity) × 2 
(level of manipulation: ingroup versus superordinate category) between-participants design 
with a non-orthogonal control group. 
6.1.2 Method 
Pretest. 20 participants were asked to rate how typical each of 51 attributes was of 
Germans and Poles on rating scales ranging from +3 (applies to Poles) via 0 (applies to both) 
to +3 (applies to Germans). 4 Persons were excluded from the analysis because they indicated 
that they did not have the German citizenship. Likewise, another 20 participants were asked to 
indicate the same attributes’ valence on 7-point scales ranging from -3 (very negative) to +3 
(very positive).  
Eight attributes were chosen of which four were perceived as applying to Poles (e.g., 
“religious”) and four were perceived as typical of Germans (e.g., “efficient”). After the rating 
scales were transformed into scales ranging from -3 (applies to Poles) to +3 (applies to 
Germans), the mean typicality of the Polish attributes was M = -1.24 (SD = 1.16) and the 
mean typicality of the German attributes was M = 1.17 (SD = 1.09). Importantly, the four 
typical Polish attributes were perceived as moderately positive on average (M = 1.13, SD = 
1.12), as were the four typical German attributes (M = 1.22, SD = 1.02).  
Participants. Participants were students from the University of Giessen. The Experiment 
was advertised on campus as a study on how Europeans perceive Europe. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of four conditions of the 2 (variability: unity versus diversity) × 2 
(level of manipulation: ingroup versus superordinate category) design or the control group. 
All participants were members of the ingroup “Germans” so that the final sample consisted of 
all 111 initial participants with 22 or 23 participants in each condition. Participants received 5 
EUR for their participation. 
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Procedure. Participants completed the experiment individually but in sessions with up to 
12 participants. The presented intergroup situation described Europe as the superordinate 
category which contained Germans and Poles as ingroup and outgroup. First, participants read 
that the purpose of the study was to assess the perception of Europe, Germany, and Poland 
from different perspectives. This introduction was intended to make the intergroup situation 
with ingroup, outgroup and superordinate category salient.  
Thereafter, the manipulation of diversity versus unity, respectively, referred either to the 
ingroup or the superordinate group. In the diversity condition, participants were asked to think 
about the diversity of the respective group (i.e., ingroup or superordinate category) and to 
describe this diversity in a short paragraph. The wording of the unity condition was analogous 
except that the word “diversity” was exchanged with unity. These manipulations were 
adopted from Waldzus et al. (2003, 2005). The control condition only received the 
introduction. 
On the pages following the manipulation, the dependent measures were assessed. After 
the entire questionnaire was completed, participants were thanked and received 5 EUR for 
participation. Participants were debriefed via electronic mail after the data collection was 
completed. 
Dependent Variables. First, participants indicated their identification with the ingroup 
and with the superordinate category on four items each (e.g., “I identify with the [Germans, 
Europeans]”). These questions were answered on 6-point scales ranging from 0 (does not 
apply at all) to 5 (applies completely). Like in Experiment 1 and 2, identification was an 
important control variable. As a manipulation check, the global within group similarities of 
the ingroup, the outgroup and the superordinate category were assessed with one item each. 
Participants rated their agreement with the item “The [Germans, Poles, Europeans] are mostly 
very similar to each other” on 7-point scales ranging from -3 (does not apply at all) to +3 
(applies completely) (Maurer et al., 1995).  
Next, participants rated the ingroup, the outgroup and the superordinate category on eight 
attributes on rating scales ranging from -3 (not at all) to +3 (completely). According to the 
pretest, four of the eight attributes were stereotypical of Germans (e.g., „efficient“) and four 
of Poles (e.g., „religious“). As in Part I, these ratings were used to calculate Euclidean 
Distances between the superordinate category and the ingroup and outgroup, respectively. The 
difference between outgroup-superordinate category distance and ingroup-superordinate 
category distance served as an indirect measure of perceived prototypicality of the ingroup 
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relative to that of the outgroup (indirect prototypicality). Perceived prototypicality was also 
assessed directly (direct prototypicality). Participants rated the statements “[Germans, Poles] 
are typical of Europeans” on 7-point scales from -3 (does not apply at all) to +3 (applies 
completely).  
To assess intergroup evaluation, the ingroup was rated on two items “I like Germans” 
and “I like the German mentality” on 7-point scales ranging from -3 (does not apply at all) to 
+3 (applies completely). For outgroup evaluation, eleven items were available. In particular, 
the two items paralleling ingroup evaluation (e.g., “I like Poles”) plus nine more items (e.g., 
“I would like to have contact to Poles”) were employed. As an index of ingroup bias the 
difference between ingroup evaluation and outgroup evaluation on the two common items 
was calculated. 
6.1.3 Results and discussion 
In order to analyze the 2 × 2 between-participants design, two-factorial between-
participants ANOVAs were conducted. The manipulation of unity versus diversity is entered 
into the ANOVA as “mental representation”-factor. The mental representation was either 
manipulated at the level of the ingroup or at the level of the superordinate category. This 
second orthogonal factor is referred to as “level of manipulation”-factor. The non-orthogonal 
control condition was not included in these 2 × 2 ANOVAs. If the 2 × 2 ANOVAs revealed a 
significant effect of experimental manipulation, planned contrast analyses including the 
control group were employed in order to provide information about the relation between 
experimental conditions and the baseline.  
Identification. After the exclusion of one item in both the ingroup identification scale and 
the superordinate category identification scale (“Sometimes I regret being [German, 
European].”), the scales were reliable (Cronbach’s α = .88 and .91, respectively). An ANOVA 
with target group (i.e., identification with the ingroup and the superordinate category) as 
within-participants factor and mental representation and level of manipulation as between-
participants factor revealed a main effect of target group, F(1,85) = 14.08, p < .001, η2 = .142. 
The mean score of identification with the ingroup was M = 3.22 (SD = 1.10). The 
significantly higher mean identification with the superordinate category was M = 3.77 (SD = 
1.06). No further main effect or interaction occurred, Fs < 1. Both means differed 
significantly from the scale midpoint of 2.5, t(110) = 6.88 and t(110) = 12.66, ps < .001. The 
results indicated that participants were more identified with the superordinate category across 
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all conditions. Moreover, identification with both the ingroup and the superordinate category 
was considerably high. But importantly, neither identification with the ingroup nor with the 
superordinate category varied as a function of experimental manipulation. 
Manipulation check. To check the efficiency of the manipulation at the ingroup and the 
superordinate category level, 2 (mental representation) × 2 (level of manipulation) ANOVAs 
were calculated with either the similarity measure of the ingroup or the superordinate category 
as dependent variables. None of the effects was significant, Fs < 1. It was also tested whether 
the manipulation of ingroup or superordinate category variability affected the mental 
representation of the outgroup. Using the similarity measure of the outgroup as dependent 
variable, the 2 × 2 ANOVA did not reveal a significant effect either, Fs < 1. 
Indirect and direct measures of prototypicality. Table 5 displays means and standard 
deviations of the indirect prototypicality measures for ingroup and outgroup. A 2 × 2 × 2 
ANOVA with target group as within-participants factor and mental representation and level of 
manipulation as between-participants factors yielded a significant effect of mental 
representation, F(1,84) = 4.28,9 p < .05, η2 = .049. The means in Table 5 suggest that in the 
unity conditions both the ingroup and the outgroup were perceived as less prototypical (i.e., 
more distant) of the superordinate category (Md(IG-SC) = 3.66, SD = 1.36, and Md(OG-SC) = 4.03, 
SD = 1.76) than in the diversity conditions (Md(IG-SC) = 3.26, SD = 1.62, and Md(OG-SC) = 3.27, 
SD = 1.57). All other effects were not significant, Fs < 1.10. Specifically, ingroup and 
outgroup were perceived as equally prototypical of the superordinate category as indicated by 
their profile similarity (M = 3.46, SD = 1.50, and M = 3.66, SD = 1.70).  
Also for direct prototypicality a 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA was conducted with target group as 
within-participants factor and mental representation and level of manipulation as between-
participants factors. The analysis revealed a main effect of target group, F(1,85) = 54.77, p < 
.001, η2 = .392. The ingroup was perceived as more prototypical of the superordinate category 
than the outgroup (M = .38, SD= 1.32 versus M = -.49, SD = 1.15). In line with predictions, 
the target group × mental representation interaction was also significant, F(1,85) = 4.06, p < 
.05, η2 = .046. The means in Table 5 show that in both diversity conditions the differences 
between ingroup and outgroup prototypicality were smaller than in the unity conditions (M = 
.64, SD= 1.25 versus M = 1.11 , SD = .94). An unexpected marginal interaction effect 
                                                 
9 Due to one missing value in the diversity/ingroup condition, this test was based on a sample of N = 
88 so that the error term has only 84 degrees of freedom. 
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between mental representation × level of manipulation emerged, F(1,85) = 3.11, p = .08. 
Table 5 suggests that participants in the superordinate category/unity condition perceived both 
ingroup and outgroup as more prototypical of the superordinate category. However, this effect 
was only marginal. There was no further main, second or third order interaction effect 
(F(1,85) = 1.70, p > .1, for the main effect of mental representation, other Fs < 1). Using 
relative direct prototypicality (i.e., the difference measure) as a dependent measure and 
contrasting the unity conditions against the control condition in a first contrast and the 
diversity conditions against the control condition in a second contrast, revealed no significant 
effect, t(104) = 1.45, p > .1, and t < 1.  
As indicated by the significant two-way interaction (mental representation × target 
group), diversity manipulations led to less relative ingroup prototypicality. This replicates the 
results of Waldzus et al. (2003; 2005) where a diversity manipulation at the superordinate 
category level was related to less relative ingroup prototypicality than a unity manipulation. 
Furthermore, the results presented here showed that also a diversity manipulation at the 
ingroup level was related to less relative ingroup prototypicality compared to a unity 
manipulation. Since no three-way interaction occurred, both the manipulation of mental 
representation at the ingroup level as well as at the superordinate category level can be 
assumed to be equally effective in reducing relative ingroup prototypicality. 
Intergroup evaluation. Ingroup and outgroup evaluation were assessed with two items 
each (r(109) = .635, p < .001; r(108) = .588, p < .00110). Table 5 displays mean evaluation 
scores and standard deviations as a function of experimental manipulation. A 2 (mental 
representation) × 2 (level of manipulation) × 2 (target group) ANOVA was conducted. The 
ingroup was evaluated better than the outgroup (M = .68, SD = 1.11, and M = .35, SD = .97) 
reflecting the classical ingroup bias, F(1,84) = 5.49, p < .05, η2 = .061. No further main 
effects, two- or three-way interactions were obtained, F(1,84) = 2.28, p > .1, for the mental 
representation × target group interaction, all other Fs < 1. Although the mental representation 
× target group interaction was not significant, note that the means in Table 5 indicate on a 
descriptive level that contrary to predictions the difference between ingroup and outgroup 
evaluation was especially pronounced in the diversity conditions (M = .70 and M = .41) 
whereas the difference was smaller in the unity conditions (M = .22 and M = .02). 
                                                 
10 Due to one missing value in the unity/superordinate category condition, this test was based on a 
sample of N = 110 so that the error term has only 108 degrees of freedom.  
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Table 5. Means and standard deviations of indirect prototypicality, direct prototypicality and 
evaluation of the ingroup and outgroup as a function of mental representation and level of 
manipulation (Experiment 3).  
Ingroup Superordinate category Control  
Unity Diversity Unity Diversity  
Dependent 
variable 
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Euclidean 
Distance 
          
d(IG-SC) 3.73 1.40 3.31 1.71 3.59 1.35 3.21 1.56 4.23 1.57 
d(OG-SC) 4.16 1.86 3.31 1.39 3.90 1.67 3.23 1.75 3.88 1.51 
Direct 
typicality 
          
Ingroup .35 1.53 .32 1.17 .95 1.21 -.09 1.19 .05 1.65 
Outgroup -.70 1.29 -.45 1.01 -.23 1.38 -.59 .80 -.55 1.44 
Evaluation           
Ingroup .59 1.16 .98 1.05 .43 1.22 .73 1.01 .36 1.28 
Outgroup 
(2 items) .37 .98 .27 1.13 .43 1.06 .32 .75 .32 1.35 
Outgroup 
(11 items) .22 1.14 .40 .98 .31 1.04 .54 1.21 .48 1.3 
Note. d(IG,SC): Euclidean Distance between the ingroup and superordinate category trait 
ratings; d(OG,SC): Euclidean Distance between the outgroup and superordinate category 
trait ratings. 
For the evaluation of the outgroup, altogether 11 items were employed. The scale was 
reliable with an internal consistency of Cronbach’s alpha = .91. The means and standard 
deviations of the 11-item scale are also presented in Table 5. A 2 (mental representation) × 2 
(level of manipulation) ANOVA was conducted. None of the effects was significant, Fs < 1.  
To summarize, the analysis of intergroup evaluation showed the well-known 
phenomenon of ingroup favoritism. But the manipulation of diversity and unity did not 
influence ingroup bias in the expected direction. In contrast, at a merely descriptive level, 
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ingroup in relation to the outgroup in the diversity conditions). Parallel to the analyses of 
Waldzus et al. (2003), I also tested if outgroup evaluation alone changed as a function of 
experimental condition. Similar to Waldzus et al. (2003) it was not possible to demonstrate a 
total effect of mental representation on outgroup evaluation.  
Relation between mental representation, relative ingroup prototypicality and intergroup 
evaluation. By a mediation analysis according to Baron and Kenny (1986) I tested the 
hypothesis that diversity leads to less relative ingroup prototypicality and that relative ingroup 
prototypicality is positively related to ingroup bias. As already demonstrated by the analysis 
of variance and in line with predictions, mental representation (coded as a contrast variable, -1 
for unity conditions, +1 for diversity conditions) was significantly related to direct 
prototypicality, β = -.212, p < .05, R2 = .045. The analysis of variance also already revealed 
that mental representation is not related to ingroup favoritism. The regression analysis 
confirmed this result, β = .160, p > .1, R2 = .026. When mental representation and direct 
prototypicality were simultaneously entered into the regression model, direct prototypicality 
was related to ingroup favoritism as expected and predicted by the Ingroup Projection Model, 
β = .250, p < .05. Furthermore, within the same regression model the direct β-weight of 
mental representation as a predictor of ingroup favoritism reached significance, β = .216, p < 
.05. Surprisingly, diversity led to more ingroup favoritism if direct prototypicality was 
controlled for. For an illustration of the mediation analysis see Figure 5.  
 
.160 
(.216*) 
.250* 
-.212* Mental 
representation 
Direct 
prototypicality 
Ingroup bias 
Figure 5. The relations between mental representation, direct prototypicality, and ingroup 
bias. * p < .05. Mental representation: (-1) unity manipulation; (+1) diversity manipulation. 
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In order to test if the relation between ingroup favoritism and direct prototypicality was 
moderated by experimental conditions, I conducted a moderation analysis following the 
suggestions of Aiken and West (1991). Three contrast-coded variables (i.e., the main effect of 
mental representation [-1 1 -1 1], the main effect of level of manipulation [-1 -1 1 1] and their 
interaction [1 -1 -1 1]) and the z-standardized direct prototypicality variable were entered into 
a regression model with ingroup favoritism as a dependent variable. The model as a whole 
reached marginal significance, R2 = .093, F(4,83) = 2.12, p = .09. As already indicated by the 
mediation analysis, the contrast-coded variable which represented mental representation as 
well as the direct prototypicality variable were significant predictors of ingroup favoritism, β 
= .218, p < .05, and β = .249, p < .05. Adding the product terms of the contrast-coded 
variables and direct prototypicality did not lead to a significant change in R2, R2-change = 
.010, F < 1. Thus, the relation between ingroup bias and direct prototypicality was not 
moderated by the experimental conditions.  
The second measure of perceived prototypicality, indirect prototypicality, was not related 
to ingroup favoritism, β = .056, p > .05, and, as already indicated by the analysis of variance, 
indirect prototypicality was not affected by the experimental conditions. Similarly, there was 
no significant moderation for the relation between indirect prototypicality and ingroup bias, 
R2-change = .020, F < 1.  
Because originally the Ingroup Projection Model formulated that relative ingroup 
prototypicality predicts outgroup derogation, I also tested for the relation between relative 
ingroup prototypicality and outgroup evaluation. Evaluation of the outgroup was assessed 
with eleven items of which only two entered the difference score of ingroup bias. As for 
ingroup bias, the relation between outgroup evaluation and relative prototypicality (measured 
directly or indirectly) was not moderated by experimental condition, all |ts| < 1.5, ps > .1. 
Thus, indirect and direct prototypicality are equally good predictors of outgroup evaluation 
across all experimental conditions, β = -.312, p < .01, and β = -.309, p < .01. Like for ingroup 
bias, experimental conditions and direct prototypicality were entered simultaneously into the 
regression model with outgroup evaluation as the dependent variable. Direct prototypicality 
remained a significant predictor, β = -.362, p < .01. But contrary to ingroup bias, mental 
representation did not predict outgroup evaluations after direct prototypicality was controlled 
for, β < 1, p > .1. The same results were obtained if indirect prototypicality and experimental 
conditions were entered simultaneously into the regression model, β = -.294, p < .01, for 
indirect prototypicality and β < 1, p > .1, for mental representation. Hence, the results for 
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outgroup evaluations did not parallel the results of ingroup bias concerning variability 
manipulations as a predictor when prototypicality was controlled for. 
6.1.4 Summary 
It was hypothesized that diversity manipulations at the ingroup as well as at the 
superordinate category level lead to a decrease in perceived ingroup prototypicality. 
Furthermore and in correspondence to Experiment 1 and 2, it was expected that ingroup 
prototypicality and ingroup bias are positively related only if the mental representation of the 
ingroup and the superordinate category, respectively, are of little variability like in the unity 
conditions.  
To control for the effect of identification on ingroup bias, identification with the ingroup 
and the superordinate category were assessed. Neither identification with the ingroup nor with 
the superordinate category was influenced by experimental conditions. Although the 
manipulation check with perceived ingroup similarity did not prove the effectiveness of the 
manipulation, evidence was provided that diversity manipulations prevented participants from 
projecting ingroup attributes onto the superordinate category as indicated by a significant 
main effect of mental representation on direct prototypicality (see Figure 5). In line with the 
hypothesis, this effect was found irrespective of the level of manipulation (see the non-
significant three-way interaction). Hence, diversity manipulations at the ingroup level as well 
as at the superordinate category level may be effective means to decrease projection 
tendencies. As predicted by the Ingroup Projection Model, prototypicality perceptions (if 
measured directly) were significantly related to ingroup favoritism. But although diversity 
manipulations decreased direct prototypicality perceptions and direct prototypicality predicted 
ingroup bias, there was no total effect of mental representation on ingroup bias. However, the 
direct effect of mental representation on ingroup favoritism became significant after perceived 
prototypicality was controlled for. Interestingly, the positive regression coefficient indicated 
that diversity led to significantly more ingroup favoritism after controlling for direct 
prototypicality.  
The fact that the mediation analysis revealed significant paths from mental representation 
to direct ingroup prototypicality and from direct ingroup prototypicality to ingroup bias but no 
significant total effect from mental representation to ingroup bias (β = .160) suggests other 
processes at work. Diversity manipulations may trigger a second process that is antagonistic 
to the effect of variability on prototypicality perceptions and neutralizes the positive effects of 
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evaluation. Although neither ingroup nor outgroup evaluation varied as a function of 
experimental manipulations (F(4,106) = 1.00, p > .1, and F < 1), a consideration of the means 
at a purely descriptive level reveals that in both diversity conditions it was the evaluation of 
the ingroup that increased (see Figure 6). This points toward the assumed second, antagonistic 
process.  
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Figure 6. Mean ingroup and outgroup evaluation scores (Experiment 3). IG: Ingroup; SC: 
Superordinate category.  
In the discussion of Experiment 2, I already argued that threat might be triggered by 
diverse or complex group representations. In particular, the finding that subgrouping led to 
more ingroup bias was discussed with regard to distinctiveness threat. Although the focus of 
the distinctiveness threat literature was mainly on intergroup distance, which was supposed to 
threaten distinctiveness needs and to provoke ingroup bias (e.g., Brown & Abrams, 1986; 
Hornsey & Hogg, 2000; Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1996; Roccas & Schwartz, 1993), Jetten, 
Spears and Manstead (1997, 1998) manipulated ingroup variability and intergroup distance 
orthogonally. Jetten et al.’s (1998) data showed an interaction between intergroup distance 
and within-group variability. If the mean distance between two groups is rather high, an 
increase in ingroup and outgroup variability triggered ingroup bias which was interpreted as a 
consequence of threat. The fact that intergroup distance needs to be high for an effect of 
increased group variability to occur was interpreted such that only two groups that are 
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perceived as two different entities can feel threat to their distinctiveness. As the intergroup 
situation of Experiment 3 (and Experiment 4), Germans and Poles within Europe, consisted of 
two clearly distinguishable groups, it is conceivable that an increase in ingroup variability 
exerted threat to the groups’ distinctiveness.  
As already pointed out, it is the ingroup which is upgraded in the diversity conditions 
compared to the unity and control conditions, a result which parallels the findings of Jetten et 
al. (1997) who found a better evaluation of the ingroup and no devaluation of the outgroup in 
the distinctiveness threat condition. In Experiment 4, I want to investigate the influence of 
variability manipulations on distinctiveness threat.  
So far the main focus of the present thesis was on cognitive, “cold” processes. 
Hypothesizing distinctiveness threat as an antagonistic process, however, reintroduces a rather 
“hot” component to the model. According to social identity approaches, people feel 
threatened when their positive social identity is challenged (Jetten & Spears, 2003). In order 
to maintain positive distinctiveness, people increase ingroup evaluations relative to outgroup 
evaluations. Hence, a necessary reaction to threat is ingroup bias. On the other hand, 
distinctiveness threat can also be conceived as a motivated social cognition process where 
clear group boundaries are desirable because they facilitate an understanding of social reality 
without much cognitive effort. In this case, increasing the difference between ingroup and 
outgroup evaluation is only a means to retain clear group boundaries and is not an instrument 
to enhance ones own positive social identity. Concerning the present thesis, both motivations 
can cause the effect. However, I do not aim at disentangling these two motivations but suggest 
that the effect of diversity manipulations on ingroup prototypicality is compensated by a 
motivational process. 
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6.2 Experiment 4 
6.2.1 Introduction 
Distinctiveness threat research so far rests on the assumption that similarity between two 
groups leads to threat (for a review see Jetten & Spears, 2003). In several studies it has been 
demonstrated that a decrease of group distinctiveness led to ingroup bias. However, this 
proposition has never been measured up to date. In particular, from the manipulations of 
intergroup distance or within group variability and the resulting ingroup bias it has been 
inferred that people feel threatened. But participants have never been actually asked if they 
felt threat in response to low intergroup similarity or high within group variability.  
Similarly problematic is that the predictions of Social Identity Theory and Self 
Categorization Theory are clearly contradicting with regard to the effect of intergroup 
distance: Social Identity Theory predicts that higher intergroup similarity undermines group 
distinctiveness which provokes positive differentiation (i.e., ingroup bias) to reestablish clear 
group boundaries (Brown, 1984). In contrast, the more cognitive and perceptual perspective 
of Self Categorization Theory predicts that higher intergroup similarity deemphasizes 
differences and relates to less ingroup bias (Jetten & Spears, 2003). Thus, whereas intergroup 
similarity leads to ingroup bias according to Social Identity Theory, it leads to intergroup 
harmony according to Self Categorization Theory. Spears, Jetten and Scheepers (2002) 
conclude that “(…) both, the presence of group distinctiveness, and its absence, have been 
used to account for differentiation and discrimination between groups” (p. 148, see also 
Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). Also empirical results concerning the relation between 
distinctiveness and differentiation are rather mixed (Brown, 1984; Henderson-King, 
Henderson-King, Zhermer, Posokhova, & Chiker, 1997; Mummendey & Schreiber, 1984). 
Theoretical arguments to dissolve the theoretical contradictions come from Spears et al. 
(2002). The authors distinguish two processes that are either related to Social Identity Theory 
or to Self Categorization Theory. A reactive distinctiveness process is at work in accordance 
with Social Identity Theory and leads to ingroup bias as a consequence of high intergroup 
similarity. A reflective distinctiveness process is at work in accordance with Self 
Categorization Theory and leads to ingroup bias as a consequence of low intergroup 
similarity. Self Categorization Theory defined intergroup similarity by the meta-contrast 
which is the ratio of intergroup differences to intragroup differences (Oakes, Haslam, & 
Turner, 1994). The meta-contrast increases with an increase in intergroup differences and a 
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decrease in intragroup differences. Reflective distinctiveness is based on the meta-contrast 
principle and is, therefore, a more cognitive and perceptual process and is related to Self 
Categorization Theory. According to the reflective distinctiveness process more ingroup bias 
is expected for dissimilar groups. 
Spears et al. (2002) suggested identification with the ingroup as a moderator which 
determines whether reactive or reflective distinctiveness processes will occur. The reflective 
distinctiveness process is predominant for low identifiers whereas high identifiers will be 
more susceptible to the reactive distinctiveness process. Experimental support for this 
hypothesis comes from data collected by Jetten, Spears and Manstead (2001; see also Roccas 
& Schwartz, 1993; Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997). Further support for the assumption 
that identification will determine whether reactive or reflective distinctiveness processes are 
predominant derives from a meta-analytic integration by Jetten, Spears and Postmes (2004). 
The authors found a positive relation between intergroup similarity and ingroup bias for high 
identifiers (reactive distinctiveness) and a negative relation for low identifiers (reflective 
distinctiveness).  
The reflective distinctiveness process which is based on the meta-contrast is similar to 
the perception of prototypicality in that both are rather cognitive processes. Relying on the 
Cognitive Model of Ingroup Projection and, thus, understanding projection as a heuristic 
process, I assumed that projection occurs irrespective of the level of identification. Likewise, 
threat reactions, expressed by ingroup bias, after the induction of intergroup similarity do not 
necessarily depend on the level of identification (Pickett, Bonner, & Coleman, 2002). 
Reaction to threatened group distinctiveness could also be conceptualized in terms of more 
general social motives. For example, Optimal Distinctiveness Theory (Brewer, 1991) 
proposed opposing needs for assimilation versus differentiation as two powerful social 
motives. The assimilation need is satisfied by inclusion of the self into large social entities 
whereas the differentiation need is satisfied by contrasting others (e.g., outgroups) from the 
self. It has been shown that the differentiation need leads to more ingroup bias and increased 
levels of ingroup and outgroup homogeneity (Brewer, Manzi, & Shaw, 1993; Pickett & 
Brewer, 2001). Similar to distinctiveness threat, differentiation needs have been 
experimentally induced by increasing the overlap between ingroup and outgroup distribution 
on some attributes (Pickett et al., 2001; Pickett & Brewer, 2002). Although it has never been 
investigated, it seems very plausible that increasing the variability of the ingroup and, thereby, 
suggesting that nearly everybody belongs to the ingroup, also increases differentiation needs. 
Because the need for differentiation is understood as a very general social motive, it does not 
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necessarily depend on identification. In sum, it has been shown that both relative 
prototypicality and threat (differentiation needs) affected ingroup bias irrespective of the level 
of identification.11  
Integrating the cited research, I suggest that variability triggers two antagonistic 
processes in parallel that both affect ingroup bias. On the one hand, diverse ingroup 
representations lead to a decrease in ingroup bias via the more cognitive pathway of perceived 
prototypicality. On the other hand, diverse ingroup representations lead to an increase in 
ingroup bias via the motivational pathway of distinctiveness threat (or differentiation need). 
For the reasons discussed, the two antagonistic pathways do not necessarily depend on 
identification.  
The hypothesis that motivational and cognitive processes are antagonistic with regard to 
ingroup bias is a post-hoc explanation for the results of Experiment 3 (see Figure 5): Although 
high ingroup variability led via ingroup prototypicality to less ingroup bias, it simultaneously 
caused more distinctiveness threat which led to more ingroup bias. Thus, the outcome of these 
two processes was a non-significant relation between variability manipulations and ingroup 
bias. The aim of Experiment 4 is to investigate the role of distinctiveness threat explicitly. 
Addressing the problem that distinctiveness threat has never been measured, a scale was 
developed to measure threat and to analyze the underlying processes.  
In line with Jetten et al. (1998), it is assumed that both intergroup distance and ingroup 
variability are important components of group distinctiveness. In particular, distinctiveness 
between two groups increases with increasing intergroup distance and decreasing within 
group variability. In Experiment 4, the design of Jetten et al. (1998) was adapted and ingroup 
variability and intergroup distance were manipulated orthogonally. The idea that intergroup 
distance and ingroup similarity are two components of the distinctiveness construct can be 
understood by the metaphor of a t-test (Jetten et al., 1998): Two groups differ if their means 
are distinct and the standard deviation around them is rather small. The smaller the difference 
between the two means and the higher the standard deviations, the smaller becomes the 
                                                 
11 Though Optimal Distinctiveness Theory and the approach of Jetten and colleagues focus on 
different perspectives (i.e., the former has an interpersonal perspective whereas the latter has a group 
perspective), both theories make many similar predictions concerning intergroup distinctiveness 
(Spears et al., 2002). Therefore, the terms “differentiation needs” and “distinctiveness threat” are used 
synonymously in the following chapters. 
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likelihood that the test indicates a significant difference between two groups. So, both factors 
work in concert. Distinctiveness threat decreases if two groups become more different in 
statistical terms. Thus, I assume that the two factors combine additively with regard to 
threat.12 In particular, an increase in variability and a decrease in intergroup distance should 
lead to more distinctiveness threat. At first glance, this hypothesis contradicts the observed 
interaction effect of intergroup distance and within group variability found by Jetten et al. 
(1998). The authors demonstrated that threat only occurred as a consequence of high within 
group variability given that the intergroup distance was rather high. Jetten et al. (1998) 
reasoned that groups need to feel as two distinct entities to feel threatened by an increase in 
variability. However, in the intergroup setting of Experiment 3 and 4 (Poles and Germans) 
groups are clearly distinguishable and, thus, the extreme that ingroup and outgroup nearly do 
not differ was not investigated here. Therefore, a linear relation between distinctiveness and 
threat is hypothesized in Experiment 4. 
The prototypicality pathway relates to Self Categorization Theory and the Ingroup 
Projection Model which emphasize the cognitive and perceptual side of intergroup 
evaluations. Both intergroup distance and ingroup variability seem to be important in this 
context, too. Concerning intergroup distance, Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) stated that 
given an inclusive background, dissimilarity between groups is related to more relative 
ingroup prototypicality and leads to more negative intergroup evaluations. Indeed, Waldzus et 
al. (2003) showed a significant positive relation between dissimilarity of ingroup and 
outgroup and relative ingroup prototypicality. The role of variability for prototypicality 
perceptions has been outlined already: More variability should reduce prototypicality 
perceptions. Hence, concerning the two factors intergroup distance and ingroup variability, I 
expected two main effects with regard to ingroup prototypicality. In particular, an increase in 
variability should lead to less ingroup prototypicality; an increase in intergroup distance 
should lead to more ingroup prototypicality. These two main effects represent the cognitive 
processes derived from the perceptual principles of Self Categorization Theory and the 
                                                 
12 Note, that I only manipulated the variability of the ingroup. Using once again the t-test metaphor, I 
argue that the variability of one group is sufficient in order to produce different levels of 
distinctiveness. But I acknowledge that different levels of variability in both ingroup and outgroup 
could produce stronger effects. 
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pathway are summarized in Figure 7. 
To summarize, in the 2 (ingroup variability: unity versus diversity) × 2 (intergroup 
distance: high versus low) design I expected no effect on ingroup bias because two processes, 
namely threat and prototypicality, compensate for each other: The two independent factors 
influence the two mediating variables such that they have opposite effects on the dependent 
variable ingroup bias. Concerning threat, two main effects were expected. Firstly, low 
intergroup distance leads to more threat. Secondly, high ingroup variability leads to more 
threat. In accordance with the literature I expected that threat predicts ingroup bias. Similarly, 
for ingroup prototypicality two main effects were hypothesized. As a replication of 
Experiment 3, I expected that ingroup variability leads to less relative ingroup prototypicality. 
In addition, low intergroup distance should also lead to less relative ingroup prototypicality.  
Next to the main effects it was also tested whether the relation between ingroup 
prototypicality and ingroup bias is moderated by experimental condition as in Experiment 1 
and 2. In particular, it was expected that ingroup prototypicality and ingroup bias are 
significantly related under low ingroup variability but that this relation diminished under high 
ingroup variability. There was no directed hypothesis for intergroup distance with regard to 
the moderation hypothesis. 
 
Distinctiveness Direct 
prototypicality 
Ingroup bias Threat 
+
+
- 
+
Figure 7. The relations between distinctiveness, relative ingroup prototypicality, threat and 
ingroup bias. “Distinctiveness” refers to a composite of ingroup variability and intergroup 
distance. 
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6.2.2 Method 
Participants. Participants were 149 students from the University of Jena. They were 
recruited on campus and were asked to take part in a study on Europe. Participants were 
randomly assigned to the cells of a 2 (ingroup variability: unity versus diversity) × 2 
(intergroup distance: high versus low) factorial design and a non-orthogonal control group. As 
in the previous study, Germans were the ingroup, Poles the outgroup and Europeans the 
superordinate category. Eight students were excluded because they were not born in Germany 
or because German was not their first language. The final sample consisted of 141 German 
students. They were paid 2 EUR for their participation. 
Procedure. The distance between ingroup and outgroup was manipulated between 
participants. Then, variability of mental ingroup representation (unity versus diversity) was 
manipulated orthogonally between participants. Note that in this study only the mental 
representation of the ingroup was manipulated; the superordinate category representation was 
not subjected to any manipulation. 
As in all studies, the material comprised a general introduction about the purpose of the 
study which was announced as a study on the perception of Europe. It was mentioned that the 
study was concerned with participants’ perception of Germany, and one of its neighboring 
countries, in this case Poland, and Europe in general. This part introduced the intergroup 
situation from the start.  
In order to manipulate intergroup distance, participants were asked to think about the 
similarities (low intergroup distance) or differences (high intergroup distance) of Germany 
and its European neighbors and to write down their ideas about similarities or differences in a 
few words. The manipulation did not target intergroup distance between Germans and Poles 
directly such that it paralleled the manipulation of ingroup similarity as closely as possible. 
Thus, the manipulation focused on the mental representation of the ingroup and not the 
outgroup.  
After the intergroup distance manipulation, ingroup variability was manipulated 
orthogonally between participants. The manipulation of ingroup variability was adapted from 
Waldzus et al. (2003, 2005) and parallels Experiment 3. Participants were asked to think 
either about the unity or the diversity of their ingroup and to write down some thoughts. 
Finally, the manipulations were summarized in one sentence saying that the study was 
concerned with differences (or similarities) between Germany and their European neighbors 
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and the unity (or diversity) within Germany. The control condition did not receive any 
instructions to think about intergroup differences or ingroup variability. Then, the dependent 
measures were assessed in the same way for all five conditions.  
Dependent Variables. Identification with the ingroup and the superordinate category 
were important control variables (see Experiment 1, 2, and 3) and were assessed with four 
items each on 6-point scales ranging from 0 (does not apply at all) to 5 (applies completely). 
Next, distinctiveness threat was measured with six items (e.g., “I worry that Germany will 
lose its characteristics because of the European Unification”) (see Appendix). Participants 
indicated their agreement with six statements on 7-point rating scales ranging from -3 (does 
not apply at all) to +3 (applies completely). 
In order to obtain a measure of indirect prototypicality, participants rated the ingroup, the 
outgroup and the superordinate category on various traits. Because the intergroup situation 
was the same as in Experiment 3, the same pretested attributes as in Experiment 3 were used. 
Participants were asked for mean ratings on 7-point rating scales ranging from -3 (not at all) 
to +3 (completely). As in Experiment 3, Euclidean Distances between ingroup and 
superordinate category and between outgroup and superordinate category were calculated. 
The difference between the outgroup-superordinate category distance and the ingroup-
superordinate category distance were computed to which I refer as indirect measure of 
prototypicality. In addition, participants indicated how prototypical ingroup and outgroup are 
of the superordinate category directly on a 7-point scale ranging from -3 (not at all) to +3 
(completely). The difference between these direct ingroup and outgroup prototypicality ratings 
is taken as a direct measure of prototypicality. 
Ingroup and outgroup evaluation were assessed with four items each (e.g., “I like 
Germans/Poles.”) on 7-point rating scales ranging from -3 (applies not at all) to +3 (applies 
completely). Ingroup bias was calculated as the difference between ingroup and outgroup 
evaluation. Furthermore, the willingness to have contact to Poles was measured with four 
items (e.g., “I am interested to get to know Poles.”). The same 7-point rating scales as for 
ingroup bias were used. To obtain a more affective measure of intergroup attitude a “feeling 
thermometer” (Campbell, 1971) was employed. Participants were asked how positive they 
feel towards the ingroup, the outgroup and the superordinate category and to place themselves 
on the 10-point thermometer with the endpoints 0 (negative) and 10 (positive). 
As a manipulation check of ingroup variability, global similarity was assessed as in the 
previous experiment with one item per group. High values indicate that the members of the 
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group are perceived to be similar. In addition, I asked how diverse the ingroup, the outgroup 
and the superordinate category were perceived. Concerning the diversity scale, high values 
indicate that the group is perceived as diverse. For both variables, 7-point rating scales 
ranging from -3 (does not apply at all) to +3 (applies completely) were used. 
In order to check the effectiveness of the intergroup distance manipulation, I employed 
one verbal item and one pictorial item that was adapted from Schubert and Otten (2002). The 
verbal measure asked for similarity between the groups of Poles and Germans on a 7-point 
scale ranging from -3 (very different) to +3 (very similar). The pictorial measure shows seven 
pictures on which two circles, representing the groups of Germans and Poles, overlap to an 
increasing extend from not at all to near completely. Participants were asked which of the 
seven pictures best represented the similarity between Germans and Poles. Possible values 
range between 1 and 7 with higher values indicating a higher overlap between Poles and 
Germans. 
6.2.3 Results and discussion 
First, 2 × 2 ANOVAs were conducted to analyze the influence of intergroup distance and 
ingroup variability. I refer to the manipulation of high versus low intergroup distance as 
“intergroup distance”-factor. The factor “ingroup variability” refers to the manipulation of 
diversity versus unity. Secondly, planned contrasts including the control condition were 
conducted when an effect of experimental condition was obtained to test the experimental 
conditions against the baseline.  
Identification. The four items for ingroup and superordinate category identification 
provided reliable scales, Cronbach’s α = .77 and Cronbach’s α = .80, respectively. An 
ANOVA with ingroup identification versus superordinate category identification as a within-
participants factor and ingroup variability and intergroup distance as between-participants 
factors revealed a significant effect of target group, F(1,110) = 53.49, p < .001, η2 = .327. 
Participants were more identified with the superordinate category (M = 3.93, SD = .91) than 
with the ingroup (M = 3.12, SD = 1.10). All other main effects, two-way or three-way 
interactions were not significant, Fs < 1.9, ps > .1. Mean identification scores with the 
ingroup and the superordinate category were significantly above the scale midpoint of 2.5, 
t(140) = 7.45, p < .001, and t(140) = 19.18, p < .001. In sum, identification with both the 
ingroup and the superordinate category were rather high and neither ingroup nor 
superordinate category identification varied as a function of experimental condition.  
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Manipulation check. As manipulation check, global similarity as well as global diversity 
were assessed. Means and standard deviation are presented in Table 6. A two-factorial 
ANOVA with ingroup variability and intergroup distance as between-participants factors and 
similarity of the ingroup as dependent variable revealed a significant effect of ingroup 
variability, F(1,110) = 8.35, p < .01, η2 = .071. This indicates that participants in the diversity 
conditions perceived the members of the ingroup as less similar compared to the participants 
in the unity conditions (M = -.84, SD = 1.35, versus M = -.04, SD = 1.59). The other effects of 
the two-factorial ANOVA were not significant, Fs < 1. It was tested whether both high and 
low ingroup variability manipulations differ from the control group. Two planned contrasts 
were calculated. In assigning contrast weights of [-1 0 -1 0 2] the unity conditions were tested 
against the control condition; in assigning contrast weights of [0 -1 0 -1 2] the diversity 
conditions were tested against the control condition. Both contrasts were not significant, 
t(144) = -1.30, p > .1, for the fist contrast, t(144) = 1.21, p > .1, for the second contrast. Thus, 
unity and diversity conditions differed significantly from each other but both did not differ 
from the control condition. 
The manipulation of ingroup variability did not affect the perception of outgroup 
similarity, F(1,110) = 1.82, p > .1, for ingroup variability, other Fs < 1. Likewise, the 
perception of superordinate category variability did not vary with experimental conditions, 
F(1,110) = 1.42, p > .1, for ingroup variability, other Fs < 1.  
The analysis of global diversity yielded a similar picture. A 2 × 2 ANOVA with diversity 
of the ingroup as dependent variable revealed a significant effect of ingroup variability, 
F(1,110) = 6.01, p < .05, η2 = .052. Table 6 indicates that participants in the diversity 
conditions perceive the ingroup as more diverse than participants in the unity conditions (M = 
1.77, SD = .82, versus M = 1.32, SD = 1.12). The other effects were not significant, Fs < 1. 
Planned contrast analyses were conducted to test whether both unity and diversity conditions 
differed from the control group. Contrasting the unity conditions against the control condition 
did not reveal a significant effect, t < 1, whereas contrasting the diversity conditions against 
the control condition revealed a marginally significant effect, t(144) = -1.89, p = .06.  
The 2 × 2 ANOVA was not significant for the diversity of the outgroup, Fs < 1. 
However, conducting a 2 × 2 ANOVA with diversity of the superordinate category as 
dependent variable revealed a marginally significant effect of ingroup variability, F(1,109) = 
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3.83, p = .05, η2 = .034,13 indicating a tendency towards more perceived diversity of the 
superordinate category in the diversity conditions compared to the unity conditions (M = 2.71, 
SD = .68, versus M = 2.49, SD = .53). The other effects were not significant, Fs < 1. Also here 
it was tested whether the unity and the diversity conditions differed from the control 
condition. Both contrasts were not significant, ts < 1.2.  
Intergroup distance was assessed with one verbal and one pictorial item. Means as a 
function of experimental condition can be found in Table 6. A 2 × 2 ANOVA with the verbal 
item as dependent variable revealed no significant effects, F(1,110) = 1.62, p > .1, for 
intergroup distance, other Fs < 1. However, the pictorial measure of intergroup distance 
showed the expected effect for intergroup distance, F(1,110) = 11.04, p < .01, η2 = .091. In 
the low intergroup distance condition the ingroup and the outgroup were perceived as 
overlapping to a higher extent than in the high intergroup distance condition (M = 3.98, SD = 
1.14, versus M = 3.28, SD = 1.10). All other effects of the ANOVA were not significant, Fs < 
1. Contrasting the low intergroup distance conditions against the control condition revealed no 
significant effect, t < 1, whereas the high intergroup distance conditions differed significantly 
from the control condition, t(136) = 2.28, p < .05. 
In sum, the results on similarity and diversity demonstrate that the manipulation of 
ingroup variability was successful. The results demonstrated at the same time that variability 
manipulations of the ingroup did not affect the mental representation of the outgroup so that 
effects of variability can not be attributed to the outgroup representation. Concerning the 
superordinate category, variability manipulations did (marginally) affect the perceived 
diversity. The pictorial manipulation check on intergroup distance showed the success of the 
manipulation. The verbal intergroup distance item, however, did not confirm this result.  
                                                 
13 Due to one missing value in the unity/superordinate category condition, this test was based on a 
sample of N = 113 so that the error term has only 109 degrees of freedom.  
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Table 6. Means and standard deviations of the manipulation checks (Experiment 4).  
High intergroup 
distance 
Low intergroup 
distance 
Control  
Unity Diversity Unity Diversity  
Dependent 
variable 
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Within group 
variability 
          
Ingroup 
similarity -.14 1.63 -.97 1.40 .07 1.58 -.71 1.30 -.52 1.74 
Outgroup 
similarity .21 1.20 -.21 1.45 .24 1.27 .00 1.31 -.19 1.62 
Superordinate 
category 
similarity 
-1.18 1.42 -1.55 1.30 -1.24 1.48 -1.50 1.45 -1.78 1.15 
Ingroup 
diversity 1.36 1.13 1.76 .74 1.28 1.13 1.79 .92 1.33 1.44 
Outgroup 
diversity .89 1.13 .83 1.28 .90 1.18 1.18 1.09 1.15 1.32 
Superordinate 
category 
diversity 
2.50 .64 2.62 .56 2.48 .74 2.81 .48 2.59 .80 
Intergroup 
distance  
          
Verbal distance -.64 1.13 -.55 1.18 -.31 1.26 -.29 1.44 -.11 1.01 
Pictorial 
distance 3.21 1.17 3.34 1.04 4.10 1.21 4.10 1.21 3.85 .82 
 
Distinctiveness threat. Two main effects were expected for threat. Firstly, I expected that 
high ingroup variability instigates threat. Secondly, in line with research on distinctiveness 
threat, I hypothesized that low intergroup distance leads to more threat compared to high 
intergroup distance. The six items to measure distinctiveness threat showed less than an 
optimal level of internal consistency, Cronbach’s α = .60.  
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The threat scale was subjected to a two-factorial ANOVA with ingroup variability and 
intergroup distance as between-participants factors. A main effect of ingroup variability 
occurred, F(1,110) = 5.87, p < .05, η2 = .051. In line with the hypothesis, in the diversity 
conditions significantly more threat was experienced than in the unity conditions (M = .69, SD 
= .70, versus M = .29, SD = 1.02). The effect of intergroup distance as well as the interaction 
were not significant, F(1,110) = 1.41, p > .1, and F < 1. Planned contrasts contrasting either 
the unity conditions against the control condition or the diversity conditions against the 
control condition did not yield significant results, ts < 1. In sum, concerning the main effect of 
variability on threat, the hypothesis was confirmed that an increase in ingroup variability 
leads to more threat. However, intergroup distance did not have the expected effect on threat.  
Indirect and direct measures of prototypicality. Table 7 displays the means and standard 
deviations of the Euclidean distance measures (indirect prototypicality) between ingroup and 
superordinate category and outgroup and superordinate category, respectively, as a function of 
intergroup distance and ingroup variability. The distance measures were subjected to a 2 × 2 × 
2 ANOVA with intergroup distance and ingroup variability as between-participants factors 
and target group as within-participants factor. The target group factor revealed a significant 
effect, F(1,107) = 4.74, p < .05, η2 = .042, indicating that the ingroup is perceived as more 
distant from the superordinate category than the outgroup (M = 3.93, SD =1.50, versus M = 
3.56, SD = 1.54). All other effects were not significant, Fs < 1.  
The same analysis was conducted for direct prototypicality. Means and standard 
deviations as a function of intergroup distance and ingroup variability are presented in Table 
7. A 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA with intergroup distance and ingroup variability as between-
participants factors and target group as within-participants factor was conducted. The target 
group factor was significant, F(1,110) = 36.70, p < .001, η2 = .250, indicating that the ingroup 
is perceived as more prototypical (M = .68, SD = 1.37) than the outgroup (M = .10, SD = 
1.21). The only other significant effect was a main effect of intergroup distance, F(1,110) = 
4.04, p < .05, η2 = .035. An inspection of Table 7 shows that both ingroup and outgroup are 
rated as being more prototypical of the superordinate category in the low intergroup distance 
condition. Planned contrast analyses revealed that neither the low nor the high intergroup 
distance conditions differed from the control condition with regard to direct ingroup or 
outgroup prototypicality ratings, ts < 1. 
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Table 7. Means and standard deviations of distinctiveness threat, indirect and direct 
prototypicality, ingroup and outgroup evaluation, contact intentions and thermometer scales 
as a function of ingroup variability and intergroup distance (Experiment 4).  
High intergroup 
distance 
Low intergroup 
distance 
Control  
Unity Diversity Unity Diversity  
Dependent 
variable 
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Threat .46 .87 .72 .66 .13 1.14 .66 .75 .48 .99 
Euclidean 
Distance 
          
d(IG-SC) 3.79 1.54 4.14 1.57 4.03 1.69 3.75 1.21 3.61 1.52 
d(OG-SC) 3.59 1.73 3.74 1.75 3.54 1.31 3.38 1.41 3.43 1.60 
Direct typicality           
Ingroup .29 1.70 .59 1.05 .66 1.29 1.18 1.31 .70 1.38 
Outgroup -.18 1.36 -.03 .98 .24 1.24 .36 1.22 .33 1.21 
Evaluation           
Ingroup .39 1.38 .49 1.08 .78 1.12 .81 1.29 .91 1.09 
Outgroup .13 .92 .51 .94 .57 .87 .88 .84 .84 .90 
Contact intention .89 1.00 .88 1.43 .87 1.17 1.46 1.02 1.37 .95 
Thermometer 
scales 
          
Ingroup 5.35 3.24 4.01 2.99 4.90 3.83 5.64 3.18 6.02 3.07 
Outgroup 4.26 2.79 2.90 3.01 3.50 3.49 4.64 3.12 4.44 3.32 
Superordinate 
category 6.58 3.30 6.20 2.89 5.97 3.41 6.73 2.62 6.83 2.86 
Note. d(IG,SC): Euclidean Distance between the ingroup and superordinate category trait 
ratings; d(OG,SC): Euclidean Distance between the outgroup and superordinate category 
trait ratings. 
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To summarize, the measure of indirect prototypicality showed a significant difference 
between target groups. Surprisingly, the ingroup was perceived as more distant from the 
superordinate category than the outgroup. In contrast, the measure of direct prototypicality 
showed the expected significant differences regarding the higher prototypicality of the 
ingroup. The expected interactions between target group and within group variability (i.e., 
less perceived relative ingroup prototypicality in the diversity conditions) and between target 
group and intergroup distance (i.e., less perceived relative ingroup prototypicality in the low 
intergroup distance conditions) failed to reach significance. Instead a significant main effect 
of intergroup distance was obtained such that ingroup and outgroup are both perceived as 
more prototypical in the low intergroup distance condition. 
Intergroup evaluation. The items of ingroup and outgroup evaluation provided scales 
with internal consistencies of Cronbach’s α = .87 and .77. Table 7 displays means and 
standard deviations of both scores. A 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA with target group as within-
participants factor and intergroup distance and ingroup variability as between-participants 
factors revealed only a significant main effect of intergroup distance, F(1,110) = 6.99, p < .01, 
η2 = .060. Table 7 suggests that low intergroup distance led to a better evaluation of both 
ingroup and outgroup (Mingroup = .79, SD = 1.20, and Moutgroup = .72, SD = .86) compared to 
high intergroup distance (Mingroup = .44, SD = 1.22, and Moutgroup = .32, SD = .94). All other 
effects were not significant, F(1,110) = 2.07, p > .05, for the main effect of ingroup 
variability, all other Fs < 1. Planned contrast analyses revealed that the high intergroup 
distance conditions (marginally) differed from the control group concerning both ingroup and 
outgroup evaluation, t(136) = 1.66, p = .1, and t(136) = 2.49, p < .05. Contrasting the low 
intergroup distance conditions against the control condition with ingroup and outgroup 
evaluation as dependent variables did not yield a significant effect, both ts<1.  
We also measured intentions to have contact with the outgroup. The five items of the 
scale proved to be reliable, Cronbach’s α = .85. Mean scores and standard deviations are 
shown in Table 7. A 2 (intergroup distance) × 2 (ingroup variability) ANOVA was conducted 
on these data. Neither the two main effects nor the interaction were significant, F(1,110) = 
1.70, p > .1, for intergroup distance, F(1,110) = 1.78, p > .1, for ingroup variability, F(1,110) 
= 1.90, p > .1, for the interaction.  
Finally, thermometer scales were used in order to assess the attitude towards the ingroup, 
the outgroup and the superordinate category. As before, ingroup and outgroup thermometer 
evaluation were entered as within-participants factor into a 2 (target group) × 2 (intergroup 
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distance) × 2 (ingroup variability) ANOVA. The target group factor was significant, F(1,110) 
= 12.44, p < .01, η2 = .102, indicating that the ingroup was evaluated better than the outgroup 
(M = 4.96, SD = 3.34, versus M = 3.82, SD = 3.15). The only other significant effect was the 
two-way interaction between intergroup distance and ingroup variability, F(1,110) = 5.07, p < 
.05, η2 = .044. A closer inspection of Table 7 revealed that in the high intergroup 
distance/high ingroup variability condition and in the low intergroup distance/low ingroup 
variability condition both target groups were evaluated worse compared to the other two 
conditions. Superordinate category evaluation was also assessed with the thermometer scales. 
The evaluation of the superordinate category did not vary across experimental condition, Fs < 
1.  
In sum, the analysis of the intergroup evaluation scales did not yield significant ingroup 
bias. In contrast, the analysis of the thermometer scales revealed the classical ingroup bias. 
Because of the presumed antagonistic cognitive and motivational processes, ingroup bias, 
contact intentions and the thermometer measures did not vary across experimental condition. 
Similarly, the evaluation of the superordinate category did not vary with experimental 
conditions. 
Relation between experimental manipulation, threat, relative ingroup prototypicality, 
and intergroup evaluation. I wanted to test if perceived distinctiveness threat and ingroup 
prototypicality are both influenced by the experimental manipulations (i.e., ingroup variability 
and intergroup distance) and if they, in turn, influence intergroup evaluation in opposite ways. 
For threat, two main effects were expected indicating that more ingroup variability and less 
intergroup distance increase the feeling of threat. In turn, threat will lead to intergroup bias. 
For perceived ingroup prototypicality, I hypothesized that high levels of variability decrease 
the perception of ingroup prototypicality, as in Experiment 3. On the other hand, high 
intergroup distance was expected to enhance relative ingroup prototypicality. As predicted by 
the Ingroup Projection Model and as already shown in the present series of Experiments, 
perceived ingroup prototypicality is related to ingroup favoritism. Thus, the hypothesis was 
about two opposing mediations, or two antagonistic processes, which cancel each other out 
explaining that in total there was no effect of the experimental manipulations on ingroup bias.  
Reflecting the analysis of variance, the three contrast-coded variables (intergroup 
distance [1 1 -1 -1], ingroup variability [-1 1 -1 1], and the interaction [1 -1 -1 1]) did not 
predict ingroup bias, R2 = .009, F < 1. Considering the mediation via relative ingroup 
prototypicality, the paths between experimental condition and indirect prototypicality were 
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calculated first. None of the betas representing the predictive weight of the experimental 
conditions or the interaction were significant (βs < .1, ps > .1). Using direct prototypicality as 
dependent variable, again all three contrast-coded variables failed to reach significant levels 
(βs < .15, ps > .1). As expected, direct prototypicality was related to ingroup bias also if 
experimental conditions were controlled for, β = .229, p < .05. Likewise, indirect 
prototypicality was significantly related to ingroup bias when the experimental conditions 
were controlled for, β = .313, p < .01. Considering the mediation via threat, the result of the 2 
× 2 ANOVA was replicated in that only ingroup variability predicted threat, β = .223, p < .05. 
Entering the mediating variable threat as well as experimental condition together in a 
regression analysis, threat remained a significant predictor of ingroup bias, β = .230, p < .05. 
Concerning the experimental conditions, none of the contrast-coded variables were 
significant, βs < .150, ps > .1. The relations between ingroup variability, (in-)direct 
prototypicality, threat and ingroup bias are depicted in Figure 8.14
It was also tested how relative ingroup prototypicality and threat were related to the 
intention to have contact with the outgroup. Entering indirect prototypicality and the 
experimental conditions simultaneously into a regression analysis, indirect prototypicality was 
a significant predictor of contact intentions, β = -.207, p < .05. Similarly, direct prototypicality 
predicted contact intentions, β = -.185, p = .05. Concerning the threat pathway, a regression 
analysis also yielded a significant result such that threat was negatively related to contact 
intentions, β = -.282, p < .01. In none of the regression analysis experimental conditions 
predicted contact intentions, ps ≥ .1. 
Regressing the thermometer difference measure (i.e., the ingroup thermometer scale 
relative to the outgroup thermometer scale) on indirect prototypicality and experimental 
conditions, indirect prototypicality was a significant predictor, β = .215, p < .05. Using direct 
prototypicality as a predictor, the regression analysis also revealed a significant effect, β = 
.404, p < .001. Threat was also (marginally) related to the thermometer difference measure, β 
= .188, p = .06. Again, in none of the regression analysis experimental conditions were 
significantly related to the thermometer difference measure, p > .1. 
                                                 
14 Threat was neither predicted by indirect prototypicality, β = .002, p > .1, nor by direct 
prototypicality, β = .029, p > .1. Furthermore, neither relation was moderated by experimental 
condition, R2-change = .035, F(3,106) = 1.33, p > .1, for indirect prototypicality and R2-change = .016, 
F < 1, for direct prototypicality. 
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Figure 8. The relations (in βs) between ingroup variability, relative ingroup prototypicality, 
threat and ingroup bias (Experiment 4). β-weights refer to the variable “ingroup variability” 
with assigned contrast weights of -1 for unity and +1 for diversity. However, the regression 
analysis included “intergroup distance” and the interaction. In brackets: The relations with 
indirect prototypicality; Without brackets: The relations with direct prototypicality. * p < .05, 
** p < .01. 
Overall, the regression analyses using different dependent variables revealed very 
consistent results. The relations between relative ingroup prototypicality (measured as direct 
and indirect prototypicality) and ingroup bias, contact intentions and the thermometer 
difference measure were in line with the ingroup projection model. Similarly, threat predicted 
ingroup bias, contact intentions and the thermometer differences measure in the expected 
directions. In line with the predictions, ingroup variability triggered threat. However, the 
relation between ingroup variability and relative ingroup prototypicality was not replicated.  
Moderation of the ingroup prototypicality - ingroup bias relation and the threat - ingroup 
bias relation by experimental condition. A directed hypothesis has been formulated for the 
moderation of relative prototypicality and ingroup bias by ingroup variability. In particular, I 
hypothesized that the relation between relative ingroup prototypicality and ingroup bias only 
sustains if the ingroup representation is of little variability. On the contrary, if the ingroup 
representation reaches high levels of variability the relation between relative ingroup 
prototypicality and ingroup bias is hypothesized to diminish. Concerning threat, a moderation 
analysis testing whether the threat-ingroup bias relation was moderated by experimental 
conditions was calculated to assure that the significant relation is stable across conditions. 
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Moderations were tested in a multiple regression approach. Predictors were three contrast-
coded variables (intergroup distance [1 1 -1 -1], ingroup variability [-1 1 -1 1], and the 
interaction [1 -1 -1 1]), either perceived prototypicality or threat as continuous variables (z-
standardized) and the product terms of the contrast-coded variables and the continuous 
variables. Ingroup bias was the dependent variable.  
For indirect prototypicality, no moderation emerged, R2-change = .018, F < 1. For direct 
prototypicality, however, the interaction terms led to a significant R2-change, R2-change = 
.112, F(3,106) = 4.76, p < .01. Considering the βs of the interaction terms, the three-way 
interaction and the two-way interaction between intergroup distance and direct prototypicality 
were significant, β = -.227, p < .05, and β = .187, p < .05. In order to clarify the meaning of 
the significant betas of the product terms, simple slopes were calculated. In the unity/high 
intergroup distance condition there was a significant positive relation between direct 
prototypicality and ingroup bias, β = .377, p < .05. Similarly, in the unity/low intergroup 
distance and the diversity/high intergroup distance conditions significant positive relations 
between direct prototypicality and ingroup bias were obtained, β = .458, p < .05, and β = .626, 
p < .05. Only in the diversity/low intergroup distance conditions, the simple slope analysis 
revealed a non-significant relation, β = -.202, p > .1. In addition, ingroup bias was regressed 
on direct prototypicality in the control condition. The regression analysis yielded a non-
significant β, β = .132, p > .1 (see Figure 9). Regarding the low intergroup distance 
conditions, the relation between direct prototypicality and ingroup bias nearly replicated 
Experiment 1 and 2. This result can be conceived as support for the theoretical argument that 
only in the unity condition the projected ingroup prototype served as a comparison standard 
whereas a loosely defined ingroup prototype (diversity condition) cannot serve as such a 
standard. However, this interaction effect was only obtained in the low intergroup distance 
condition. The role of intergroup distance for the relation between relative ingroup 
prototypicality and ingroup bias will be addressed in the general discussion. 
It was also tested whether the relations between indirect and direct prototypicality and 
contact intentions were moderated by experimental conditions. The moderation analysis 
revealed that the relation between indirect prototypicality and contact intentions did not vary 
with experimental conditions, R2-change = .014, F < 1. However and similar to the 
moderation analysis with ingroup bias as dependent variable, the relation between direct 
prototypicality and contact intentions was moderated by experimental condition, R2-change = 
.086, F(3,106) = 3.63, p < .05. Considering the βs, the three-way interaction between 
intergroup distance, ingroup variability and direct prototypicality was significant, β = .250, p 
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< .01. Therefore, simple slopes were calculated. The simple slope analysis was consistent 
with previous results concerning ingroup bias: Direct prototypicality was negatively (though 
not always significantly) related to contact intentions in the high distance/unity condition, β = 
-.200, p > .1, in the high distance/diversity condition, β = -.520, p < .05, and in the low 
distance/unity condition, β = -.510, p < .05. In the low distance/diversity condition, however, 
there was no negative relation between direct prototypicality and contact intentions, β = .170, 
p > .1. In the control condition there was no significant relation between direct prototypicality 
and contact intentions either, β = -.092, p > .1. 
The relation between indirect prototypicality and the thermometer difference measure 
was not moderated by experimental condition, R2-change = .023, F < 1. Similarly, the 
moderation analysis using the direct prototypicality measure revealed no significant R2-
change, R2-change = .032, F(3,106) = 1.39, p > .1. However, the β for the three-way 
interaction reached marginal significance, β = -1.76, p = .06. To illustrate this result, simple 
slopes were calculated. Again, the simple slopes were (marginally) significant in both high 
distance conditions, βunity = .315, p = .08, and βdiversity = .668, p < .01, and in the low 
distance/unity condition, β = .582, p < .01. Again, in the low distance/diversity condition 
direct prototypicality was no predictor of the dependent variable, β = .232, p > .1. In line with 
previous results, direct prototypicality was not significantly related to the thermometer 
difference measure in the control condition, β = .200, p > .1. 
The moderation analysis for threat yielded no significant moderation when ingroup bias 
was the dependent variable: Entering the interaction terms into the model yielded no 
significant change in the predictive power of the model, R2-change = .020, F < 1. Thus, the 
relation between threat and ingroup bias is not a function of intergroup distance and ingroup 
variability or their interaction. Likewise, neither the relation between threat and contact 
intentions nor between threat and the thermometer difference measure was moderated by 
experimental condition, R2-change = .008, F < 1, and R2-change = .005, F < 1. 
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Figure 9. The relation between direct prototypicality and ingroup bias as a function of 
experimental condition (Experiment 4). 
In sum, the moderation analyses revealed consistent effects using different dependent 
measures (i.e., ingroup bias, contact intentions and the thermometer difference measure). In 
particular, the results converged such that direct prototypicality was related to ingroup bias, 
contact intentions and the thermometer difference measure in both high intergroup distance 
conditions and in the low intergroup distance/unity condition whereas there was no such 
relation in the low intergroup distance/diversity condition and in the control condition. The 
moderation analyses concerning threat indicated that threat is an equally good predictor of 
ingroup bias, contact intentions and the thermometer difference measure in all experimental 
conditions. 
 
6.2.4 Summary 
The aim of Experiment 4 was to investigate the role of distinctiveness threat when 
variability of the ingroup was manipulated. Therefore, a distinctiveness threat scale was 
developed to measure the influence of variability manipulations on threat. Because intergroup 
distance was the focus variable in distinctiveness threat research, intergroup distance was 
manipulated orthogonally to ingroup variability. It was hypothesized that high levels of 
ingroup variability and low levels of intergroup distance increase distinctiveness threat. For 
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relative ingroup prototypicality it was expected that high levels of ingroup variability and low 
levels of intergroup distance decrease relative ingroup prototypicality. In addition, the 
hypothesis was tested that ingroup variability affects the ingroup prototypicality-ingroup bias 
link such that a significant relation between these two variables is only expected for low 
levels of ingroup variability. 
To summarize, in Experiment 4 intergroup distance and ingroup variability were 
successfully manipulated as indicated by the manipulation checks. As in previous 
Experiments, identification neither with the ingroup nor with the superordinate category 
varied as a function of the experimental manipulation. Although the threat scale showed less 
than an optimal level of internal consistency, the manipulation of ingroup variability 
significantly affected the degree of experienced threat. Contrary to expectations, intergroup 
distance did not affect threat. In line with predictions, threat was a significant predictor of 
ingroup bias. The effect shown in Experiment 3 that an increase in ingroup variability 
decreased direct prototypicality was not replicated. Similarly, direct prototypicality was not 
affected by the manipulation of intergroup distance. But interestingly, low intergroup distance 
heightened the perception of both the ingroups’ and the outgroups’ direct prototypicality. 
Consequently, both ingroup and outgroup were evaluated better in the low intergroup distance 
conditions. But as expected, the relative evaluation of ingroup and outgroup did not vary 
across experimental conditions.  
The moderation analysis concerning the relation between direct prototypicality and 
ingroup bias revealed a significant effect. Interestingly, there was no significant relation 
between direct prototypicality and ingroup bias in the diversity/low intergroup distance 
condition whereas there was such a relation in the other three experimental conditions. 
Similar results were obtained when either contact intentions or the thermometer difference 
measure were used as dependent variables. If only the low intergroup distance condition is 
considered, the result can be understood as a replication of Experiment 1 and 2. In both 
experiments a significant relation between relative ingroup prototypicality and ingroup bias 
was obtained in conditions with low ingroup complexity. The interpretation of Experiment 4 
as a replication of Experiment 1 and 2 was substantiated when the manipulation check of the 
intergroup distance manipulation is considered. The mean perceived intergroup distance 
differed not from the control condition in the low intergroup distance conditions whereas the 
expected difference was observed for the high intergroup distance conditions. That the high 
intergroup distance manipulations increased the distance between ingroup and outgroup but 
that the low intergroup distance manipulations did not significantly decrease the distance 
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between ingroup and outgroup compared to the control condition seems to suggest that low 
intergroup distance is the default in this particular intergroup situation. If low intergroup 
distance is the default representation in the context of Germans and Poles within Europe, the 
significantly different relation between direct prototypicality and ingroup bias in the low 
intergroup distance/unity condition compared to the low intergroup distance/diversity 
condition might be interpreted as a replication of the experiments in Part I.  
Throughout this thesis, it has been argued that variability of the ingroup representation is 
projected onto the superordinate category. Support for this reasoning derives from the 
diversity measures in Experiment 4. Interestingly, diversity manipulations of the ingroup led 
to more perception of diversity at the superordinate category level. This finding might be 
interpreted as a support for the notion that variability of the ingroup representation is 
projected onto the superordinate category where it influences the usability of the 
superordinate category prototype as a comparison standard. 
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6.3 Discussion of Part II 
The two Experiments reported in Part II showed rather mixed results. In contrast to Part 
1, Part 2 focused on the role of variability instead of complexity. The difference between 
complexity and variability has been defined with reference to the concepts of differentiation 
and integration. Variability only refers to the differentiation of elements whereas complexity 
refers to both differentiation and integration. Both Experiments in Part II used the 
manipulations of Waldzus et al (2003, 2005) to manipulate variability.  
In Experiment 3, unity and diversity manipulations were employed to manipulate the 
variability of the mental ingroup or superordinate category representation. Confirming the 
notion of prototypicality as a function of ingroup variability, results showed that on both 
levels of categorization the manipulation of diversity led to a decrease in ingroup 
prototypicality perceptions. Prototypicality perceptions were, as expected, related to ingroup 
bias. However, diversity manipulations did not lead to less ingroup bias. To the contrary, if 
ingroup bias was regressed onto experimental condition while prototypicality perceptions 
were controlled for, the analysis even revealed the opposite effect such that diversity led to 
more ingroup bias. 
Already in Part I, I discussed the possibility that distinctiveness threat might have 
influenced the effects of complexity. The puzzling results of Experiment 3 suggested 
investigating the likely influence of distinctiveness threat. Because distinctiveness threat has 
never been measured, a distinctiveness threat scale was constructed for Experiment 4. 
Intergroup distance as a focus variable of the distinctiveness threat research was introduced as 
a second factor and was manipulated by asking participants to think about the similarities or 
differences between the ingroup category and other categories belonging to the superordinate 
category. Ingroup variability was manipulated as in Experiment 3. Both manipulations were 
successful as indicated by significant manipulation checks. 
Although the threat scale did not meet conventional levels of internal consistency, a 
significant effect of ingroup variability was obtained. As predicted, high levels of ingroup 
variability led to an increase in distinctiveness threat. However, the notion that intergroup 
distance affects threat was not confirmed. In line with the hypothesis, threat was significantly 
related to ingroup bias. On the whole, the attempt to measure threat to make conclusions 
about the different effects of variability manipulations was rather successful. However, 
neither variability of the mental ingroup representation nor intergroup distance did affect the 
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magnitude of relative ingroup prototypicality. Thus, the effect of variability manipulations on 
relative ingroup prototypicality in Experiment 3 was not replicated in Experiment 4. 
This thesis formulated a second hypothesis that specifies the conditions in which a 
relation between relative ingroup prototypicality and ingroup bias is to be expected. In 
particular, I argued that relative ingroup prototypicality predicts ingroup bias only if the 
mental ingroup representation is of little variability. Evidence for this reasoning derived from 
Experiment 1 and 2. In accordance with Experiment 1 and 2, a moderation of direct 
prototypicality and ingroup bias by experimental condition was also obtained in Experiment 
4. In particular, simple slopes analysis revealed that in the low distance/diversity condition a 
non-significant β-weight was obtained whereas the other three conditions showed significant 
positive β-weights. Similar results were obtained using contact intentions or the thermometer 
difference measure as dependent variables. It should be noted that the perceived intergroup 
distance did not differ significantly between the low intergroup distance conditions and the 
control condition whereas the perceived intergroup distance differed significantly between the 
high intergroup distance conditions and the control condition. If low intergroup distance 
represents the default intergroup distance in this particular setting, the results can be 
conceived as a replication of Experiment 1 and 2 where intergroup distance was not 
manipulated. In sum, Experiments 1, 2, and 4 supported the theoretical argument that only 
given that the ingroup mental representation is clearly defined (as opposed to variable and 
complex) it serves as a prescriptive standard at the level of the superordinate category.  
In general, the results concerning distinctiveness threat can be conceived as an 
enlightening contribution to the overall understanding of the effects of variability and 
complexity of mental ingroup representations. However, the distinctiveness threat scale used 
in Experiment 4 clearly needs some revision. It is still an unresolved issue under which 
conditions ingroup variability or complexity influence the magnitude of relative ingroup 
prototypicality and under which conditions they influence the relation between ingroup 
prototypicality and ingroup bias. Apparently, it is not the difference between variability and 
complexity that caused the different effects as Experiment 3 and 4 used the same 
manipulations.  
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7 General discussion 
7.1 Overview 
The starting point of this doctoral thesis was to investigate the role of mental ingroup 
representations for ingroup projection and intergroup evaluation. The idea that mental ingroup 
representations are crucial for projection and evaluation processes in intergroup settings 
derived from the Cognitive Model of Ingroup Projection. Because superordinate categories 
are less available and less defined than basic categories (Rosch et al., 1976), the Cognitive 
Model of Ingroup Projection has argued that features of subordinate groups are projected to 
superordinate categories in order to generate mental representations of superordinate 
categories. In contrast to exemplar-based mental group representations, prototype-based 
mental group representations can be used in a more resource-saving manner (e.g., Sherman et 
al., 2000). Hence, the generalization of prototype-based subordinate features to superordinate 
categories enables people to generate a superordinate category representation without too 
much cognitive effort. In bringing together research on the linguistic intergroup bias (e.g., 
Maass et al., 1989), the ultimate attribution error (e.g., Islam & Hewstone, 1993), spontaneous 
trait inferences (Otten & Moskowitz, 2000) and Sherman et al.’s (1998) work on prototype- 
versus exemplar-based representations in intergroup settings, it has been reasoned that 
positive ingroup and negative outgroup features are represented prototype-based whereas 
negative ingroup and positive outgroup features are represented on the basis of exemplars. 
Linking the cited research, the Cognitive Model of Ingroup projection has argued that 
concerning positive contents people use the prototype-based, abstract mental ingroup 
representation to generate a superordinate category representation.  
Relying on the Cognitive Model of Ingroup Projection, the basic concern of my 
dissertation was to find mechanisms to change the ingroup projection process. For this 
purpose, properties of prototype-based, abstract representations were identified. In reviewing 
the relevant literature and in considering theoretical arguments, variability and complexity 
were identified as two concepts related to prototype-based, abstract representations. It was 
argued that prototypes are summary representations of categories which are used as heuristic 
tools to navigate through social reality (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Heuristics as rules of thumb 
are clearly related to simplicity and low levels of variability otherwise they loose their 
characteristic as a tool that allows people to organize their every-day life without much 
cognitive effort. Following the Cognitive Model of Ingroup Projection, projection is a 
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function of the abstractness of the mental ingroup representation. Linking these assumptions, I 
hypothesized that projection is a function of complexity and variability such that ingroup 
representations should be projected to the extent that the ingroup representation is of little 
complexity and variability. In more technical terms, variability and complexity of the ingroup 
representation should affect the magnitude of ingroup projection. 
In addition, a second hypothesis was proposed. The Cognitive Model of Ingroup 
Projection has argued that ingroup features are projected onto the superordinate category to 
generate a mental image of the superordinate category. Extending this argument, I proposed 
that complexity and variability of the ingroup are projected onto the superordinate category in 
a similar manner. Following the findings of Hogg et al. (1993) who have shown that 
evaluation of ingroup members is predicted by members’ prototypicality only if the ingroup 
prototype is clearly defined, I argued that evaluation of subordinate groups is predicted by 
their prototypicality only if the superordinate category prototype is clearly defined and can, 
thus, serve as an evaluative standard for ingroup and outgroup judgments. Hence, because the 
mental representation of the ingroup is used to characterize the superordinate category 
representation I hypothesized that ingroup prototypicality is a predictor of ingroup bias only if 
the mental representation of the ingroup is clearly defined, and thus, of little complexity and 
variability. In contrast, if the superordinate category is through projection characterized by 
high levels of ingroup variability and complexity, it cannot be used as a standard and, thus, 
ingroup prototypicality is not related to ingroup bias. In more technical terms, the extent of 
variability and complexity of the ingroup representation should affect the extent to which 
prototypicality perceptions are related to intergroup evaluations. 
Subgrouping and subtyping were identified as two processes that are related to the 
complexity of mental ingroup representations. Subgrouping is to sort group members into 
clusters according to multi-dimensional similarities. Thus, subgrouping should generate a 
complex mental ingroup representation. In contrast, subtyping is the mental isolation of 
stereotype-inconsistent group members: Along the line of the stereotype consistency-
inconsistency dimension, stereotype-inconsistent members are mentally excluded from the 
group representation. After exclusion of the stereotype-inconsistent group members, the 
mental group representation is of little complexity. I argued that in contrast to complexity 
which refers to the differentiation and integration of a given set of stimuli, variability only 
refers to the differentiation of stimuli. To induce low versus high levels of variability of 
mental ingroup representations, the unity and diversity manipulations of Waldzus et al. (2003; 
2005) were employed as they trigger differentiation but do not enforce integration. The 
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empirical part was divided into two chapters. In the first chapter, complexity manipulations 
were employed whereas variability manipulations were employed in the second chapter. I will 
now briefly summarize the results of the four experiments presented in this thesis. 
The aim of Experiment 1 was to demonstrate that varying levels of complexity of the 
mental ingroup representation change the ingroup projection and intergroup evaluation 
process such that increasing complexity decreases the magnitude of relative ingroup 
prototypicality and the link between relative ingroup prototypicality and ingroup bias. In 
Experiment 1, subgrouping and subtyping manipulations for natural groups (Park et al., 1992) 
were employed in order to manipulate complexity. Next to the experimental conditions, 
Experiment 1 included a control condition. The prototypicality measures did not vary with the 
experimental manipulation. However, ingroup bias was a function of the experimental 
conditions such that the subtyping condition differed significantly from the control condition. 
Furthermore, a regression analysis testing for a moderation of the relation between relative 
ingroup prototypicality and ingroup bias by experimental condition yielded a significant 
result. Simple slopes indicated that only in the subtyping condition relative ingroup 
prototypicality was a significant predictor of ingroup bias whereas the subgrouping and 
control condition did not show a significant relation between relative ingroup prototypicality 
and ingroup bias. In accordance with the theoretical argument that only a clear prototype 
serves as a prescriptive standard, a significant difference was found between the control 
condition and the subtyping condition in the strength of the relation between relative 
prototypicality and ingroup bias. The results concerning the subgrouping condition were 
interpreted such that the request to subgroup one’s own ingroup leads to a reproduction of the 
default mental ingroup representation (see Park et al., 1992) so that no difference between the 
subgrouping and the control condition can occur. 
The main aim of Experiment 2 was to replicate the subtyping effect on ingroup bias and 
on the relation between relative ingroup prototypicality and ingroup bias. In order to 
manipulate subgrouping and subtyping, subgroups and subtypes were predefined and 
participants were asked to sort attributes to either the different subgroups or to the subtype 
and the remaining ingroup. The results largely replicated Experiment 1. Firstly, experimental 
conditions did not affect prototypicality perceptions. Secondly, in the subtyping condition 
participants showed significantly more ingroup bias than in the control condition. Thirdly, the 
relation between ingroup bias and relative ingroup prototypicality was significantly stronger 
in the subtyping condition than in the control condition. A second aim of Experiment 2 was to 
investigate the role of interindividual differences within the projection process. Based on the 
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reasoning of Snyder and Ickes (1985) it was hypothesized that interindividual differences 
determine judgmental decisions and behavior as long as no other cues guide decisions and 
behaviors (i.e., “psychologically weak situations”). PNS and diversity beliefs were introduced 
as interindividual difference measures. PNS detects the individual preference for simple 
structure and is related to ingroup bias (Shah et al., 1998). Besides PNS, a diversity beliefs 
scale was employed. A diversity beliefs scale is supposed to measure the preference for 
diverse (as opposed to homogeneous) categories (van Knippenberg & Haslam, 2003). I 
suggested that on a societal level, diversity beliefs are identical to the preference for 
multiculturalism which is related to lower levels of ingroup favoritism (Richeson & 
Nussbaum, 2004; Wolsko et al., 2000). However, as diversity beliefs are not an established 
interindividual difference measure, this scale was employed to serve explorative functions. In 
line with Snyder and Ickes (1985), I hypothesized that PNS and diversity beliefs are related to 
ingroup bias in the control condition whereas neither PNS nor diversity beliefs are significant 
predictors in the subtyping condition. Such a moderation would shed further light on the 
moderation of ingroup prototypicality and ingroup bias by complexity of mental 
representations in that it would prove that simple representations are strong cues for 
evaluation and, thus, overpower interindividual differences. 
Indeed, evidence was provided that the desire for simple structure, a subscale of PNS, 
was related to ingroup bias only in the control condition. For diversity beliefs, the expected 
moderation did not appear. Interestingly, diversity beliefs decreased under subgrouping. This 
gave interesting insights into processes that might have been triggered by subgrouping 
manipulations. In Experiment 2, participants in the subgrouping condition showed 
significantly more ingroup bias and a significantly stronger ingroup prototypicality-ingroup 
bias link than participants in the control condition. Post-hoc I argued that forcing people to 
structure their ingroup beyond their default mental representation might lead to reluctance and 
to a denial of ingroup complexity. This might have caused a contraction of the ingroup 
representation and might be expressed in the decrease of diversity beliefs. In the context of 
Experiment 2, the possibility that manipulations of ingroup complexity and variability cause 
distinctiveness threat were discussed (Jetten and Spears, 2003). 
In Experiment 3, diversity and unity manipulations of Waldzus et al. (2003, 2005) were 
employed in order to induce low versus high variability levels of mental category 
representations. The aim of Experiment 3 was to investigate whether the more parsimonious 
concept of variability is already sufficient to trigger changes in the projection and evaluation 
process. Furthermore, unity and diversity were either manipulated at the level of the ingroup 
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or at the level of the superordinate category so that the tolerance model of Waldzus and 
colleagues (2003, 2005) and the hypothesis of the present thesis were tested within one 
experiment. Manipulations of the mental ingroup representation refer to the hypothesis of the 
present line of research whereas manipulations of the mental superordinate category 
representation refer to the approach of Waldzus and collaborators (2003, 2005). The results 
confirmed the hypothesis that diverse ingroup representations decrease the perception of 
relative ingroup prototypicality. In addition, the Waldzus et al. (2003, 2005) results were 
replicated in showing that participants in the diverse superordinate category condition 
claimed less prototypicality for the ingroup. Furthermore, more perceived ingroup 
prototypicality was related to more ingroup bias. The relation between ingroup prototypicality 
and ingroup bias was not moderated by experimental condition. However, there was no total 
effect of diversity manipulations on ingroup bias. That is, variability of mental representations 
led to less ingroup prototypicality and ingroup prototypicality was significantly related to 
ingroup bias but there was no significant effect of variability of mental representations on 
ingroup bias. This suggested that a second process that is antagonistic to the prototypicality 
process shapes the mediation. In Experiment 2 it was already discussed that variability or 
complexity manipulations might trigger distinctiveness threat or differentiation needs. 
Likewise, the puzzling results of Experiment 3 were discussed against the background of 
distinctiveness threat.  
The role of distinctiveness threat was investigated more explicitly in Experiment 4. Most 
of the distinctiveness threat research manipulated intergroup distance and measured ingroup 
bias as a dependent variable. But recently also ingroup variability was manipulated in order to 
trigger threat (Jetten et al., 1998). The results confirmed that ingroup variability manipulations 
were related to ingroup bias. Thus, I reasoned that ingroup variability or complexity 
manipulations in the present line of research might have triggered threat or a need for 
differentiation. I suggested a dual pathway model that specifies the two effects of variability. 
Firstly, variability leads to less prototypicality perceptions which are related to less ingroup 
bias. Secondly, variability leads to more distinctiveness threat which is related to more bias. 
As a result, these two pathways cancel each other out such that ingroup bias is not affected by 
variability manipulations.  
Intergroup distance was manipulated orthogonally to ingroup variability to allow for a 
broader scope of distinctiveness. For ingroup variability manipulations, the instructions of 
Experiment 3 were adopted. Low versus high intergroup distance was induced by asking 
participants to think about similarities versus differences between their ingroup and other 
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groups within the superordinate category. It was expected that high levels of ingroup 
variability and low intergroup distance lead to the least ingroup prototypicality perceptions 
whereas low levels of ingroup variability and high intergroup distance lead to the most 
ingroup prototypicality perceptions. In accordance with the distinctiveness threat research, 
most threat was expected for high levels of ingroup variability and low intergroup distance 
whereas least threat was expected for low levels of ingroup variability and high intergroup 
distance. A measurement instrument for distinctiveness threat was developed to investigate 
the hypothesized, underlying processes. Although the distinctiveness threat scale did not meet 
conventional levels of reliability, variability manipulations affected distinctiveness threat such 
that diversity triggers distinctiveness threat. In line with the hypothesis, high levels of 
distinctiveness threat were related to more ingroup bias. Concerning relative ingroup 
prototypicality, the results of Experiment 3 were not replicated and neither ingroup variability 
nor intergroup distance manipulations were related to perceived ingroup prototypicality. To 
summarize, it was possible to provide evidence for the distinctiveness threat pathway but no 
evidence was provided for the prototypicality pathway within the same experiment. However, 
an interesting moderation was found in Experiment 4. In the low intergroup distance 
condition the relation between relative ingroup prototypicality and ingroup bias was 
moderated by ingroup variability such that only in the unity condition relative ingroup 
prototypicality was a significant predictor of ingroup bias. The manipulation check provided 
evidence that the low intergroup distance condition is the default representation in this 
intergroup setting in that it did not differ from the non-orthogonal control condition with 
regard to the perception of intergroup distance. Thus, Experiment 4 might be interpreted as a 
replication of Experiment 1 and 2 and as support for the argument that only ingroup 
representations of little complexity or variability serve as a prescriptive standard at the level 
of the superordinate category. This interpretation was corroborated by the finding that 
variability manipulations of the ingroup affect the perceived variability of the superordinate 
category. 
To broadly summarize the empirical part of this thesis, mental ingroup representations of 
little complexity lead to a strengthened ingroup prototypicality-ingroup bias link as compared 
to a control condition (Experiment 1 and 2). The induction of low levels of variability of 
mental ingroup representations showed mixed results. In Experiment 3 the level of relative 
ingroup prototypicality increased with decreased levels of variability of the mental ingroup 
representation whereas Experiment 4 provided evidence for a strengthened ingroup 
prototypicality-ingroup bias link in the unity condition as compared to the diversity condition 
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which might be considered as a replication of Experiment 1 and 2 (disregarding the high 
intergroup distance condition). Experiment 2 and 3 raised the question if the manipulation of 
variable and complex ingroup representations triggers distinctiveness threat. Experiment 4 
provided evidence that indeed variability manipulations increased threat.  
7.2 Strengths and limitations of the presented experiments 
In this line of research, it was assumed that variability and complexity of mental ingroup 
representations shape the ingroup prototypicality-ingroup bias link such that prototypicality is 
strongly related to ingroup bias only when the mental ingroup representation is of low 
variability and complexity. In contrast, mental ingroup representations of high complexity or 
variability were hypothesized to weaken the ingroup prototypicality-ingroup bias link. This 
hypothesis was supported in that relative ingroup prototypicality was a stronger predictor of 
ingroup bias in conditions with low complexity and variability compared to control conditions 
(Experiment 1 and 2) or high variability conditions (Experiment 4). This evidence is not 
limited to a specific intergroup setting. In different intergroup settings – business students 
versus students of economics (Experiment 1), natural science students versus students of 
humanities (Experiment 2) and Germans versus Poles (Experiment 4) – the same pattern of 
moderation emerged and therefore seems not to be restricted to characteristics of any of these 
settings.  
The present thesis relies on the Cognitive Model of Ingroup Projection. Ingroup 
identification in terms of social identity needs is not considered as a crucial variable within 
this model. However, identification should not vary across experimental condition so that the 
effects of experimental manipulations on ingroup bias cannot be attributed to varying levels of 
ingroup identification and, thus, to different levels of social identity needs. Hence, 
identification measures were important control variables. In the presented experiments, 
identification was rather high but did not vary with experimental condition.15 Therefore, 
                                                 
15 One exception was Experiment 2. Experiment 2 yielded a significant interaction between the order 
factor (i.e., ingroup variables or outgroup variables were presented first) and mental representation 
(i.e., subgrouping, subtyping and control) for identification with the ingroup. However, at the time 
participants were asked to indicate their identification with the ingroup, the order factor was not yet 
introduced. Thus, the effect can only be due to an α-error in randomized assignment of participants to 
the experimental conditions. 
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social identity needs can neither explain the effects on ingroup bias nor the effects on the 
ingroup prototypicality-ingroup bias link.  
Prototypicality is a key variable when ingroup projection processes are investigated. 
However, here and elsewhere (e.g., Waldzus et al., 2003) the reliable and valid assessment of 
prototypicality was rather difficult. In the experiments presented here, the direct and indirect 
measures of prototypicality did not always converge in their statistical association with the 
dependent measures. The effects were rather consistent across studies for the direct 
prototypicality measure in that direct prototypicality was a reliable predictor of ingroup bias 
in conditions with low levels of variability and complexity. In contrast, results concerning 
indirect prototypicality measures were rather mixed. Indirect prototypicality predicted ingroup 
bias in Experiment 1 and 4 whereas it was not significantly related to ingroup bias in 
Experiment 2 and 3. Hence, the main findings of the presented research rely on one item for 
direct ingroup prototypicality and on one item for direct outgroup prototypicality. This is 
clearly a limitation of the presented experiments. Future research should develop better 
measures of prototypicality. Implicit measures might be a promising approach in assessing 
prototypicality unobtrusively and validly (Bianchi & Mummendey, 2005).  
A strength of the presented research is that both ingroup and outgroup evaluations were 
assessed simultaneously. Declaring an increase in outgroup evaluations as a positive effect 
with regard to intergroup relations ignores the possibility that ingroup evaluations might have 
increased at the same time which maintains the difference between ingroup and outgroup 
evaluations. Similarly, manipulations might increase ingroup evaluations while outgroup 
evaluations remain at the same level. Not assessing ingroup evaluations would mask the 
actual effect of an increase in ingroup bias (for a similar reasoning see also Gaertner, Mann, 
Murrell, & Dovidio, 1989). In Experiment 3, for example, variability manipulations increased 
(at a descriptive level) ingroup evaluations whereas outgroup evaluations remained at the 
same level. The regression analyses of Experiment 3 yielded even more obvious differences 
in effects depending on the evaluation measure: The regression of ingroup bias on variability 
manipulations and relative ingroup prototypicality revealed that variability manipulations are 
positively related to ingroup bias whereas there was no such effect if outgroup evaluation was 
the dependent variable. By assessing outgroup evaluation in relation to ingroup evaluation, 
the presented research revealed a more complete picture of intergroup evaluations and can, 
thus, draw more solid conclusions about positive and negative effects of variability and 
complexity.  
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The results of the subgrouping conditions remain an unanswered question. The 
subgrouping condition did not differ from the control condition in Experiment 1. However, 
the problem with the subgrouping manipulation can be reformulated as a problem with the 
control condition: If relative ingroup prototypicality and ingroup bias are not related in the 
control condition it is not possible to demonstrate a decrease in this relation in the 
subgrouping condition. The statistically non-significant and very weak relations between 
relative ingroup prototypicality and ingroup bias in the control conditions of Experiments 1, 2, 
and 4 contradict earlier research (e.g., Wenzel et al., 2003) and illustrates that relative ingroup 
prototypicality as a predictor of ingroup bias is not a general rule. To the contrary, further 
research is needed that clarifies the conditions under which relative ingroup prototypicality 
predicts ingroup bias. This doctoral dissertation might be conceived as a beginning in 
showing that the availability of a simple prototype plays a pivotal role. 
Turning back to the subgrouping condition, Experiment 2 showed an equally strong 
ingroup prototypicality-ingroup bias link as the subtyping condition. Because of these 
puzzling results in Experiment 2, the question of a second antagonistic process emerged. 
Distinctiveness threat was suggested as such a process that operates in parallel to the 
projection process. Experiment 3 emphasized the necessity to investigate this process. The 
hypothesis that distinctiveness threat or optimal distinctiveness may play a major role if 
variability and complexity of mental ingroup representations are manipulated was developed 
in the progress of the presented research. And in fact, Experiment 4 was successful in 
providing evidence that participants felt threatened after a diversity manipulation. This 
supports the interpretation in Experiment 2 and 3 although this reasoning is post-hoc and it is, 
thus, not possible to draw safe conclusions. Even though no support was found for the notion 
that a decrease in intergroup distance leads to distinctiveness threat, the creation of a threat 
scale in Experiment 4 can be conceived as a starting point for the analysis of threat processes. 
In conclusion, the inconsistency of the results concerning the high complexity and variability 
manipulations should be taken as a strength of this research in that it led to a successful 
integration of the research on variability and complexity of mental representations within the 
process of ingroup projection and the distinctiveness threat and optimal distinctiveness 
research. 
Despite the limitations discussed, the present line of research provided convincing 
evidence that variability and complexity of mental ingroup representations play a crucial role 
in ingroup projection and evaluation processes. In particular, Experiment 1, 2 and 4 provided 
convergent evidence that the extent to which the ingroup is perceived as complex versus 
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simple and variable versus homogeneous has an important impact on the usability of ingroup 
prototypicality as a criterion for group evaluations. 
7.3 Theoretical links to intergroup research 
As outlined in the theoretical part of this doctoral dissertation, variability and complexity 
of mental group representation have been a main topic in social psychology for more than two 
decades. Social cognition research considered variability of mental group representations 
mostly in the context of stereotyping. For example, taking estimates of stereotype-consistent 
and stereotype-inconsistent information as a measure of dispersion (Park & Judd, 1990), it has 
been demonstrated that providing stereotype-incongruent information changes the perceived 
variability of a category (Johnston & Hewstone, 1992; Weber & Crocker, 1983). Changing 
variability perceptions were considered as a vehicle of stereotype change as it impedes the 
overgeneralization of group attributes (i.e., “All Germans are efficient”, e.g., Richards & 
Hewstone, 2001). Recently, Ryan, Judd and Park (1996) demonstrated that the confidence in a 
judgment of an individual group member according to the stereotype decreases with 
increasing group variability. But changes in variability were not necessarily related to a 
change in the central tendency of a group and, thus, not to the valence of the stereotype 
(Garcia-Marques & Mackie, 1999; Paolini, Hewstone, Rubin, & Pay, 2004). 
In contrast, research on intergroup relations investigated the difference between 
perceived ingroup and outgroup variability and its relation to ingroup bias. Although the 
phenomenon of outgroup homogeneity has been understood as a “general rule” (e.g., Simon 
& Pettigrew, 1990), the research of the last 25 years provided rather mixed results with some 
results even pointing to an ingroup homogeneity effect. Concerning the relation between 
perceived variability and ingroup bias, some research emphasized that the perception of 
ingroup and outgroup variability is not connected to the phenomenon of ingroup favoritism 
(Judd & Park, 1988; Park & Rothbart, 1982). Other research suggested that “variability 
judgments can be used strategically as a way to make social identity more positive” (p. 1206, 
Rothgerber, 1997; see also Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002). Brewer (1993) 
concluded that the empirical evidence concerning the relation between variability and 
intergroup evaluations is rather ambiguous. 
This thesis brings together stereotype and intergroup research in proposing a model that 
specifies the theoretical relation between variability and intergroup evaluations. Relying on 
the notion that prototypes are only usable as a tool to judge members of a group to the extent 
that within group variance is rather low (e.g., Ryan et al., 1996), I argued that a prototype is 
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only usable as a judgmental standard in an intergroup context to the extent that variability and 
complexity of the mental representation is rather low. It was suggested that only ingroup 
representations of little variability and complexity serve as a prescriptive standard at the level 
of the superordinate category. A prescriptive standard allows for clear judgments and, 
therefore, ingroup prototypicality predicts ingroup bias. Support for this reasoning was 
provided in Experiment 1, 2 and 4. Thus, this thesis bridges the gap between social cognition 
research and intergroup research in providing a model that specifies how ingroup variability 
and complexity shape the intergroup evaluation process.  
The present work is clearly linked to the Cognitive Model of Ingroup Projection. The 
Cognitive Model of Ingroup Projection provided a reasonable framework to derive predictions 
about projection and evaluation processes but as the presented research was not aiming at 
explicitly testing the model, conclusions about the accuracy of the model can be made only to 
a very limited degree. However, the argument that prototype-based representations go hand in 
hand with limited variability and complexity of mental representations suggests that 
Experiment 3 in which relative ingroup prototypicality was a function of variability can be 
interpreted as support for the Cognitive Model of Ingroup Projection. In contrast, Experiment 
1, 2, and 4 did not yield such a main effect on relative ingroup prototypicality. Although 
Experiment 1, 2, and 4 cannot be interpreted as clearly supportive for the Cognitive Model of 
Ingroup Projection, they are not contradictive either. To the contrary, a moderation of ingroup 
prototypicality and ingroup bias by variability or complexity of mental ingroup representation 
might be an interesting theoretical complement to the Cognitive Model of Ingroup Projection. 
Future research should investigate how and to which extent prototype-based representations 
influence the ingroup prototypicality-ingroup bias link. Convergent evidence with the 
presently reported results would support the cognitive perspective on projection and 
intergroup evaluation.  
Obviously, the presented research is theoretically linked to the distinctiveness threat 
research. Distinctiveness threat was a post-hoc explanation for the puzzling results in 
Experiment 2 and 3 and Experiment 4 provided convincing evidence that diversity 
manipulations triggered threat. This is in line with research by Jetten et al. (1998) who 
suggested that intragroup variability was an unattended variable in the distinctiveness threat 
research and demonstrated that an increase in variability leads to more ingroup bias. Because I 
wanted to make conclusions about the process and to ensure that in fact threat triggers ingroup 
bias, a measurement instrument was developed in Experiment 4. This scale is certainly only a 
beginning and needs some refinement to increase internal consistency and external validity. 
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However, contrary to predictions of the distinctiveness threat research, intergroup distance 
was not related to threat. As the findings of the distinctiveness threat research are rather 
mixed concerning the effect of intergroup distance (Jetten et al., 2004) this result does not 
necessarily speak against the scale developed here. To the contrary, a distinctiveness threat 
scale might be helpful to investigate effects of intergroup distance and to clarify the interplay 
between within group variability and intergroup distance.  
The hypothesis that variability manipulations at the ingroup level trigger distinctiveness 
threat is clear cut and corresponds to the distinctiveness threat literature. Maybe not so self-
evident, but the notion of distinctiveness threat or the need for differentiation might also 
explain why diversity manipulations at the superordinate category level did not lead to a 
better intergroup evaluation either (see also Waldzus et al., 2003). Brewer (1993) argued that 
overly inclusive categories trigger the need for differentiation and, as a consequence, 
identification with lower order categories increases. In fact, Hornsey and Hogg (1999) 
demonstrated that the perception of inclusiveness of the superordinate category was related to 
more ingroup bias at the subgroup level. It is very likely that the manipulation of diversity at 
the superordinate category level implies a high level of inclusiveness and, thus, triggers 
differentiation needs which are related to ingroup bias (Brewer et al., 1993). In a nutshell, I 
argued that an increase in variability of mental representations of both ingroups and 
superordinate categories triggers threat. This suggests that whenever variability of mental 
representations is increased one should be aware of the possibility to cause negative side-
effects for the relation between ingroup and outgroup evaluation.  
Also closely related to this thesis is the tolerance model of Waldzus et al. (2003, 2005). 
The tolerance model suggests that variability of superordinate category representations 
influences the level of ingroup projection. In particular, it has been argued that for highly 
diverse superordinate categories the ingroup cannot claim prototypicality as strongly as for 
less diverse superordinate categories. In line with predictions, Waldzus et al. (2003, 2005) 
found evidence that the level of projection decreases with increased levels of superordinate 
category variability. In contrast, the present thesis focused on the ingroup representation. Two 
hypotheses were formulated. The hypothesis suggesting relative ingroup prototypicality to be 
a function of ingroup variability and complexity was supported in Experiment 3 whereas 
support for the second hypothesis that ingroup variability and complexity shape the ingroup 
prototypicality-ingroup bias link was found in Experiments 1, 2, and 4. However, according to 
the reasoning of the present thesis manipulating the superordinate category directly should 
also moderate this link. As already outlined, Waldzus et al. (2003, 2005) also argued that the 
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superordinate category prototype can only serve as a standard for subgroup judgment if it is 
characterized by low levels of variability. Nevertheless, Waldzus et al. (2003, 2005) did not 
report a moderation analysis. Although several questions concerning the effects of variability 
and complexity within the Ingroup Projection Model remain open, the results of the tolerance 
model and this thesis together illustrate that mental representations at each level of 
categorization can play a crucial role in the projection process. 
Another model related to variability and complexity of mental representations is the 
multiculturalism approach. Multiculturalism emphasizes the diversity of an inclusive category 
and stresses that each subgroup within the inclusive category is an asset to the whole. 
Evidence has been provided that priming of the multicultural ideology decreased ingroup 
favoritism (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Wolsko et al., 2000). Although the similarities 
between the approach of this thesis, the tolerance model and the multiculturalism approach 
are obvious in that they all focus on diversity, there exist some clear differences. While 
Waldzus’ tolerance model and the approach of this thesis induced different levels of 
variability and complexity of mental representations without valuing the one or the other, the 
multiculturalism approach does not intervene in the idiosyncratic representation but tries to 
enhance the appreciation of existing diversity. These two outcome variables might be even 
negatively related as suggested by Experiment 2. That is, increasing the complexity of the 
ingroup led to a decrease in the appreciation of diversity at the superordinate category level. 
Thus, the representation of diversity and the appreciation of diversity seem to be two distinct 
concepts which are related in a more complex manner than it appears at first glance.  
The social identity complexity approach by Roccas and Brewer (2002) needs to be 
mentioned when thinking about the relation between complexity and variability of mental 
representations and ingroup favoritism. However, this approach takes a clearly different 
perspective than the model of this doctoral thesis. It does not focus on the mental 
representation of groups but on the mental representation of the self. In particular, the focus is 
on the number of clearly distinguishable group memberships of an individual. A complex 
social identity refers to the perception that each ingroup an individual is a member of 
integrates different people and the self representation is the combined representation of all 
group identities. In contrast, a simple social identity is rather exclusive and integrates only 
people who share exactly the same category memberships. In terms of cross-cutting 
categories, a complex social identity would recognize all Whites and all Christians as being 
the ingroup whereas a simple social identity would only recognize White Christians as an 
ingroup. For complex social identities, two conditions need to be met: Firstly, people need to 
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be aware of multiple ingroup categorizations and, secondly, people need to realize that these 
multiple categories do not overlap completely. 
Though the concept of complexity is employed in different areas (i.e., the self versus the 
ingroup) there are some overlaps between the social identity complexity approach and the 
idea of this dissertation. Subgrouping of the ingroup implies the recognition of differences 
within the ingroup: Some ingroup members are similar to the self on multiple dimensions but 
most ingroup members are different from the self on multiple dimensions. Likewise, a 
complex social identity implies that most ingroup members are ingroup members with respect 
to one dimension of categorization but outgroup members with respect to other dimensions of 
categorization. However, it is a characteristic of a complex social identity to recognize all 
individuals who only share one dimension as belonging to the ingroup. Hence, complex social 
identities include the perception of ingroups as complex. Indeed, similar to the results of 
Experiment 1 and 2, simple social identities were related to less tolerance towards outgroups 
(Brewer & Pierce, 2005). Brewer (2005) also demonstrated that social identity complexity 
was related to less ingroup projection. In sum, social identity complexity is a promising 
approach with regard to intergroup relations. Nevertheless, many questions remain open. So 
far, social identity complexity has been measured but was never manipulated. It is not 
unlikely that manipulating social identity complexity beyond the idiosyncratic mental 
representation triggers threat or differentiation needs. The present thesis showed that threat 
should be kept in mind when forcing people to change mental representations in terms of 
variability and complexity.  
This thesis demonstrated that the reduction of complexity of mental ingroup 
representations strengthens the ingroup prototypicality-ingroup bias link and increases 
ingroup bias. Although different in reasoning and in the direction of impact, the presented 
research is in line with the tolerance model (Waldzus 2003, 2005), the multiculturalism 
approach (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Wolsko et al., 2000) and the social identity 
complexity approach (Brewer & Pierce, 2005; Roccas & Brewer, 2002) with regard to the 
notion that diversity and complexity are promising variables for the change of intergroup 
evaluations. However, from the empirical evidence presented here it must be concluded that 
the impairing impact of simple and homogeneous mental representations on intergroup 
evaluations is greater than the ameliorating effect of complex and variable mental 
representations on intergroup evaluations. The improvement of intergroup evaluations 
through variability and complexity seems to be a complicated task. I suggested that when 
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dealing with complex or variable mental representations the danger of counteracting effects of 
threat or differentiation needs should be kept in mind.  
7.4 Future research 
It was argued here that prototypicality perceptions, variability and complexity of group 
perceptions are strongly interwoven concepts. According to the Cognitive Model of Ingroup 
Projection, projection strongly depends on ingroup and outgroup representations in terms of 
prototypes and exemplars. The presented research relied on changes in complexity and 
variability to change the prototype-based representation of the ingroup and, therefore, the 
projection process. The complexity of mental ingroup representations was manipulated using 
subgrouping and subtyping procedures whereas variability of mental ingroup representations 
was manipulated using diversity and unity instructions of Waldzus et al. (2003, 2005). 
Apparently, these procedures were rather blatant. More subtle procedures might be promising. 
An understanding of a prototype-based representation of a social category as equivalent to the 
notion of stereotypes (Stangor, 2000) would open the door for methods which have been used 
successfully to change stereotypes. A convincing approach to manipulate variability 
perceptions is the presentation of stereotype-inconsistent information (Garcia-Marques & 
Mackie, 1999). Paolini et al. (2004) demonstrated that little pieces of stereotype-inconsistent 
information are already sufficient to change perceived variability. Although these procedures 
were employed to change the variability of outgroup stereotypes, they should be similarly 
efficient in changing the variability of ingroup stereotypes. Furthermore, this procedure also 
provides the opportunity to trigger less variability through subtyping. If inconsistent 
information is concentrated within a few individuals, subtyping is triggered which leads to the 
mental exclusion of these inconsistent instances and homogenizes the category representation 
(Johnston & Hewstone, 1992; Weber & Crocker, 1983). Thus, the distribution of inconsistent 
information across group members determines whether high or low variability is induced. 
These more subtle procedures might also circumvent the distinctiveness threat problem. 
This thesis only focused on positively valued contents. Similarly interesting might be to 
test if predictions would also be confirmed with negatively valued contents. The Cognitive 
Model of Ingroup Projection proposes that concerning negative contents it is the outgroup that 
is represented prototype-based. In this case, people should rely one the negative abstract 
mental representation of the outgroup in order to generate a mental representation of the 
superordinate category. If the negative outgroup representation is used to generate the 
superordinate category representation, outgroup and superordinate category representation are 
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automatically more similar than ingroup and superordinate category representation. 
Concerning negative contents, the relation between prototypicality and evaluation turns 
around such that the relatively more prototypical group is evaluated less positively. It would 
be interesting to replicate the findings of the present thesis with negative contents. In such an 
experiment, the negative contents of the ingroup and the outgroup should be emphasized 
before high versus low levels of complexity or variability are induced for the outgroup 
representation. As a mirror image of the processes regarding positive contents, it is expected 
that concerning negative contents the relation between outgroup prototypicality and ingroup 
bias are moderated by mental outgroup representations such that outgroup prototypicality is 
only positively related to ingroup bias if the outgroup representation is of little complexity 
and variability because only then the outgroup representation can serve as a standard at the 
level of the superordinate category. In addition, triggering high levels of complexity or 
variability of the outgroup representation might have the advantage that distinctiveness threat 
is not triggered simultaneously as the ingroup is not affected so that no negative side-effects 
of variability and complexity are to be expected.  
Considering the manipulation of positive ingroup representations and negative outgroup 
representations suggests considering also the other two cells of the valence by target group 
matrix, namely the negative ingroup representations and the positive outgroup 
representations. From the empirical evidence provided here, I suggest, however, that a change 
of negative ingroup representations and positive outgroup representations would be less 
effective in changing the prototypicality-ingroup bias link. According to the Cognitive Model 
of Ingroup Projection, projection tendencies for negative ingroup representations and positive 
outgroup representations are rather low. Furthermore, the results of this thesis converged in 
that three out of four times variability of ingroup representations did not affect the magnitude 
of relative ingroup prototypicality. According to the argument put forward in this thesis, 
ingroup variability is projected onto the superordinate category just like individual ingroup 
features and, thus, influences the usability of the superordinate category prototype as a 
prescriptive standard. As a certain amount of projection seems necessary to transfer variability 
information onto the superordinate category and the magnitude of projection is hardly 
increased by variability manipulations it seems not very promising to modify negative 
ingroup representations and positive outgroup representations to change projection and 
evaluation processes. 
Of capital importance would be the investigation of the underlying processes of the 
moderation found in Experiments 1, 2, and 4. It has been argued that variability and 
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complexity of mental representation might be stored in an abstract manner (Judd & Park, 
1988). I reasoned that variability or complexity information of the ingroup is projected onto 
the superordinate category as an abstract piece of information. Support for this notion comes 
from Experiment 4 where ingroup variability manipulations affected the perceived variability 
of the superordinate category. I argued that the abstract variability information determines the 
usability of the superordinate category prototype as a prescriptive standard. The moderation 
hypothesis put forward here was derived from this theoretical argument. However, other 
processes would produce similar results. People might rely on variability or complexity 
information in order to determine the reliability or the diagnosticity of the prototypicality 
judgment. As in statistics, information is reliable to the extent that deviation is rather low. 
Support for this reasoning derives again from the stereotype literature. People use category 
information (i.e., stereotypes) only if there is not too much dispersion (Ford & Stangor, 1992). 
Furthermore, although people indicate that a group possesses a certain trait, this trait 
information is used to a stronger extent for further judgments when group variability is rather 
low (Park & Hastie, 1987). Likewise, Park et al. (1991) argued that highly variable group 
representations do not provide diagnostic information. Thus, people indicate mean judgments 
for a group if asked for it but they refuse to use the mean information as a reliable 
information basis for any further judgment under the condition of high group variability. With 
regard to the question of the present thesis, this notion would suggest that participants do 
indicate that their ingroup is more prototypical of the superordinate category than the 
outgroup. However, ingroup prototypicality serves as reliable information only if the ingroup 
is perceived as simple and homogeneous. Thus, only in this case prototypicality is diagnostic 
and, therefore, a predictor of intergroup evaluations. 
In sum, two processes (i.e., the usability of the superordinate category prototype as a 
standard and the reliability of the ingroup prototypicality information) would both explain the 
results of Experiment 1, 2 and 4. The hypothesis that the usability of the superordinate 
category prototype as a standard is affected by ingroup variability and complexity 
manipulations could be tested by investigating if variability or complexity manipulations at 
the superordinate category level also moderate the ingroup prototypicality-ingroup bias link in 
the same way as variability and complexity manipulations at the ingroup level. In Experiment 
3 the mental representation of the superordinate category in terms of unity and diversity was 
manipulated and no moderation occurred. However, in this experiment a moderation by 
ingroup complexity did not occur either. A reanalysis of the data of Waldzus et al. (2003, 
2005) might provide further insight.  
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A direct test of the hypothesis that variability or complexity manipulations of mental 
ingroup representations affect the reliability of the ingroup prototypicality information 
appears more difficult. Similarly to a procedure of Ryan et al. (1996) who directly asked 
participants to indicate how confident they were in their trait judgments, one might ask 
participants directly about how much they rely on the judgment that the ingroup is more 
prototypical of the superordinate category than the outgroup. If it is in fact the reliability of 
the prototypicality judgment that caused the effects, the confidence in prototypicality 
judgments should moderate the ingroup prototypicality-ingroup bias link. However, next to 
this rather blatant procedure, more subtle procedures should be developed to measure or even 
manipulate confidence or reliability of prototypicality judgments. 
The role of intergroup distance for prototypicality perceptions also needs further 
consideration. It has been argued (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999) and demonstrated (Waldzus 
et al., 2003) that intergroup distance is related to prototypicality perceptions. It was not 
possible to replicate this relation in Experiment 4 although the manipulation check showed 
that the manipulation had the intended effect. Although it has been argued here and elsewhere 
(Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999) that an increase of intergroup distance should go hand in 
hand with an increase of relative ingroup prototypicality, this is not an inevitable relation. 
Theoretically, the distance between ingroup and outgroup can increase while the relative 
distance from the superordinate category prototype is maintained. Even though the magnitude 
of ingroup prototypicality was not affected by intergroup distance manipulations, Experiment 
4 has shown that intergroup distance was an important factor for the strength of the relation 
between ingroup prototypicality and ingroup bias. That is, the strength of the relation between 
ingroup prototypicality and ingroup bias only varied with the variability of the mental ingroup 
representation if the intergroup distance was low. This suggests that high intergroup distance 
repairs either the usability of the standard or the reliability of the information concerning 
ingroup prototypicality. One possible explanation might be derived from research by Crisp 
(2005). Crisp provided evidence that manipulations of intercategory distance also affect 
intracategory differentiation such that more intercategory distance led to more homogeneity 
within categories. Higher intercategory distance also facilitated stereotype-accessibility. Both 
of these processes might have influenced the effects in Experiment 4 such that an increase in 
intergroup distance homogenized the category representation and made ingroup prototypes 
more accessible. The intergroup distance manipulation might, thus, overpower diversity 
manipulations. Clearly, the result concerning intergroup distance needs some replication and 
further theoretical considerations. 
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7.5 Conclusion 
The current research addressed the question how variability and complexity of mental 
ingroup representations shape the projection and evaluation process. Although only three 
experiments converged such that the relation of ingroup prototypicality and ingroup bias was 
moderated by the variability or complexity of mental ingroup representation whereas one 
experiment provided evidence for a main effect of ingroup variability on ingroup projection, 
all experiments demonstrated that mental ingroup representations should carefully be 
considered when investigating intergroup processes.  
In the progress of this research, the hypothesis emerged that distinctiveness threat or 
differentiation needs are crucial variables when variability and complexity of mental 
representations are manipulated. Experiment 4 provided evidence for this notion. In several 
approaches, complexity or variability of mental representations were used as promising 
variables to change intergroup evaluation and to promote tolerance (Brewer & Pierce, 2005; 
Waldzus et al., 2003, 2005; Wolsko et al., 2000). However, when increasing variability or 
complexity one should be aware of the risk to trigger distinctiveness threat or differentiation 
needs which work against the enhancement of intergroup relations.  
This project is a first successful step in demonstrating the relevance of mental ingroup 
representations for projection and evaluation processes. Apparently, next steps should be 
taken to come to more definite conclusions. I outlined that two processes could explain the 
results of three experiments. It could be assumed that superordinate category standards are not 
usable for judgmental decisions if they are complex or variable. But it is similarly conceivable 
that increasing variability and complexity diminish the reliability of ingroup information. 
Similarly important from my perspective is the search for manipulation procedures that 
prevent threat or differentiation needs from occurring when variability or complexity are 
increased. While answering some questions, new urgent questions emerge. Nevertheless, this 
doctoral dissertation contributed to the existing research in the field of intergroup relations in 
that it emphasized mental ingroup representations as an important factor in ingroup projection 
and, more generally, in intergroup evaluations. 
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Summary 
This doctoral thesis is concerned with changes in intergroup evaluation processes. In 
focusing on the ingroup instead of the outgroup it takes a new perspective. The theoretical 
basis is the Ingroup Projection Model (Mummendey & Wenzel, 2003) with its proposition 
that people project ingroup features onto a superordinate category (encompassing both 
ingroup and outgroup) in order to be more prototypical of the superordinate category which 
leads to a better evaluation of the ingroup relative to the outgroup. Recently it has been 
proposed that the mode of mental ingroup representations is crucial for projection to occur 
(Meiser et al., 2005). In particular, it has been suggested that ingroup features are projected to 
the extent that they are represented in a well defined prototype. Relying on the cognitive 
perspective, the present research focuses on changes of the ingroup prototype in order to 
change projection and evaluation processes. This is a rather new approach in efforts to change 
intergroup evaluations as most approaches focus on the representation of either outgroups or 
superordinate categories (Gaertner et al., 1989; Garcia-Marques & Mackie, 1999; 
Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999).  
Prototypes serve as tools to simplify the complex environment (Sherman et al., 2000). 
Prototypes need to be simple and of little variability to fulfill this function. Changing 
complexity and variability of prototypes should interfere with their function to simplify the 
complex environment. Thus, changing prototypes should change processes which are based 
on the use of prototypes. Relying on the proposition that ingroup features are projected to the 
extent that they are represented prototype-based, complexity and variability manipulations 
should weaken projection tendencies. In contrast, homogenizing the prototype should 
strengthen projection tendencies.  
A second hypothesis was suggested. It has been suggested that variability information 
can be represented as an abstract piece of information like any other category information 
(Judd & Park, 1988). Thus, it is conceivable that variability and complexity information of the 
ingroup is projected onto the superordinate category like any other ingroup feature. I assumed 
that the projected variability and complexity information influence the usability of the 
prototype of the superordinate category (see also Hogg et al., 1993). The extent to which the 
superordinate category prototype serves as an evaluative standard should specify in how far 
ingroup prototypicality is the basis of better evaluation of the ingroup relative to the outgroup. 
This means that variability and complexity of the ingroup determine the extent to which 
ingroup prototypicality predicts ingroup bias.  
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One experiment (Experiment 3) supported the first hypothesis in providing evidence that 
projection tendencies increased after inducing ingroup representations of low variability as 
opposed to high variability. Converging evidence for the second hypothesis was found in 
three experiments (Experiment 1, 2 and 4). More specifically, ingroup prototypicality was a 
strong predictor of ingroup bias when the ingroup was of little complexity and variability. 
However, the induction of highly complex and variable ingroup representation yielded 
unexpected results. In particular, more complex ingroup representations did either not differ 
from a control condition (Experiment 1) or were similar to the low complexity condition 
(Experiment 2). These interesting results made it necessary to investigate the underlying 
process that was triggered by complexity and variability manipulations. In line with 
distinctiveness threat research (Jetten & Spears, 2003), I hypothesized that complexity and 
variability of the ingroup trigger threat and thereby foster ingroup bias. This hypothesis was 
explicitly investigated in Experiment 4. In line with the hypothesis, manipulations of ingroup 
variability led to more perceived threat and threat predicted ingroup bias.  
In sum, the results of four experiments clearly support the notion that mental ingroup 
representations are crucial in ingroup projection and evaluation processes. In line with several 
other approaches (Brewer & Pierce, 2005; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Roccas & Brewer, 
2002; Waldzus 2003, 2005; Wolsko et al., 2000) this thesis emphasizes the potential of 
diversity and complexity as promising variables for the change of intergroup evaluations. 
However, the present thesis suggests that one should carefully consider the possibility of 
threat being triggered when complexity and variability are induced. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Die vorliegende Arbeit befasst sich mit der Veränderung von Bewertungsprozessen im 
Intergruppenkontext. Dabei stellt die Eigengruppe im Gegensatz zur Fremdgruppe den 
Schwerpunkt dieser Dissertation dar. Somit wird hier eine neuartige Perspektive der 
Intergruppenforschung eingenommen. Die theoretische Grundlage bildet das 
Eigengruppenprojektionsmodell (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999), welches annimmt, dass 
Eigengruppen die Merkmale und Charakteristiken der eigenen Gruppe auf eine übergeordnete 
Kategorie projizieren, der Eigengruppe und Fremdgruppe angehören. Durch diese Projektion 
der Eigengruppenmerkmale ist die Eigengruppe prototypischer für die übergeordnete 
Kategorie als die Fremdgruppe. Da der Prototyp der übergeordneten Kategorie als 
Bewertungsstandard dient, folgt aus der höheren Eigengruppen-Prototypikalität eine bessere 
Bewertung der Eigengruppe relativ zur Fremdgruppe. Meiser et al. (2005) stellen der eher 
motivationalen Sichtweise des Eigengruppenprojektionsmodells eine kognitive Sichtweise 
gegenüber. Der kognitive Ansatz nimmt an, dass Merkmale der Eigengruppe in dem Maße auf 
die übergeordnete Kategorie projiziert werden in dem sie prototyp-basiert repräsentiert sind. 
Basierend auf der kognitiven Sichtweise untersucht die vorliegende Arbeit, inwiefern 
Veränderungen der prototyp-basierten Repräsentation der Eigengruppe zu Veränderungen im 
Projektions- und Bewertungsprozess führen. Dieser Ansatz hebt sich ab von den meisten 
Modelle der Intergruppenforschung, die zur Veränderungen von Intergruppen-Bewertungen 
auf die Repräsentation der Fremdgruppe oder der übergeordneten Kategorie zielen (Gaertner 
et al., 1989; Garcia-Marques & Mackie, 1999; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999).  
Prototypen erleichtern die Orientierung in einer komplexen Umwelt (Sherman et al., 
2000). Um diese Funktion zu erfüllen müssen sie notwendigerweise wenig komplex und 
variabel sein. Folglich sollten Veränderungen der Komplexität und Variabilität von 
Prototypen mit deren Funktion interferieren. Unter der Annahme, dass 
Eigengruppenmerkmale in dem Maße auf eine übergeordnete Kategorie projiziert werden in 
dem sie prototyp-basiert repräsentiert sind, sollten Veränderungen der prototyp-basierten 
Eigengruppen-Repräsentation zu Veränderungen im Projektionsprozess führen. Im Einzelnen 
wird erwartet, dass komplexere und variablere Eigengruppen-Repräsentationen zu weniger 
Projektion führen wohingegen die homogenisierte und vereinfachte Eigengruppen-
Repräsentation zu mehr Projektion führt. 
Des Weiteren wurde die Hypothese aufgestellt, dass die Beziehung von Eigengruppen-
Prototypikalität und Eigengruppenfavorisierung durch die Repräsentation der Eigengruppe 
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beeinflusst wird. Judd und Park (1988) nehmen an, dass Informationen bezüglich der 
Variabilität von Gruppen wie jede andere Information prototyp-basiert repräsentiert sein kann. 
Folglich ist denkbar, dass Variabilitätsinformation auf die übergeordnete Kategorie projiziert 
wird. Hier wurde angenommen, dass die projizierte Variabilitätsinformation die Nutzbarkeit 
des Prototypen der übergeordneten Kategorie verändert (siehe auch Hogg et al., 1993). Das 
Ausmaß in dem der Prototyp der übergeordneten Kategorie als Bewertungsstandard genutzt 
werden kann, sollte determinieren inwieweit die wahrgenommene Prototypikalität der 
Eigengruppe ein Kriterium für die bessere Bewertung der Eigengruppe relativ zur 
Fremdgruppe ist. Entsprechend der Annahmen sollte die Variabilität und Komplexität der 
Eigengruppe die Höhe des Zusammenhangs zwischen Eigengruppen-Prototypikalität und 
Eigengruppenfavorisierung vorhersagen.  
Experiment 3 bestätigte die Hypothese, dass Eigengruppen-Prototypikalität eine 
Funktion der Variabilität der Eigengruppen-Repräsentation ist. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass 
mit einer eingeschränkten Variabilität der Eigengruppe ein Anstieg der wahrgenommenen 
Eigengruppen-Prototypikalität einhergeht. Die Experimente 1, 2 und 4 hingegen stützen die 
Hypothese, dass Variabilität und Komplexität der Eigengruppe die Höhe des Zusammenhangs 
zwischen Eigengruppen-Prototypikalität und Eigengruppenfavorisierung vorhersagen. 
Zusammengenommen zeigen die Ergebnisse, dass Eigengruppen-Prototypikalität ein guter 
Prädiktor für Eigengruppenfavorisierung ist, wenn die mentale Repräsentation der 
Eigengruppe durch geringe Variabilität und Komplexität geprägt ist. Hingegen waren die 
Ergebnisse bezüglich der Bedingungen mit hoher Variabilität und Komplexität zunächst 
unerwartet. In Experiment 1 glich die Bedingung hoher Komplexität der Kontrollbedingung, 
in Experiment 2 zeigen die Bedingungen hoher und niedriger Komplexität ähnliche 
Ergebnisse. Diese zunächst unerwarteten Ergebnisse machten es notwendig, die durch 
Komplexitätsmanipulationen ausgelösten Prozesse genauer zu untersuchen. In 
Übereinstimmung mit der Forschung zu „distinctiveness threat“ (Jetten & Spears, 2003) 
wurde hier angenommen, dass Komplexität und Variabilität der Eigengruppenrepräsentation 
die Distinktheit der Eigengruppe bedroht und dadurch die Favorisierung der Eigengruppe 
fördert. Diese Hypothese wurde explizit in Experiment 4 untersucht. In Übereinstimmung mit 
der Hypothese führte die Erhöhung der Variabilität der Eigengruppenrepräsentation zu einem 
größeren Gefühl der Bedrohung. Hypothesenkonform war das Gefühl der Bedrohung ein 
Prädiktor für Eigengruppenfavorisierung. 
Zusammengenommen zeigen die vier Experimente der vorliegenden Dissertation, dass 
die mentale Repräsentation der Eigengruppe für Projektions- und Bewertungsprozesse im 
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Intergruppenkontext bedeutsam ist. In Übereinstimmung mit anderen Ansätzen der 
Intergruppenforschung (Brewer & Pierce, 2005; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Roccas & 
Brewer, 2002; Waldzus 2003, 2005; Wolsko et al., 2000) konnte hier gezeigt werden, dass 
Variabilität und Komplexität vielversprechende Variablen bei der Veränderung von 
Intergruppenbewertungen darstellen. Allerdings konnte ebenfalls gezeigt werden, dass 
Variabilität und Komplexität die Gefahr bergen, die Distinktheit von Gruppen zu gefährden 
und somit die Favorisierung der Eigengruppe erneut auszulösen. 
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Appendix 
Personal Need for Structure Scale – original version (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993) 
 
1 It upsets me to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect 
from it. 
2 I’m not bothered by things that interrupt my daily routine (reversed). 
3 I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life. 
4 I like to have a place for everything and everything in its place. 
5 I enjoy being spontaneous (reversed). 
6 I find that a well-ordered life with regular hours makes my life tedious 
(reversed). 
7 I don’t like situations that are uncertain. 
8 I hate to change my plans at the last minute. 
9 I hate to be with people who are unpredictable. 
10 I find that a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more. 
11 I enjoy the exhilaration of being in unpredictable situations (reversed). 
12 I become uncomfortable when the rules in a situation are unclear.  
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Personal Need for Structure Scale – German version (Machunsky & Meiser, in press) 
 
1 Es bringt mich aus der Fassung, wenn ich in eine Situation komme ohne zu 
wissen, was mich zu erwarten hat. 
2 Es stört mich nicht, wenn mich Dinge aus meiner täglichen Routine bringen 
(reversed). 
3 Es gefällt mir, wenn ich ein klares und strukturiertes Leben habe. 
4 Ich mag es, wenn alles seinen Platz hat und alles an seinem Platz ist. 
5 Ich genieße es, spontan zu sein (reversed). 
6 Ich finde, dass ein wohlgeordnetes Leben mit regelmäßigen Abläufen 
langweilig ist (reversed). 
7 Ich mag unklare Situationen nicht. 
8 Ich hasse es, meine Pläne in der letzten Minute zu ändern. 
9 Ich bin ungern mit Leuten zusammen, deren Verhalten nicht vorhersehbar ist. 
10 Ich finde, dass eine gewisse Routine es mir ermöglicht, mein Leben mehr zu 
genießen. 
11 Ich genieße die Herausforderung, mich in unvorhersehbaren Situationen zu 
befinden. (reversed). 
12 Ich fühle mich unwohl, wenn die Regeln in einer Situation unklar sind. 
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Diversity Beliefs Scale in Experiment 2 – English version 
 
1 I believe that work groups with members from different disciplines are very 
productive. 
2 I am sure that creativity of scientific work groups is a question of 
multidisciplinarity. 
3 I would favor working in a workgroup with only scientists of my own subject 
(reversed). 
4 Diversity is an enrichment in all respects. 
5 I think that scientific workgroups with very different members have high 
productivity losses (reversed). 
6 I believe that very heterogeneous work groups waste too much time with 
getting ideas across (reversed). 
7 The different scientific disciplines can learn a lot from each other. 
8 Only looking at scientific results from different professional perspectives makes 
sense. 
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Diversity Beliefs Scale in Experiment 2 – German version 
 
1 Ich glaube, dass Arbeitsgruppen, denen Wissenschaftler aus verschiedenen 
Fachrichtungen angehören, sehr produktiv sind. 
2 Ich bin davon überzeugt, dass Kreativität von wissenschaftlichen Arbeitsgruppen 
eine Frage von Interdisziplinarität ist.  
3 Ich würde es bevorzugen, in einer Arbeitsgruppe zu arbeiten, in der 
ausschließlich Wissenschaftler meines Fachgebietes arbeiten (reversed). 
4 Vielfältigkeit halte ich in jeglicher Hinsicht für eine große Bereicherung. 
5 Ich denke, dass wissenschaftliche Arbeitsgruppen mit sehr unterschiedlichen 
Mitgliedern hohe Produktivitätsverluste haben (reversed). 
6 Ich glaube, dass sehr heterogene Arbeitsgruppen einfach zu viel Zeit damit 
verschwenden, sich den anderen verständlich zu machen (reversed). 
7 Die verschiedenen wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen können eine Menge 
voneinander lernen. 
8 Erst unter verschiedenen fachlichen Perspektiven machen wissenschaftliche 
Erkenntnisse wirklich Sinn. 
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Distinctiveness Threat Scale in Experiment 4 – English version 
 
1 I am worried that Germany loses its particularities through the European 
unification. 
2 If it was up to me, all countries of Europe should give up their specific features 
as soon as possible (reversed).  
3 I think it is good that Germany and other European countries clearly differ from 
each other. 
4 I am relieved when I see that Germany is keeping its idiosyncrasy despite the 
European unification.  
5 In my opinion, Germany and the other European countries should take common 
positions inwards as well as outwards, preferably at all times (reversed). 
6 I am scared because the European Union withdraws the individual member 
states’ identities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 145
 
Distinctiveness Threat Scale in Experiment 4 – German version 
 
1 Ich bin besorgt, dass Deutschland durch den europäischen Einigungsprozess seine 
Besonderheiten verliert. 
2 Wenn es nach mir ginge, sollten alle Länder Europas so schnell wie möglich ihre 
jeweiligen spezifischen Eigenheiten aufgeben (reversed). 
3 Ich finde es gut, dass Deutschland und andere europäische Länder sich deutlich 
voneinander unterscheiden.  
4 Es beruhigt mich, wenn ich sehe, dass Deutschland seine Eigenheiten trotz des 
europäischen Einigungsprozesses wahrt. 
5 Meiner Meinung nach sollten Deutschland und die anderen europäischen Länder 
nach innen wie nach außen möglichst immer gemeinsame Positionen vertreten 
(reversed).  
6 Es macht mir Angst, dass die europäische Union den einzelnen Mitgliedsstaaten die 
Identität nimmt. 
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